From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws by McAnaney, Kathleen G. et al.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 4 Article 10
6-1-1999




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathleen G. McAnaney, Laura A. Curliss & C.E. Abeyta-Price, From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev.
819 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol68/iss4/10
From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws
I. INTRODUCTION ............................ 821
II. "STALKERS:" PERSONALITY PROFILES, CORRELATES OF
VIOLENCE, PROSPECTS FOR TREATMENT, AND THE
IMPACT OF STALKING ON THE VICTIM ............... 831
A. "Stalker" Profiles ........................ 832
1. Erotomania and de Clrambault's Syndrome . 832
2. "Borderline Erotomania" ................. 835
3. "Former Intimate" Stalkers ................. 838
4. Sociopathic Stalkers .................. 842
B. Correlates of Violence ...................... 843
1. Psychobiologic Correlates .................. 844
2. Environmental Correlates .................. 845
3. Intrapsychic Correlates ................... 846
4. Psychiatric Correlates ................. 848
C. The Impact of Stalking on the Victim .............. 850
D. Prospects for Treatment .................... 853
1. Erotomania and de Cl6rambault's Syndrome 853
2. "Borderline Erotomania" . ................ 855
3. "Former Intimate" Stalkers ................. 856
4. Sociopathic Stalkers ...................... 858
E. Conclusion ............................ 859
III. A HISTORY OF MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW AND
STALKING BEHAVIORS . ....................... 862
A. Criminal Law and Stalking Behaviors ............. 862
1. Offenses Against the Peace:
Threatening Letters .................... 863
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
2. Offenses Against the Person: Criminal
Menacing, "Lyeing in Waite,"
and Attempt Laws .................. 865
3. A Remedy for Preventing a Breach of the
Peace: Surety of the Peace ............... 868
B. Civil Law and Stalking Behaviors ................. 875
1. Injunctions ... .................... 875
2. Tort Remedies ...................... 878
IV. ANTI-STALKING LAWS: AN ANALYSIS .............. 882
A. Laws Used Before 1990 to Prevent Stalking Behaviors . . 882
B. Anti-Stalking Laws ........................ 891




d. Course of Conduct
e. Harm to the Victim
f. Credible Threat
2. Constitutionality of the "Course of Conduct"
Requirement ...................... 897
3. Grading of Offenses .................. 900
a. Stalking in Violation of Court Orders
or Domestice Violence Laws
b. Subsequent Violations
4. Provision for Mental Evaluation
and Treatment .................... 902
5. Other Significant Differences Between
the Statutes ....................... 903
a. Procedural
b. Substantive




On July 18, 1989, Rebecca Schaeffer, a star on the television
show "My Sister Sam," was murdered at her Los Angeles apart-
ment by an obsessed fan who had pursued her for two years.' In
Connecticut, Margaret Ray repeatedly has appeared at David
Letterman's home, sometimes claiming to be his wife.2 Both of
these high-profile cases have helped direct the attention' of the
media and of state legislatures to a problem that more often af-
fects the ordinary citizen--usually a woman-than a public fig-
ure: "stalking." Typically, states define stalking as wilfully,4 mali-
5ciously, and repeatedly following and harassing -another person..
Stalkers can be obsessed fans,6 divorced or separated spouses,7 ex-
1 DARRELL DAWSEY & ERIC MALNIC, Acmsss REBEcCA ScmauRi FATALLY SHOT AT
APARTMEmT, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1989, at 1; see also Maria Harper, Personalities, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 1991, at B3 (for almost a year, her murderer, Robert Bardo, had sent
Schacffer gifts and telephoned her); Eric Malnic, Man Who Killed T.V. Actress Gets Life
Without Parole LA. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at 3B (Bardo followed Schaeffer for nearly two
years, hired a detective to get her address, who obtained it through the California De-
paitment of Motor Vehicles, and repeatedly sent her letters); Rick Ratliff, Computer Misuse
Puts Snoopers into Private Lives, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 30, 1992, at 9 (Bardo had gathered
information about Schaeffer's personal life using an on-line database).
2 MARIA PUENTE, LEGiS.ATORS TACKNG THE TERROR OF STALKING: BUT SOME EXPERTS
SAY MEASURES ARE VAGUE, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A (also reporting that Johnny
Carson, Olivia Newton-John, and Michael J. Fox have been stalked, as was John Lennon);
see also Marvine Howe, ChronidA N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at B24 (Mr. Letterman's
"stalker," Margaret Ray, went to his residence seven times and, on one occasion, broke
into his house and stole his car.).
3 COOPFRATAE AGREEMENT TO DEVELOP MODEL STATE ANTI-STALKiNG LAW, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, DEC. 23, 1992, AVAILABLE jN LEXIS, NExis LIBRARY, WIRES FILE [HEREINAFTER
COOPERATVE AGREEMENT] (-[T]HE VAST MAJORITY OF STALKERS PREY ON ORDINARY CIrIZENS,"
STATED NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE SPOKESMAN CHARLES B. DEWITr.); ANTI-STALraNG
LEGATION: H&IGs ON & 2922 BEUORE THE SENATE COMm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D
CONG., 2D SESS. (1992) (PREPARED STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES TESEI ,G AT THIS SEPT. 29,
1992 HEARING ARE AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION FROM THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEEE'S
DOCUMENTS CLERK) [HEREiNAFrER HEAIaS] ("DozENs OF WOMEN AND MEN TOLD US
ABOUT THEIR ENCOUNTERS WITH STALKERs.") (STATEMENT OF REP. BULLARD).
4 THOUGH SEVERAL STATES UTI.ZE 'WILFULLY" TO DESIGNATE THE CUPABILITY REQUIRE-
MENT OF STALKING BEHAVIOR, ITS USE CAN BE PROBLEMATIC. SEE MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02, cmL 10 n.47 (1985), for a discussion between Judge Learned Hand and Herbert
Wechsler about the inadequacy of the word wilfully. ("It's an awful wordl It is one of the
most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged,
'wilful' would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.").
5 COOPERATIVE AGREEMEVT, SUPRA NOTE 3; SEE ALSO NATRA NOTE 28.
6 JOSH MEYER, MAN HELD R , STALKING OF POP SINGER JANET JACCSON, L.A. TIMES (Val-
ley ed.), June 25, 1992, at 3B (man claiming to be Jackson's husband charged with stalk-
ing after making threats and attempting to gain entry to her home); Milwaukee Man
Charged with Threatening Johnny Carson, LA.. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1989, at I (man who had
1993]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
lovers,8  rejected suitors,' neighbors,"0  co-workers,11
classmates,12  gang members,"3  former employees,14  disgruntled
threatened to kill Johnny Carson unless paid $5 million charged with making terrorist
threats and with sending threatening letters).
7 SEE, E.G., LINDA MAE CARISTONE, EVERY DAY MAY BE My LAs, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13,
1992, at 3 (woman and her four-year-old son have been "followed, watched, phoned and
threatened" by her ex-husband); James Hill, First Stalking Charge Filed in Lake County, CHI.
TRIB., July 30, 1992, at 2 (husband arrested after he repeatedly threatened wife and visit-
ed house with video camera in hopes of gathering evidence for divorce proceeding);
Janita Poe & Karen Brandon, A Bloody Rampage in Zion, CHI. TralB., Mar. 8, 1993, at 1
(despite the imposition of a restraining order and 11 calls to police by the ex-wife dur-
ing the year prior to the killings, a father/ex-husband murdered two of his children and
wounded five other people, including his ex-wife).
8 MICHAEL CONNELLY, EX-BOYFRIEND JAILED UNDER 'SrALKING LAW,' LA. TiMEs, June
10, 1991, at B (woman filed 13 reports with police about ex-boyfriend who had slashed
her car tires, stolen her dog, and poured acid on her car, all while a restraining order
was in effect); Ardy Friedberg, "I'll Never Let You Go;" Elderly Man May Be First Charged
Under Florida Stalking Law, HOUSTON CHRON., July 12, 1992, at B16 (66-year-old man
charged with stalking a 75-year-old widow, his girlfriend for 17 years, after he repeatedly
showed up at her residence and called her numerous times each day); Brenda Camp
Yarbrough, Man Pleads Guilty in Stalking Georgia Woman: One of Tennessee's First Prosecutions,
ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 14, 1993, at C2 (man plead guilty to stalking ex-girlfriend).
9 N.R. KLEiN-ELD, EX-NEW YoRK JUDGE PLADs GuiLT AND DE-ArLs PLOT, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 1993, at Al. Though former-Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals, Sol
Wachtler, was not indicted for stalking, he confessed to carrying out a 13 month long
campaign of fear aimed at his former lover, Joy Silverman. Wachtler stated that his cam-
paign was designed to "cause[] Ms. Silverman to seek my help and protection." Id. Dur-
ing his campaign, he made several threatening telephone calls using a voice-altering de-
vice, sent letters to Silverman under the forged name of David Samson, a friend of
Silverman, and sent a letter containing a condom to Silverman's daughter, again forging
Samson's signature. Wachtler even threatened to kidnap Silverman's daughter. Wachtler
was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. See also Jennifer Lenhart, Valentine Memory: Elmhurst
Lights Candles to Young Couple Slain by Stalker, CHI. TRIB. (Du Page ed.), Feb. 15, 1993, at
1 (couple slain by man who had dated the female victim a few times, had become ob-
sessed with her, and then followed her).
10 DEE NORTON, FmRST CFLARGE FLED UNDER NEw AwJI-STA.KING LAW, SEATrLE TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1992, at B (man telephoned neighbors at work, sent them flowers, and shout-
ed death threats).
11 DONNA HALVORSEN, SENA7E PANEL WILt. DEBAT STALKiNG BILL, Bur CRIME IS DI-
CULT TO DEFINR, BACRS SAY, STAR TRIB., Jan. 28, 1993, at lB (woman killed by co-worker
after he repeatedly came to her home uninvited and made threatening phone calls to
her).
12 BoY, 12, AccusED As STALKr N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at B21 (seventh grader
charged with violating Florida's anti-stalking law after leaving threatening notes in a
classmate's locker; the notes indicated that the boy had been following his victim).
13 Two WoMEv CH-ARGED UNDER STALKING LAw, CHI. TRIB. (North ed.), Jan. 22, 1993,
at 3 (two women charged with aggravated stalking after following the victim and threat-
ening to have her killed by fellow gang members); see also the discussion infra note 302
and accompanying text regarding tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.
14 CONSTANCE SOMMER, SENATOR, WFE KNow AWFUL LOT ABour STALmRS, LA. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1993, at A5 (pilot who worked for senator during 1984 campaign harassed
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defendants,"5  as well as complete strangers.16  Two hundred
thousand people in the United States are estimated to be stalking
someone.
17
In 1989, not only was Rebecca Schaeffer killed by a "stalker,"
but in Orange County, -California, five women, all of whom ob-
tained restraining orders against former spouses or boyfriends due
to harassment, were also killed by their harassers." Before 1990,
protective orders were the main defense against stalking behavior,
but these often prove ineffective. 9 This ineffectiveness, combined
with the absence of adequate legal grounds permitting the police
to intervene before a stalker causes serious bodily harm,20
senator's family for eight years through obscene phone calls in the middle of the night,
threatening letters in the mailbox, and incessant ringing of the doorbell); Marc Carey,
Police Say Tennis Pro Had Plans of Slavey, TIMES UNION (Three Star ed.), Apr. 28, 1993, at
BI, available in WESTLAW, Dialog, Papers File (Sixteen year old girl stalked by her for-
mer tennis instructor. The girl's parents had fired the instructor because he was obsessed
with their daughter. The instructor shot himself after attempting to abduct the girl. Po-
lice say he also stalked other children. The police found surveillance equipment and
pornographic materials on the instructor's premises.).
15 THE JUDGE AS VcTIM: SmE T.Lls HER STORY To PusH ANT-STALmING Bf.4 STAR
TRr., Feb. 20, 1993, at IA (judge in Minnesota suspects that a man she sentenced in
1984 is guilty of slashing her tires eight times, spray-painting her house twice, and leaving
mutilated animals on her porch); see also judge Wants Staling Law, NAT'L UJ., Mar. 8,
1993, at 6.
16 HEARNGS, SUPRA NOTE 3 (PREPARED STATEMENT OF M. JANE MCALUSTER WHO, AF-
TER A CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH A MAN IN 1981, WAS STALKED BY THE SAME MAN FOR 18
MONTHS ATER SHE ENCoUNTERED HIM AGAIN IN 1990); SEE ALso m. (PREPARED STATEMENT
OF THE MOTHER OF KIMBERLY, A YOUNG WOMAN WHO HAS BEEN STALKED SINCE 1984 BY A
MENTALLY DISTURBED MAN WHO HAD SEEN KIMBERLYS PICTURE IN THE NEWSPAPER); SCOTT
BOWLES, 'STALKED" BY "SmANCERS, WOMEN SEEK PRoEcToN, DET. NEWS,, Apr. 27, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File (woman proprietor of a grocery store
stalked by customer).
17 HIARiNGS, SUPRA NOTE 3 (STATEMENT OF SEN. BIDEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE). THIS STATISTIC IS ALSO REPORTED IN PUENTE, SUPRA NOTE 2, AT 9A
(CmNG PARK DIETZ, A CLINICAL PSYCHIATRIST WHO CONDUCTED THE ONE MAJOR STALKING
STUDY).
18 CONNELLY, SUPRA NOTE 8.
19 ALEXANDER REID, WOMAN IS SLAN' AS CHILDREN WATCH, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26,
1992, at 1 (despite an order to stay away from his wife, husband stabs wife to death in
the couple's kitchen). Caristone, supra note 7, at 3 (35,346 order-of-protection violations
reported in Illinois in a five-month period in 1992). According to the National Victims
Center, "such orders penalize perpetrators only when the orders have been violated, or
when the harm they are designed to protect against has already occurred. These restrain-
ing orders also may have jurisdictional boundaries which, when crossed, render them
unenforceable." Stalking Legislation, NAT'L VICTIM CT1L (Nat'l Victim Center, Arlington,
Va.), No. 63, 1992, at 1.
20 CONNELLY, SUPRA NOTE 8, AT B1 ("THE OLD ADAGE WAS 'ONCE HE ATTACKS YOU
PHYSICALLY, THEN WE CAN ACT,' SAID EDWARD ROYCE (SPONSOR OF CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-STALK-
ING LAW) [NOW] LAW ENFORCEMENT [HAS] THE ABILIY TO NTERVENE... BEFORE IT is
1993]
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prompted then State Senator Edward Royce of Fullerton to spon-
sor a bill that became the first "anti-stalking" law2" in the nation.
Between 1990 and 1991, no other state adopted an anti-stalk-
ing law, but 1992 brought a torrent of legislation.' To date, thir-
ty-six states' have anti-stalking laws. In twenty-six states, the first
stalking offense is a misdemeanor;24 in four states a felony;'s
TOO LATE."); JAMEs HILL, FmT STALKING CHARc FILE IN LAKE COUNTY, CHI. TRiB. (Lake
ed.), July 30, 1992, at 2 ("Previously, you had to wait until there had been some kind of
actual contact (battery) or confrontation between the two before we could really do any-
thing," said state's attorney Michael Waller, commenting on Illinois' new stalker law.);
Mark Langford, Senate Unanimously Adopts Stalking Law, UPI, Feb. 17, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (Regarding stalking victims seeking police protection,
Texas State Senator Mike Moncrief stated, "The question has always been 'Has he hurt
you yet : Until he does, our hands are tied.'"); Bill Needed to Help Control Stalkers, ATLANTA
CONST., Jan. 2, 1992, at AlO ("[I]n many cases, a stalker may be breaking no existing
laws .... [A] terrorist might stand on the street each morning in front of a woman's
house and follow closely behind her anywhere she walks. As long as he stays on public
streets and sidewalks, he isn't trespassing, so she can't make him stop."). Currently, for
example, Georgia's anti-harassment statutes only cover telephonic harassment and fighting
words. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-5-21, 16-11-39 (Michie 1992).
21 CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1991), amended by 1992 Cal. Stat. 627.
22 SE GENERALLY MATTHEw J. GILLIGAN, NOTE, STALKING THE STALRER: DEVELOPING
NEw LaW T THWART THo.w WHO 7MroRprzE OT-aRS, 27 GA. L REV. 285 (1992).
23 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Ark. Acts 388; CAL. PENAL
CODE § 646.9 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West Supp.
1992); 1992 Conn. Legis. Serv. 701 (West); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp.
1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Ga. Laws 560; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); ILL ANN. STAT.
ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Act of Apr. 29, 1993, S.B. 97 (Ind.,
not yet signed by the governor); 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 190 (West) (to be codified at
IOWA CODE § 708.11); 1992 Ran. Sess. Laws 95; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §508.130-.150
(Baldwin 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); 1992 Mich. Legis Serv. 1165 (West) (to be codified
at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.411h); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1992); 1992 Neb.
Laws 1098 (amending NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-101, 42-903, 42-924 (1988)); 1992 N.J. Sess.
Law Serv. 720 (West) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10); 1993 N.M. Laws 86;
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.13-.14, 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3
(Supp. 1992); 1993 N.D. Laws 120 (to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.211-.215 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173
(West Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-19A-1 to -6 (Supp. 1992);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 10 (amending TEX.
PENAL CODE § 42.07); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993);
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.013(1), (1r), (It) (Supp.
1992); Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (Wyoming) (to be codified at WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-126,
6-2-506, 7-3-506 to -511).
24 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(b) (up to one year imprisonment, $1000 fine, or both);
COLO. REV. STAT ANN § 18-9-11(2) (class 3); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5(2) (petty
misdemeanor); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(b) (up to one year imprisonment, $1000 fine, or
both); IOWA CODE § 708.11(2)(c)-(d) (can be a simple or serious misdemeanor); 1992
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and in six states, either a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on
the nature of the offense.26 Presently, legislators in another elev-
en states are considering anti-stalking bills,27 and in Washington,
Members of Congress are proposing several bills that provide fed-
eral penalties for stalking,' including one by freshman Congress-
man Royce, the sponsor of the California law.' Canada's anti-in-
Kan. Sess. Laws 298 (class B or A); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.2(B) (up to six months,
$1000 fine, or both); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 43(a) (up to two and, a half years
imprisonment, $1000, or both); 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261 (to be codified at MICH. COMP.
LAws §§ 750.4111) (misdemeanor); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(1) (up to six months im-
prisonment, $1000 fine, or both); 1992 Neb. Laws 1098 (if protective or bail order violat-
ed, a class I misdemeanor); 1993 N.M. Laws 86 (misdemeanor); 1992 N.J. Sess. Law Serv.
720 (West) (fourth degree crime); N.Y PENAL LAW §§ 120.13-.14, 240.25 (class A or B);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(b) (up to six months, $1000 fine, or both); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2903.211(b) (first degree misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173(a) (up
to one year imprisonment, $1000 fine, or both); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-59-2(a) (up
to one year, $3000 fine, or both); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(B) (up to one year im-
prisonment, $1000 fine, or both); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-1 (class 1); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(b)(1) (class A); 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 10 (class A); UTAH CODE
ANN. 765-106.5(3) (class B); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (class I or 2); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-2-9a(a) (up to one year, $1000 fine, or both); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.32(2) (class
A).
25 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90(1)(b) (class C felony); 1993 Ark. Acts 388 (class B or C
felony); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(f) (class F felony); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 5/12-7.3(b) (class 4 felony).
26 1992 CONN. ACTs 92-237(1)(B) (FiRsT DEGREE STALKING IS CLASS D FELONY AND A
SECOND DEGREE STALKING IS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(c)(2)-(3)
(stalking is a misdemeanor, while aggravated stalking is a felony of the third degree); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.140-.150 (first degree stalking is a class D felony, while second
degree stalking is a misdemeanor); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(5) (gross misde-
meanor or class C felony if person violates a court order protecting the person being
stalked); 1993 N.D. Laws 120; Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (Wyoming) (to be codified at
WYO. STAT. § 6-2-506(d)) (stalking may be a misdemeanor, but is a felony if the defen-
dant caused serious bodily harm to the victim, committed the offense in violation of any
condition of probation, parole or ball, or committed the offense in violation of a tempo-
rary or permanent protection order).
27 ALASKA (TWO BILLS), MAINE (ONE BILL), MARYLAND (FOUR), MINNESOTA (ELEVEN),
MISSOURI (FIVE), MONTANA (TWO BILLS), NEVADA' (THREE BILLS), NEW HAMPSHIRE (TWO
BILLS), OREGON (SEVEN BILLS), PENNSYLVANIA (THREE BILLS), AND VERMONT (FIvE BILLS).
28 S. 470, 103D CONG., IST SESS. (1993) (SPONSORED BY SEN. BoXER AND SEN.
KREUGER); H.RL 840, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS. (1993) (SPONSORED BY REP. KENNEDY).
29 H.R. 740, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS. (1993). THE TEXT OF THIS BILL IS REPRINTED
HERE BECAUSE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ITS JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS, IT INCLUDES THE
BASIC ELEMENTS OF ANTI-STALKING BILLS EITHER PASSED OR PENDING IN THE STATES. THE
BILL READS:
§ 889. STALKING
(A) WHOEVER, IN A CIRCUMSTANCE DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (C) OF THIS SECTION
WILLFULLY AND MALICIOUSLY-
(1) REPEATEDLY FOLLOWS OR HARASSES ANOTHER PERSON; AND
1993]
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timidation law became effective in 1970,"° but recently commen-
(2) MAKES A CREDIBLE THREAT WITH THE INTENT TO PLACE THAT PERSON IN
REASONABLE FEAR OF THE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY OF THAT PERSON OR A
MEMBER OF THAT PERSON'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY,
SHALL BE PUNISHED AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (B) OF THIS SECTION.
(B) THE PUNISHMENT FOR AN OFFENSE UNDER SUBSECTION (A) OF THIS SECTION
IS-
(1) A FINE UNDER THIS TITLE, OR IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN ONE
YEAR, OR BOTH, IN THE CASE OF A FIRST CONVICTION UNDER SUCH SUBSECTION OR
A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION NOT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (2)(B); AND
(2) A FINE UNDER THIS TITLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORETHAN THREE
YEARS, OR BOTH, IF THE OFFENSE-
(A) VIOLATED A RESTRAINING ORDER OR OTHER COURT ORDER IN EFFECT
PROHIBITING THE BEHAVIOR; OR
(B) IS A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION UNDER THIS SECTION AND IS
AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM AS A PRIOR OFFENSE UNDER THIS SECTION.
(C) THE CIRCUMSTANCE REFERRED TO IN SUBSECTION (A) OF THIS SECTION IS-
(1) THAT THE OFFENDER CROSSED THE BORDER OF A STATE DURING OR FOR
THE PURPOSES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE;
(2) THAT THE OFFENDER IN THE COURSE OF THE OFFENSE USED THE UNITED
STATES MAIL OR A FACILITY IN OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, OR
(3) THE OFFENSE OCCURRED IN THE SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JU-
RISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
(D) FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION-
(I) ONE HARASSES A PERSON IF-
(A) ONE KNOWINGLY ENGAGES IN A COURSE OF CONDUCT DIRECTED SPECIFI-
CALLY AT THAT PERSON;
(B) THAT CONDUCT SERIOUSLY ALARMS, ANNOYS, OR HARASSES THAT PERSON
BUT SERVES NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE; AND
(C) THE COURSE OF CONDUCT IS SUCH AS WOULD CAUSE A REASONABLE
PERSON TO SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND DOES IN FACT CAUSE
SUBSTANTIAL EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IT IS DIRECTED;
(2) THE TERM "COURSE OF CONDUCT" MEANS A PATTERN OR CONDUCT COM-
POSED OF A SERIES OF ACTS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, HOWEVER SHORT, EVIDENCING
A CONTINUITY OF PURPOSE; AND
(3) THE TERM -CREDIBLE THREAT" MEANS A THREAT MADE WITH THE INTENT
AND APPARENT ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE THREAT SO AS TO CAUSE THE PERSON
WHO IS THE TARGET OF THE THREAT A REASONABLE FEAR FOR THAT PERSON'S SAFE-
TY.
(E) THIS SECTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT ACTIVITY PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
ID.
30 R.S.C. c. C-34, s. 381 (1970), reenacted and amended, R.S.C. c. C-46, s. 423 (1985).
In Canada, the offense of "stalking" is called "intimidation." The current Canadian anti-
intimidation statute, R.S.C. c. C-46, s. 423, reads as follows:
(1) Every one who, wrongfully and without lawful authority, for the purpose of
compelling another person to abstain from doing anything that he has a lawful
right to do, or to do anything that he has a lawful right to abstain from doing,
(a) uses violence or threats of violence to that person or his spouse or children,
or injures his property,
(b) intimidates or attempts to intimidate that person or a relative of that person
by threats that, in Canada or elsewhere, violence or other injury will be done to
or punishment inflicted on him or a relative of his, or that the property of any
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tators and Members of Parliament are calling for the law to be
amended and its penalties toughened to more adequately protect
stalking victims and their families."'
-While law enforcement officials and advocates of battered
women salute the legislation, 2 others are wary of the statutes'
language and claim that the laws will ultimately be held unconsti-
tutional.S Responding to this concern, Congress recently funded
a project to draft a proto-type stalking law,' with the particular
of them will be damaged,
(c) persistently follows that person about from place to place,
(d) hides any tools, clothes or other property owned or used by that person, or
deprives him of thiem or hinders him in the use of them,
(e) with one or more other persons, follows that person, in a disorderly man-
ner, on a highway,
(f) besets or watches the dwelling-house or place where that resides, works, car-
ries on business or happens to be, or
(g) blocks or obstructs a highway,
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
(2) A person who attends at or near or approaches a dwelling-house or place,
for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information, does not
watch or beset within the meaning of this section.
Id. For committing an offense punishable by summary conviction, the offender could be
fined up to five hundred dollars, imprisoned for up to six months, or both. Id. s. 787.
31 ANTr-S TAumwN LAW, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 13; 1993, at D2 (The House of Com-
mons justice committee has recommended changes to the Canadian intimidation law to
make it more effective against stalking. MP Dawn Black has introduced an anti-stalking
bill, and Justice Minister Pierre Blais is reported to be considering introducing an anti-
stalking bill.).
32 DONNA HuNzEKER, STALiNG LAws, ST. LEGIS. REP., Oct. 1992, at I (National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colo.).
33 SEE GERA-LND KOLARIK, STALxInG LAWS PROmLRAT, A.BA. J., Rov. 1992, at 35,
36.
34 PUB. L No. 102-568. S. 2922, 102D CONG., 2D SEss. (1992). THE TEXT OF THE
BILL IN RELEVANT PART READS:
TO ASSIST THE STATES IN THE ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS THE
CRIMINAL ACT OF STALKING OTHER PEOPLE.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED,
§ 1. ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION.
(A) FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS-THE CONGRESS FINDS AND DECLARES
THAT-
(1) THE CRIMINAL ACT OF STALKING OTHER PERSONS IS A PROBLEM OF DEEP
CONCERN;
(2) PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE LEGAL RECOURSE AGAINST STALKING, SUCH AS RE-
STRAINING ORDERS, HAVE PROVEN LARGELY INEFFECTVE;
(3) ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION HAS BEEN ENACTED OR PROPOSED BY SEVERAL
OF THE STATES;
(4) THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEVERAL OF THE STATES'. ANTI-STALKING STAT-
UTES MAY BE IN QUESTION; AND
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goal of drafting one free of constitutional infirmities.35 Because
anti-stalking laws are a recent phenomenon, constitutional objec-
tions to the laws are as yet unaired in courts. Nonetheless, ques-
tions are raised about the laws' possible overbreadth,S vague-
ness,3 7 and infringement of constitutional rights, including First
Amendment rights,' the right to free association, and the right
to travel.3 9 Finally, still others criticize the legislation as redun-
dant,4° claiming that present laws can accomplish the same ends.4 1
(5) THE CONGRESS HAS AN INTEREST IN ASSISTING THE STATES IN ENACTING
ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION THAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND ENFORCEABLE.
(B) EVALUATION-THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ACTING THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SHALL-
(1) EVALUATE ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION AND PROPOSED ANTI-STALKING LEG-
ISLATION IN THE STATES;
(2) DEVELOP MODEL ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION THAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ENFORCEABLE;
(3) PREPARE AND DISSEMINATE TO STATE AUTHORITIES THE FINDINGS MADE AS
A RESULT OF THE EVALUATION; AND
(4) NOT LATER THAN I YEAR AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT OF THIS ACT,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS THE FINDINGS AND THE NEED OR APPROPRIATENESS OF
FURTHER ACTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
ID.
35 COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, SUPRA NOTE 3; Seth Schiesel, Federal Measure Would Bar
Stalking, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 1992, at 5 (The bill's sponsor, Sen. William S. Cohen,
said, "I am concerned that many of these statutes are so broad that they may not pass
constitutional muster.").
36 CONSTANCE L HAYS, IF THAT MAN IS FOLLOWIiNG HER, CONNECTICUT IS GOING TO
FOLLOW HIM, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at BI; Laura E. Keeton, Seven Proposed Bills Would
Make Stalking a Crime, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 1'7, 1993, at 1 (Texas ACLU director claims
innocent behavior could be criminalized under overly broad anti-stalking law); Elizabeth
Ross, Problem of Men Stalking Women Spurs New Laws, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, June 11,
1992, at 6 (Director of Public Education for the ACLU is concerned that an anti-stalking
law "could restrict an investigative reporter's attempts to get an interview with a public
figure").
37 SEE MARVIN GREENE, PROSwCTORs UNHAPPY WITH THE ThST OF KENTUCKY STALING
Law, GANNEIT NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
38 KILEY ARMSTRONG, HATE ABOUNDS IN THE NAME OF LOVE, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1992,
at 8 (Vice Dean of Columbia Law School concerned about the impact of anti-stalker laws
on free speech).
39 ID. (VICE DEAN OF COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF
ANTI-STALKING LAWS ON THE FREEDOM OF TRAVEL); KAREN J. COHEN, ROYCE INTRODUCES
kEDERAL STALKING BILL, STATES NEWS SERV., FEB. 3, 1993, AVAILABLE IN LEXIS, NEXIS LI-
BRARY, WIRES FILE (SOME GROUPS, INCLUDING ACLU, SAY THAT ANTI-STALKING LAWS COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE RIGHT OF FREE ASSOCIATION AND FREEDOM OF TRAVEL).
40 JOSEPH V. COLuNA, STALKNG LAw is BAD LEGisLATION, UNNEEDED AND UNCONSTTU-
TIONAL, CHI. DAILY L. BULL, July 31, 1992, at 5 (criticizing Illinois' anti-stalking law as
"unnecessary" because "[miost of the behavior it prohibits is already illegal"); Donna
Halvorsen, Senate Panel Will Debate Stalking Bil4 Bui Crime is Difficult to Define; Baders Say,
STAR TRIB., Jan. 28, 1993, at lB (Minnesota anti-stalking bill criticized because the state
already criminalizes making harassing phone calls and terroristic threats; other "stalking"
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In this Note we discuss stalking laws, their purpose, and their
historical antecedents. We will also evaluate the laws' ability to
provide continuing protection for the victim, and psychological
evaluation and treatment, where necessary, for the individual of-
fender. We do not discuss the effectiveness of anti-stalking legisla-
tion to control group activities that might violate anti-stalking
laws.4
2
In an effort to provide insight into the risks that individual
stalkers pose to their victims, Part II of this Note describes four
discrete types of individuals who stalk others, and their behavioral
patterns. Part II then describes the psychological etiology of stalk-
ing behavior, various factors known to correlate with violent behav-
ior, and prospects for treating stalkers. Finally, Part II describes
the psychological harm that stalking causes stalking victims. Be-
cause of the psychological factors that influence the stalker and
the current inability of mental health professionals to predict vio-
lence with a high degree of certainty, we conclude that the
penological goals of stalking laws should be to protect the victim
and to provide psychological evaluation for all offenders and
treatment where appropriate.'
behavior is outlawed by Minnesota's "intrusion on privacy" law).
41 Fox IER= WMrRM ARRs7ED, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 10, 1989, at 21A (California
woman who wrote Michael J. Fox 5000 threatening letters charged in 1988 with making
terrorist threats).
42 BECAUSE GROUPS CAN ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD CAUSE REASONABLE PEOPLE
TO FEAR FOR THEIR SAFETY OR THE SAFETY OF FAMILY MEMBERS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-
STALKING LAWS AGAINST GROUPS IS A TOPIC DESERVING A THOROUGH TREATMENT. GROUPS
ENGAGING IN STALKING BEHAVIOR WILL DO SO IN A DIFFERENT POSTURE THAN INDIVIDUALS;
DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AiRE IMPLICATED, OR
ARE IMPLICATED IN A DIFFERENT WAY, WHEN GROUPS UNDERTAKE STALKING BEHAVIORS.
THE ANTI-ABORTION GROUP OPERATION RESCUE, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY BE VIOLATING ANTI-
STALKING LAWS THROUGH ITS "No PLACE TO HIDE CAMPAIGN," A CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO
UNCOVER ABORTION PROVIDERS' ACTIVITIES. AS PART OF THIS CAMPAIGN, OPERATION RESCUE
PUBLICIZES THE NAMES AND FACES OF DOCTORS WHO PERFORM ABORTIONS ON "WANTED"
POSTERS. DIANNE KLEIN, TIE END DOES Nor JUSTBi" THE FANATICAL M.EANS OF TERRORIS,
LA. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at 3; Slain Dodor Vidim of Abortion Terrorism, WALL ST.J., Apr.
9, 1993, at A9 (letter to the editor from Alexander C. Sanger, President and CEO,
Planned Parenthood of New York City). The National Abortion Federation, which repre-
sents the nation's abortion providers, has recorded 29 instances of anti-abortion activists
following and threatening doctors. Id. Also, anti-abortion activists are reported to have
followed physicians' children to school or to after-school activities. See Judy Mann, Ter-
,orism at the C~lini, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1993, at E3. Dr. David Gunn, a 47-year-old
father of two who provided abortions at Pensacola Women's Medical Services, was shot in
the back three times by an anti-abortion demonstrator in Pensacola on March 10, 1993.
Abortion Fight Resumes Over Floida Cinic, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at 25. Dr. Gunn's
picture was on a "Wanted" poster distributed by Operation Rescue. Klein, supra.
43 THIS NOTE DOES NOT ADDRESS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO
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Part III discusses the history of Anglo-American criminal and
civil law enforcement efforts to control stalking behav-
iors-including laws criminalizing threatening letters, attempt laws,
"sureties of the peace," injunctions, and modern tort remedies.
Unlike anti-stalking laws, these laws were not specifically designed
to punish a series of behaviors that, though not always criminal
when taken in isolation, collectively are the fit subjects of criminal
sanctions. Stalking victims suffer substantial emotional harm or
mental distress, and may develop as a result post-traumatic stress
disorder. However, until 1990, Anglo-American law treated stalking
behavior as antecedent to some other crime, such as assault, bat-
tery, or murder, and not as crime itself."
Part IV examines criminal statutes used by United States law
enforcement agencies to combat stalking behavior before the in-
troduction of anti-stalking laws in 1990. We explain why these laws
are ineffective against stalkers and why they should not be consid-
ered viable alternatives to anti-stalking legislation. Though criminal
attempt laws could be helpful preventive tools against stalking
behavior, present judicial interpretation of the laws render them
ineffective against stalking behavior. The other criminal laws that
we discuss are also inadequate against stalkers because their scope
is too limited to encompass the breadth of possible stalking con-
duct.
Part IV also presents a textual analysis of the anti-stalking laws
and evaluates them in light of the needs of the victims and of-
fenders, especially where mental or emotional disturbance may be
a cause of the offender's stalking behavior, and suggests the most
appropriate .penological goals for anti-stalking laws. We also discuss
possible due process objections to anti-stalking statutes. We will
ENGAGE IN GROUP-SANCTIONED STALKING BEHAVIORS.
44 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE BELIEVED THAT THREATENING BEHAVIORS COULD BE DIRECTED
TOWARD THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME BUT WERE NOT CRIME ITSELF. PREVENTIVE JUSTICE,
HOWEVER, REQUIRED THE STATE TO INTERVENE TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM THESE BEHAV-
IORS. REQUIRING A CITIZEN WHO HARASSED ANOTHER TO GIVE "SURETIES OF THE PEACE" WAS
ONE WAY TO EMBODY PREVENTIVE JUSTICE IN A "STALKING" SITUATION.
[P]revenive justice is, upon every principle of reason, of humanity, and of sound
policy, preferable in all respects to punishing justice .... But the caution we
speak of at present [requiring sureties to keep the peace] is such as is intended
merely for prevention, without any crime actually committed by the party, but
arising only from a probable suspicion that some crime is intended or likely to
happen; and consequently it is not meant as any degree of punishment, unless,
perhaps, for a man's imprudence in giving just ground of apprehension.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *248-49; see infia Part III.
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not discuss possible state or federal constitutional objections based
on free speech, freedom of association, freedom of travel objec-
tions, or the constitutionality of the no-bail provisions included in
some anti-stalking statutes.4
In Part V we conclude that anti-stalking laws are a needed
extension of the criminal law. Most current statutes, though, could
be improved to better address the phenomenon and the harm
suffered by stalking victims and their families.
II. "STALKERS:" PERSONALITY PROFILES, CORRELATES OF
VIOLENCE, PROSPECTS FOR TREATMENT, AND THE
IMPACT OF STALKING ON THE VICTIM
A review of current psychological, psychiatric, and forensic
literature suggests that at least four different categories of stalkers
exist, that stalker motives and behaviors may differ, and that the
potential for aggressive behavior may differ between individuals
within categories.' The characteristics of these "stalkers" and
their typical behaviors will be described in terms of their motives,
associated mental illnesses or emotional disturbances, the etiology
of their conduct, and the prevalence of their stalking behavior.
In order to provide insight into the risks that these individuals
may pose to society, we then turn to the correlates of violence
currently under investigation by forensic, medical, psychiatric, and
psychological investigators. In light of current understanding of
"stalking" behaviors and factors that appear to be related to vio-
lent behavior, we offer general recommendations regarding the
evaluation and treatment of individuals who are prosecuted or
convicted under "stalking" statutes.
45 BECAUSE STALKERS OFTEN ARE NOT EASILY DETERRED, ESPECIALLY IF EMOTIONALLY
DISTURBED OR MENTALLY ILL, SOME STATES AUTHORIZE COURTS, WHEN APPROPRIATE, TO DENY
BAIL TO STALKING ARRESTEES. THIS PROVIDES VICTIMS WITH MUCH NEEDED SAFETY AND PEACE
OF MIND BEFORE TRIAL. WHILE "NO BAIL" PROVISIONS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, THESE PROVISIONS MAY BE HELD TO VIOLATE STATE CONSTITUTIONS. IN ILLI-
NOIS, COOK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ASSOCIATE JUDGE NICHOLAS S. ZAGONE, HAS RULED
THAT THE "NO BAIL" PROVISION OF THE ILLINOIS ANTI-STALKING STATUTE IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL UNDER THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION. SEE SUSAN KUCZKA, CLAUSE. iN STALKING L4w
RULED UNCONSrrTIONA., CHI. TRIB. (Northwest ed.), Feb. 5, 1993, at 3 (The 'court
agreed with the public defender's position that, under the Illinois Constitution, only per-
sons charged with an offense for which probation is not available, murder for example,
can be denied bail. Probation is available for those convicted of stalking.).
46 SEE J. REID MELOY, UNREQW7ED LOVE AND TIE WISH To KIL, 53 BULL. MENNINGER
CLINIC 477, 480 (1989); see also Puente, supra note 2, at 9A (citing Dr. Park Dietz, clini-
cal professor of psychiatry and biobehavioral sciences, UCLA School of Medicine).
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Finally, as discussed in Part IV of this Note, some states re-
quire that "stalking" victims experience "substantial 7 or "actual"
emotional distress,48 or both, before an individual can be prose-
cuted for "stalking." Because of this requirement, we review the
emotional impact that "stalking" behavior may have on its victims.
A. "Stalker" Profiles
1. Erotomania and de ClIrambault's Syndrome
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-
III-R") of the American Psychiatric Association defines Erotomania
as the presence of a persistent "erotic delusion that one is loved
by another."49 This disorder is frequently referred to in psychiat-
ric and psychological literature as de Cl&rambault's syndrome.'
In actuality, however, the two disorders are distinct. The DSM-III-R
nosology5" does not, for example, require that the erotomanic
believe that his fantasized object of affection initiated the relation-
ship. In contrast, de Clrambault's syndrome requires such a be-
lief. Hence, Erotomania and de Cl&rambault's syndrome should
not be equated.
Erotomania is a delusional disorder in which the individual
truly believes himself to be loved by an individual who may not
even know of his existence. The erotomanic individual often fanta-
sizes the existence of an idyllic romantic or spiritual love with
someone who is typically of a higher social status or in a position
of authority relative to the erotomanic individual.52 Sexual attrac-
47 SE INRA PART IV-B(1)(E).
48 %e RmA m.
49 AMERICAN PsycHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 199 (3d ed. 1987) (This manual defines the criteria for all mental
disorders recognized by the American Psychiatric Association and classifies them according
to type.).
50 MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 478 (CrING 0. FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYrIC THEORY
OF NEUROSIS (1945)).
51 "A BRANCH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE THAT DEALS WITH ORDERLY RELATING OR CLASSIFI-
CATION OF DISEASES. . . " WEBSTE's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
1542 (1986). Here, nosology refers to the classification of mental and emotional disorders
currently recognized and defined by the American Psychiatric Association.
52 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 199; see M. Ghaziuddin & L.
Tsai, Depmsrion-Dependent Erotomanic Ddusions in a Mentally Handicapped Woman, 158 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 127, 128 (1991); see also Park E. Dietz et al., Threatening and Otherwise map-
propriate Letters to Hollywood Celebrities, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 185, 186 (1991) (In this study,
Dietz et al. examined communications sent to celebrities of "national or international
stature." These renowned celebrities fit the criteria for "higher social status" as described
by the DSM-III-R criteria for Erotomania.).
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tion to the fantasized lover is not required for the diagnosis of
Erotomania to be made, though the erotomanic typically seeks to
establish an intimate, even permanent, relationship with the object
of his fantasy." One of the most- publicized forensic cases of
male Erotomania is the murder' of Tatiana tarasoff by a male
acquaintance, Prosenjit Poddar. Poddar initially interpreted a New
Year's Eve kiss by Tarasoff as an indication that she loved him.
After repeated, but failed, attempts to gain Tarasoff's attention
and affection, Poddar 'attempted to orchestrate a dangerous situa-
tion from which he could rescue Tarasoff; he assumed that his
heroism would reveal to her the depth of her feelings for him. His
plan went awry, and Poddar fatally stabbed Tarasoff.'
Park Elliot Dietz et aL. observed the delusional nature of Ero-
tomania in an empirical study of 1800 inappropriate communica-
tions sent to celebrities by 214 subjects." They report that twenty-
seven percent of the subjects misperceived the celebrity to be their
spouse, potential spouse, or suitor. An additional twenty-six per-
cent of the subjects projected the celebrity into the role of lover,
potential lover, or "would-be" lover. These subjects then placed
themselves in the complementary role, i.e., as the one being pur-
sued or loved rather than as the pursuer. 6 Some subjects believed
that the celebrity sufficiently reciprocated affection so that their
role as suitor or would-be" lover was warranted. The flagrant
misperception of reciprocity indicates the presence of erotomanic
delusions. When the reported behavioral overtures made by these
subjects is analyzed, Erotomania appears to be the appropriate
diagnosis for these individuals.
The DSM-III-R description of Erotomania includes the stalking
behaviors typically observed in the delustional erotomanic. They
include repeated efforts to contact the fantasized individual by
telephone, letter, gifts, attempted visits, and "even surveillance and
53 SEE AMERICAN PSYHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 199.
54 TARASOFF v. REGENTS, 551 P.2D' 334 (CAL. 1976). FOR ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF
EROTOMANIC BEHAVIOR, SEE MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 482 (MELOY DESCRIBES THE
TWINSHIP ALLIANCE" WHICH JOHN HINCKEY ATrEMPTED TO ESTABLISH WITH ACTRESS JODIE
FOSTFL BY ATEMPTING TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, HINCKLEY HOPED TO
UNITE HIMSELF wrm FoSTER IN HISTORY.)..
55 SEE DimTz ET AL, SUPRA NOTE 52. DIETZ DEFINES COMMUNICATION AS "THE DELIVERY
OF ANY WRITTEN INFORMATION OR ITEM TO AN AGENT OF THE CELEBRITY." 1D. AT 187.
56 THE ACTUAL SAMPLE OF SUBJECTS WHO BELIEVED THEY WERE THE SPOUSE OR LOVER
AND WERE IN A RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TARGET COULD BE DETERMINED ONLY IF
THEY WERE SEPARATED FROM THOSE WHO BELIEVED A CELEBRITY COULD BE A P07ENTIAL
SPOUSE OR LOVER.
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stalking are common."57 Although the statistical prevalence of
these behaviors is not empirically verified, case examples of such
behavior in the psychiatric, psychological, and forensic literature
abound.' The purpose, or goal, of the erotomanic's behavior is
to advance a relationship with the object of fantasy. Dietz et al. ob-
serve that the predominant emotion that their subjects attempted
to evoke from their target was love, and the majority of subjects
sought some type of verbal, written, or physical contact.5 9 Step-
ping into the psyche of the erotomanic, this goal is not unfound-
ed, since by definition, the erotomanic delusional believes his
target reciprocates an intensity of emotion and desire for un-
ion-despite the absence of any actual relationship or emotional reciproci-
ty.
The criteria for Erotomania set forth by the DSM-III-R indi-
cates that this disorder is diagnostically distinct from Schizophrenia
and the Mood Disorders.' While the etiology of Delusional Dis-
orders are unknown, the DSM-III-R suggests that severe socio-emo-
tional.stresses may predispose an individual to the development of
a Delusional Disorder, as might a low socioeconomic level or the
presence of a clinical Paranoid, Schizoid, or Avoidant Personality
Disorder.6 Kohut and Wolf describe a well-formulated object-rela-
tions understanding of the intrapsychic processes involved in the
development of this delusional disorder.
62
57 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 199; see also Cheryl Laird,
Stalking; Laws Confront Obsession that Turns Fear into Terror and Brings Nightmares to Life,
Hous. CHRONICLE, May 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File.
58 SEE GHAZIUDDIN & TSAi, suPRA NOTE 52 (GHAZIUDDIN DESCRIBES A MENTALLY HAND-
ICAPPED WOMAN WHO DEVELOPS AN EROTOMANIC DELUSION TOWARDS HER SCHOOL'S HEAD
TEACHER. CONVINCED THAT HE LOVED HER AND WANTED TO HAVE SEX WITH HER, SHE
WROTE HIM NUMEROUS LOVE LETTERS AND OFTEN INSISTED ON SEEING HIM. HER DELUSION
APPEARS TO BE RELATED TO HER DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS.). SEE GENERALLY JOYCE L DUNLOP,
DOES EROTOMAN ExisT BETwFEN WOMEv?, 153 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 830, 830-32 (1988)
(describing the behaviors of two women with erotomanic delusions toward older women).
59 DIETZ ET AL., SUPRA NOTE 52, AT 202.
60 SEE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 201 (Certain symptoms
necessary to make the diagnosis of schizophrenia are not present in Delusional Disorders.
In addition, if mood disorder symptoms precede psychotic features such as hallucinations,
the diagnosis of Mood Disorder with Psychotic Features cannot be ruled out.).
61' SEE o. at 339 (diagnostic criteria for Paranoid Personality Disorder); see also id. at
340 (diagnostic criteria for Schizoid Personality Disorder); id. at 353 (diagnostic criteria
for Avoidant Personality Disorder).
62 SEE HEINZ KOHUT & ERNEST S. WOLF, Tm DiSORDERS OF ThE SELF AND ThER
TREATMFrT. AN OTFL1N iN ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON NARCISSISM 175, 192 (Andrew P. Morri-
son ed., 1986) (Kohut describes "[m]erger-hungry personalities" who, because of their
"pathological" need to merge with another individual, lose their ability to "discriminate
their own thoughts, wishes and intentions from those of the selfobjecL").
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Sufficient demographic data to estimate the prevalence of this
disorder does not exist.' The prevalence of all delusional disor
ders is estimated at 0.03 percent of the United States population.
Erotomania, however, is one of the six subtypes of delusional dis-
orders included in this estimate. This estimate is conservative be-
cause "delusional patients rarely seek psychiatric help unless forced
to do so by their families or the courts.' 4 Clinical and forensic
data indicates that both males and females are affected by this
disorder, though "in clinical samples most of the cases are female,
in forensic samples most are male."° Some researchers conclude
that male erotomanics may predominate in forensic cases because
they are more prone to aggressive acting-out of their frustrations
when their affections are not reciprocated.'
2. "Borderline Erotomania"
Several features of "Borderline Erotomania" differentiate this
disorder from Delusional Erotomania. Meloy uses the term "Bor-
derline Erotomania" to describe individuals'who developed intense
emotional feelings towards other individuals who they know do not
reciprocate their feelings,67 as opposed to delusional erotomanics
who do believe their feelings are reciprocated. Borderline Erotoma-
nia is not a delusional disorder because these individuals do not
exhibit delusional features. The difference between Erotomania
and Borderline Erotomania implicates both clinical and legal con-
63 MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 479; SEE ALSO D. (CITING PARK DIETZ, THREATS AND
ATrACKS AGAINST PuBuc FIGURES (1988) (A PAPER PRESENTED AT THE MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW)).
64 HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 343 (6th ed.
1991).
65 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 199; see Meloy, supra note
46, at 478 ("male erotomania is more likely to result in violent acting out").
66 MELOY, $uPRA NOTE 46, AT 478 (CITING R.L. GOLDSTEIN, EROTOMNIA mN MEN, 143
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 802 (1986); RL. Goldstein, More Forensic Romances: De Clrambault's Syn-
drome in Men, 15 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIkTRY & L 267-74 (1987); Taylor ct al., Erotoma-
nia in Males, 13 PSCHOLOGICAL MED. (1983)); see id. at 489 (The risk of violence increas-
es as the paranoid and psychopathic traits become more obvious, especially if alcohol or
psychostimulants are used by the erotomanic.).
67 MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 480; SEE ALSO MAREVA BROWN, STATE ANTr-STALKING LAW
SHADOWS LOwRIs WHO WON'T LET GO, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 29, 1992, at Al (One of the
difficulties that researchers, clinicians, and law enforcement agencies encounter when
discussing the issue of stalking is the discrepancy in language and categorization of
"stalkers." See infra text accompanying note 81.).
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siderations, particularly as regards pleas of insanity or determi-
nations of incompetence.9
Several other features of Borderline Erotomania help to ex-
plain these individuals' stalking behavior. Meloy proposes that,
unlike delusional erotomanics, borderline erotomanics usually have
"some history of actual emotional engagement with the object [of
fantasy]." 0 He allows for the possibility that such engagement
may be extremely trivial; a friendly, but innocuous glance is often
a sufficient catalyst for the development of Borderline Erotoma-
nia.71 These individuals are profoundly vulnerable to other's trivi-
al expressions of warmth and openness. From a theoretical per-
spective, Borderline Erotomania is symptomatic of a "gross distur-
bance of attachment or bonding."72 The disturbance of attach-
ment that borderline erotomanics exhibit is essential to under-
standing their behavior and predicting their behavioral responses
in the face of rejection by their object of desire. If disturbances of
bonding or attachment to a trusted and loving caregiver occur in
early childhood, without a corrective bonding experience during
later childhood or adolescence, such disturbances may lead to
difficulties with, or disturbances of, adjustment in adulthood.'
The borderline erotomanic experiences rejection in adulthood as
a "reliving" of emotional or physical abandonment that he or she
likely experienced as a child.7 4 The individual's fragile ego, or
sense of self, hangs in the balance between his or her ability to
"win" or "lose" the others' affection. The needy, clingy desperation
that such individuals experience is remarkably similar to the terror
a young child feels when faced with imminent parental abandon-
68 MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 480.
69 SEE GENERALLY ALAN M. GOLDSTEIN & MARC BURD, ROLE OF DELUsONs iN TRIAL
COMPETENCY EVALUATIONS: CASE LAW AND IMPuCATIONS FOR FOR.ENSIC PRACTICE, 3 FORENSIC
REP. 361, 362 (1990); see id. at 367 (relationship between delusions and the competency
standards set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
70 MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 481.
71 1D.
72 D. AT 480.
73 DANIEL K. LAPSLEY & KENNETH RICE, THE "NEw LOOK" AT THE IMAGINARY AUDIENCE
A PFERSONAL FABLE: ToWARD A GENERAL MODEL OF ADOLESCENT EGO DEVELOPMENT, IN SELF,
EGO, AND IDENTITY, INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES 109, 123 (Daniel K. Lapsley & F. Clark
Power eds., 1988); see i& at 118 (stating that DSM-III-R Narcissistic and Borderline Per-
sonality disorders "result from the failure of the environment to provide empathic respon-
siveness to the adolescent's [normal] narcissistic strivings and pursuit of ideals"); see also
id. at 124 (stating that impaired ego development in adolescence can lead to disturbanc-
es in interpersonal relationships, 'e.g., entitlement, [and] exploitativeness").
74 MELOY, SPRA NOTE 46, AT 481.
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ment.75 When faced with the inevitability of abandonment in
adulthood, the borderline erotomanic may experience intense
fury, known in psychological literature as "Narcissistic Rage" 7 or
"abandonment rage."77 We will explain this type of rage in great-
er detail when the correlates of violence are discussed, but such
rage responses are not limited to expression by borderline
erotomanics, and they may also be observed in delusional
erotomanics.
Another critical characteristic of the borderline erotomanic is
the propensity to vacillate between attitudes of lovei and hate to-
wards the object of attention. This is a clinically recognized ego-
defense process by which the individual alternately idealizes and
devalues another.S.As Klein describes it, "The love object is ini-
tially idealized, but then ragefully devalued; intense love and in-
tense hatred exist concurrently, but are experienced only in alter-
nate split-off affect states; and the narcissism and grandiosity of
the violent act betray the defensive projection of devalued parts of
the self into the victim. "7 This "splitting" of affect is present in
more than one DSM-III-R diagnosis, but it is characteristic of bor-
derline erotomanics.80
The actual behavioral activities of the borderline erotomanic
may not differ significantly from those of the delusional
erotomanic, i.e., they may both repeatedly write fetters, send gifts,
make phone calls, and follow their targets. The borderline
75 &F BEN BURSTEN, SOME NARCISSiSTIC PRSONnY T-s, iN ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON
NARcISSIsM, supra note 62, at 387-88 (describing "pouting," "sulking," and the desperate
clinging of the "craving personality").
76 OTTO F. KERNBERG, FURTHER CONTRrBurONS TO TnE TREATMENT OF NAR TIC
PFRSONATT1ES, iN ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON NARcIssIsM, supra note 62, at 248; see also i4 at
272, 274, 290 (describing clients who are enraged at their analyst for his "abandonment"
of them).
77 MaOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 481; SEE ALSO LD. AT 485 (DESCRIBING THE HySTmCAL
PERSONALITY TRAITS OF THE BORDERLINE EROTOMANIC-IN PARTICULAR, THE RAPIDLY
SHIFTING EXPRESSIONS OF "BOUNDLESS AFFECTION OR UNBRIDLED RAGE").
78 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 347 (The DSM-III-R Diag-
nostic Criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder-a disorder whose features are not
unlike many of those manifested by borderline erotomanics--includes a "pattern of unsta-
ble and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between extremes
of overidealization and devaluation.").
79 MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 482 (QUOTING M.K KLEIN, ENvy AND GRATITUDE, IN
ENVY AND GRATITUDE AND OTHER WORKS, 1946-1963, at 176-235 (1975); M.K. Klein, Notes
on Some Schizoid Mechanin a in ENVY AND GRATITUDE AND OTHER WORKS, 1946-1963, supra,
at 1-24).
80 SE AMERICAN PSYHATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 377; see also supra text
accompanying note 76.
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erotomanic, however, does not presume the target reciprocates his
or her feelings of affection, and may demonstrate affective split-
ting. The individual may also express significant Narcissistic or
abandonment rage when his or her target does not develop recip-
rocal feelings of affection. Meloy, in his clinical experience with
delusional and borderline erotomanics, observes that borderline
erotomanics "invariably" manifest symptoms characteristic of one
or more DSM-III-R personality disorders."1 Specifically, he identi-
fies Narcissistic, Histrionic, Antisocial, Borderline, and Paranoid
personality disorders as diagnostic categories into which borderline
erotomanics may fall. Not all individuals presenting with these
personality disorders are at risk of becoming borderline
erotomanics.
Demographic data on the prevalence of Borderline Erotoma-
nia is not available. The Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD")
estimates that forty-three percent of its stalking cases are "love
obsessional," a group similar to borderline erotomanics. 82 This
may provide a rough figure, but further study and more refined
tracking of stalkers is necessary before a high degree of confi-
dence in these estimates is warranted.
3. "Former Intimate" Stalkers
The FBI's 1990 Supplemental Homicide Report reveals that
while four percent of the male homicide victims in 1990 were
killed by their wives or girlfriends, a staggering thirty percent of
female homicide victims were killed by husbands or boyfriends.'
Perpetrators falling into the "domestic violence" category include
both current and former wives, girlfriends, husbands, and boyfriends.
Accordingly, it is difficult to distinguish from these data the actual
prevalence of homicide by individuals who are no longer intimate-
ly involved with their victim. Ruth Micklem, codirector of Virgin-
ians Against Domestic Violence, estimates that as many as ninety
percent of the women killed by (former) husbands or boyfriends
were stalked before a murder occurred.' This category of
stalkers warrants closer scrutiny.
81 MELOY, SUPRA NOTE 46, AT 481.
82 BROWN, SUPRA NOTE 67 AND ACCOMPANYING TEXT.
83 ANDY COURT, ShE KNEW T-E SYs7EM WouLD FAiL HER, AM. LAW., June 1992, at
110 (citing the 1990 FBI Supplemental Homicide Report).
84 MELINDA BECK Er AL., MURDEROUS OBSSlON, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 60.
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The LAPD recognizes the existence of stalkers who "fixate on
someone and refuse to let go," after a sexual or emotional rela-
tionship ends. The LAPD terms these stalkers as "simple obsession-
al," but also includes casual-acquaintance-stalkers' (included in
the Borderline Erotomanic category in this Note) in this category.
Forty-eight percent of its stalking caseload is comprised of this
type of stalker.' While the LAPD characterizes Former Intimate
stalkers as individuals who "refuse to let go," a more accurate
understanding is that these individuals refuse to be rejected. These
stalkers differ from delusional erotomanics in that they do not
fantasize reciprocal idealized love; such stalkers have had intimate
relationships with their targets, while borderline erotomanics have
not.
In many cases, Former Intimate stalkers have a prior history
of abusive relationships. Not surprisingly, most of the information
regarding this type of stalker is found in the domestic violence
literature. Data indicating that this type of stalker is differentially
more violent than other types of stalkers is not available, but many
such cases result in assault or death87 Contrary to general public
perception, these stalkers are both men and women. Numerous
case examples exist of former female intimates who engage in
harassing and stalking behaviors, as well as acts of vengeful and
aggressive retaliation for terminated relationships.'s
Several psychological characteristics of Former Intimate
stalkers are salient: they are intensely emotionally dependent on
85 BY DEFINIION, cAsuALAcQuA ANcE srALKERs HAVE NOT HAD AN INTIMATE RELA-
TIONSHIP WITH THEIR VICTIMS. THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BORDERLINE
EROTOMANICS, AND NOT CONFUSED WITH INDIVDUALS WHO REFUSE TO TERMINATE AN ACTU-
AL INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP.
86 BROWN, SUPRA NOTE 67.
87 &F NOEL A. CAzANAVE & MARGARET A. ZAHN, WOMEN, MuRwER, AND MALE DOMINA-
TION: POLICE REPORTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO AND PHjLADELPHIA, IN INTIMATE
VIOLENCE; INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECrIVES 83, 92 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992) [hereinafter
INTIMATE VIOLENCE] ("In all these 'victim attempted to leave the relationship' type homi-
cides, the killings appear to entail the enforcement of norms held by the offender that
death is the penalty for the failure of the victim to continue the relationship."); see also
ANSON SHUPE ET AL., VIOLENT MEN, VIOLENT COUPLES; THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE 55 (1987) ("[O]nce he had to call the police when he moved out because she
blocked the doorway and would attack him when he tried to leave .... A month ago.
she came to his new apartment . . . came into his room and stabbed at his groin with a
pair of scissors, puncturing his scrotum."); Beck ct al., supra note 83; Brown, supra note
66; Court, supra note 82; Laird, supra note 56.
88 &E SHUPE E AL., supra note 87 at 45 ("[A] number of battered men telephoned
women's shelters every year seeking help as victims of violence.").
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their partner, yet at the same time, they are highly ambivalent
over their dependence. They may also be jealous of real or imag-
ined infidelities and exhibit a significant need to control their
former partner. As with borderline erotomanics, these individuals
experience rejection as abandonment. In contrast to the border-
line erotomanic, however, Former Intimate stalkers have an actual
history of emotional dependence upon their partner that is sev-
ered when the relationship is terminated. Shupe, Stacey, and
Hazlewood believe that in some cases, "He is so dependent on her
that he would kill her rather than let her go and not be able to
live without her."' The Former Intimate stalker is unable to tol-
erate the panic and "abandonment anxiety" that result when his
partner leaves the relationship.'
Vaselle-Augenstein and Ehrlich cite observations made by
clinicians and researchers in the field of domestic violence that
indicate that batterers experience significant ambivalence between
their need for interpersonal intimacy and their fear of engulfment
by it. They observe: "the outcome [of ambivalence] is that
batterers feel both emotionally isolated and also exaggeratedly
dependent on their wives or girlfriends." 1 Ambivalence over de-
pendency needs is closely tied to the heightened levels of jealousy
that batterers and Former Intimate stalkers demonstrate: "outsiders
are seen as intruders and there is a desire to bond even closer.
However, when this feeling is not mutual, anger erupts and there
ensues an increased risk of violence."92 Former Intimate stalkers
may target the current lover or spouse of their victim in an at-
tempt to rid themselves of what they perceive to be the obstacle
to reunification.' In fact, Dietz et al. conclude that the "person
perceived to be standing in the way of the object" is at the great-
est risk for victimization by the stalker.94
89 A). AT 37.
90 RENATA VASELLE-AUGENSTEIN & ANNETrE EHRLICH, MALE BATERERs: EVLDENcE FOR
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, N INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 86, at 139-40 (relying on KH.
Coleman, Conjugal rolence: What Thirty-Three Men Report, 6 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY
207 (1980); J. Weitzman & K. Dreen, Wife Beating; A View of the Marital Lyad, 63 SOCIAL
CASEwORK 259, 259-65 (1982)).
91 Id. at 141.
92 DANIEL J. SONKIN ET AL, THE MALE BATrERER: A TREATMENT APPROACH 43
(1985).
93 See Laird, supra note 57 (Four years after stalking a former girlfriend and her
husband, "Iv]owing both love and revenge, Jimmy had slashed the couple's van tires,
[and] pulled up their azaleas .... Now, at 10 on a Sunday night, Jimmy had decided
to carry out his threat of murdering [the stalking victim's husband].").
94 Meloy, supra note 45, at 479.
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While the Former Intimate characteristics of emotional depen-
dence, ambivalence, and jealousy may seem pitiable, the last char-
acteristic-the need to control their former partner-has far more
negative implications. Typically, batterers and some Former Inti-
mate stalkers regard their intimates as personal possessions that
can be treated as such. The propensity for batterers to apply force
to exert control or domination over their partners is widely accept-
ed by 'clinicians?' and the general public. Abusive partners may
perceive a threat to their dominance when their partner expresses
a desire for independence, and they may consequently threaten to
apply force to maintain their position .within the relation-
ship-even after the relationship ends.
A study by Rouse concludes that "[i]ndividuals with a need to
be in control in a relationship may be successful without recourse
to force but can be viewed as being at higher risk of violence
when their position of dominance is threatened."' The termina-
tion of the intimate relationship on which the "stalker" was emo-
tionally dependent is a situation that threatens the dominance of
the abusive partner, and it may increase the risk of stalking behav-
iors and aggressive behavior.
It is impossible to identify a single mental illness associated
o nly' with Former Intimate stalkers because both current and for-
mer abusive partners are considered to be cases of domestic vio-
lence. In an analysis of "risk markers" of violent men in intimate
relationships, however, Sugarman and Hotaling identified six char-
acteristics more likely to be found in male perpetrators than in.
nonviolent men.9 7 Several of them are symptoms of DSM-III-R
personality disorders or clinical disorders. They are: low self-es-
teem, low income levels, low occupational status, more frequent
abuse of alcohol, a history of physical abuse victimization as a
child, and the witnessing of parental violence as a child.
The statistical prevalence of Former Intimate stalking is not
known, and until former and current lover/spouse abuse are con-
sidered separately, a true accounting will be difficult.
95 See, e.g., Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 86.
96 Linda P. Rouse, The Dominance Motive in Abusive Partnenr: Identing Couples at Risk
31 J. C. STuDENT DEv. 330, 334 (1990).
97 David B. Sugarman & Gerald T. Hotaling, Violent Men In Intimate Relationships: An
Analysis of Risk Markers, 19 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1035 (1989).
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4. Sociopathic Stalkers
Two groups of criminals that are notably absent from the
"stalking" literature are serial murderers and serial rapists, an
absence that is all the more remarkable given that the behavioral
activities proscribed by most stalking laws" are familiar character-
istics of such individuals. Ted Poe, a Texas district court judge,
often hears testimony from rape and assault victims that they saw
their assailaiffon repeated occasions "at the grocery store, at their
child's schoof: in a car" prior to their assault.99
Two distinct features differentiate Sociopathic stalkers from
the three other types. First, they do not appear to be seeking to
initiate or maintain an interpersonal relationship with their victim.
Second, they seek individuals that fit their assault criteria-they
first formulate the characteristics of the "ideal victim" and then
seek an "acceptable example" to fit the criteria."0
Faith Leibman analyzed the life histories of four serial mur-
derers: Ted Bundy, Albert De Salvo, Edmund Kemper, and Jerome
Brudos. 1°  She identifies several personality features and life
events that she believes predisposed these men to pursue a pattern
of murder:
-Cruel and extremely violent parenting.
-A rejection in childhood by the parents.
-A rejection by a member of the opposite sex in adulthood.
-- Contact with the criminal justice system-adult or juvenile.
-Commitment to a mental health facility.
-Aberrant sexual patterns.
-A loner.
Certainly, not all individuals who experience these events or who
demonstrate these characteristics become serial murderers or rap-
ists. Leibman concludes that, after repressing their childhood rage
(at being abused or rejected) for many years, finding themselves
unable to control their environment, and then experiencing rejec-
98 See infra Part IV-B.
99 Laird, supra note 57; see also STANTON E. SAMENOW, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND
104 (1984) (example of a rapist who stalked his victim before committing the crime).
100. See Laird, supra note 57 (Serial rapist Gary Wayne Sheppard identified his targets
in newspaper society and fashion sections. He would then call their home, visit at least
once, ostensibly seeking directions, and would later return to effectuate the rape.).
101 Faith H. Leibman, Serial Murnerers: Four Case Histories, 53 FED. PROBATION 41, 42
(1989) (Leibman is a forensic psychologist with the Atlantic County Jail and criminal
justice professor at Temple University.).
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tion again as an adult, some individuals displace their anger onto
their victims in adulthood. 2 In one of the cases analyzed, that
of Edmund Kemper, Leibman reports that between the ages of
ten and thirteen, Kemper "began to follow women down the street
fantasizing that they would love him."10 3 Though not enough in-
formation is available to determine the extent of Kemper's stalking
behavior, his fantasizing is suggestive of Borderline Erotoma-
nia."° Similarly, Leibman reports that Bundy
met a woman he could not get out of his mind. He dated this
woman .... could not tell her the truth about his status in
life .... began to threaten her[,] and press her to have sex in
unusual. ways .... She then told him never to call her again.
Shortly thereafter, Bundy's first victim was abducted. Other
victims followed the January 1974 one, many sexually molested
and brutally slain. 5
This pattern of behavior is similar to those of Former Intimate
stalkers, except that his victim was not the former intimate herself.
In three of the four cases that Leibman presents, the serial mur-
derer also either began his "career" by sexually assaulting his vic-
tims (De. Salvo and Brudos) or the sexual assault took place prior
to the victim's murder (Bundy) ."
Several of the features that Leibman identifies in serial mur-
derers can be found in the life histories of many borderline
erotomanics and Former Intimate stalkers. The relationship be-
tween the various types of stalkers is unclear, but additional re-
search is necessary to determine by which mechanisms some indi-
viduals become Sociopathic stalkers.
B. Correlates of Violence
The ability to predict with a high degree of confidence the
risk posed to society by stalkers is the laudable, but formidable,
goal of forensic scientists and mental health professionals. The
American Psychiatric Association observes that "neither psychiatrists
nor anyone else has reliably demonstrated an ability to predict
future violence or dangerousness." 107 Despite this candid admis-
102 Id.
103 Id. at 44.
104 See supra Part II-A(2).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 44-45.
107 Margaret K. Cooke & Jeffrey H. Goldstein, Sodal Isolation and Violent Behavior, 2
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sion, research continues to examine possible causes of violence. As
research proceeds in various disciplines of study, a growing con-
sensus is emerging that "violence" is multi-determined-it results
from interactions among multiple environmental, psychological,
and biological factors."
1. Psychobiologic Correlates of Violence
An imbalance between activating (norepinephrine and dopa-
mine) and inhibitory (serotonin and gamma-aminobutyric acid)
neurotransmitters may be associated with violence and aggression.
Cushing's Syndrome, Addison's Disease, and Gonadal Hormone
Dysfunction are three endocrinological states that may also be
associated with increased aggression. Structural brain lesions (such
as frontal lobe damage) and diffuse brain damage are recognized
as correlates of violence. In addition, there is an observable rela-
tionship between violence and epileptic seizures, as well as a rela-
tionship between violence and the medications used to treat these
seizures (phenobarbital and tranxene, in particular), is observed.
Similarly, medications used to treat the symptoms of both delirium
and dementia are associated with increased aggressive
behavior."° The relationship between these neurobiologic factors
and the risk of violence in stalkers is not fully understood. Dr.
Paul Nestor observes, "Violence mediated by clear-cut neurological
factors is most likely to be characterized as unplanned, impulsive,
unprovoked and primitive.""' Though the majority of stalking
incidents do not appear to fit this description, additional research
FORENSIC REP. 287 (1989) (quoting AMERiCAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLiNICAL ASPECTS
OF THE VIOLENT INDMDUAL 20 (1974) (task force reports)); see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108 Herman Jones, Neuropsychology of Violence, 5 FORENSIC REP. 221 (1992); Jan Volavka
et al., Psychobiology of the Violent Offender, 37 J. FORENSIC Sc. 237 (1991).
109 See Jones, supra note 108, at 222-30; see also Volavka et al., supra note 108, at 241-
44 (literature reviews on the psychobiologic correlates of violence); KAPLAN & SADOCK,
supra note 63, at 257 (describing the etiology, clinical features, and diagnosis of Organic
Delusional Syndrome and Disorder); id. at 265 (describing the interictal psychotic states
which are manifested "most prominently by paranoid delusions and hallucinations"); id. at
268 (describing the changes in personality, cognition, and neurological functioning that
occur in endocrine disorders).
110 Paul G. Nestor, Neuropsychological and Clinical Correlates of Murder and Other Forms of
Extreme Violence in a Forensic Psychiatric Population, 180 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE 418,
418 (1992) (quoting D.M. Treiman, Epilepsy and VIrolence: Medical and Legal Issues, 27
EPILEPSIA 77 (Supp. 2, 1986)) (Dr. Nestor is a member of the Department of Psychiatry
at Harvard Medical School and the Department of Psychology at Bridgewater State Hospi-
tal in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.).
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is necessary to identify the neurobiologic factors. that may be relat-
ed to the development of delusional disorders and other violent
behavior.'
2. Environmental Correlates of Violence
Several environmental risk factors are hypothesized to predis-
pose an individual to violence. Some of these factors present dur-
ing childhood and adolescence have lingering emotional and in-
terpersonal effects that may give rise to violence in adulthood.Sugarman and Hotaling identified two factors that differentiat-
ed violent from nonviolent men in intimate relationships: lower
economic status and witnessing violence in their own family of
origin."' Volavka et aL review the data that link the experience
of childhood abuse to the perpetration of violent offenses as
adults."' Further, in light of studies that link diffuse brain inju-
ry-often sustained by children in abusive situations-to violence,
they caution that "[w]e must consider that abused children who
have had brain injury develop an especially elevated predisposition
for violent behavior.""
4
In addition to lower socioeconomic status ("SES") and a histo-
ry of childhood victimization, other environmental risk factors
correlate with violent behavior. Cooke and Goldstein"' identify
two social isolation variables that are able to differentiate males
charged with an FBI violent index crime (homicide, robbery, rape,
and aggravated assault) from those charged with any other crime.
These variables, living alone and not discussing problems with
anyone, were significantly better at differentiating the groups than
other variables included in their study."'
Finally, Dr. Daniel Martell reports that "homelessness does
significantly increase the risk of indictment for violent criminal-
behavior among mentally disordered offenders .... [this is] partic-
ularly true of indictments for assault."" 7 He cautions that this
111 See KAPLAN & SADocK, supra note 64, at 343 ("Patients with delusional disorders
have no identifiable organic basis for their delusions.").
112 Sugarman & Hotaling, supra note 97, at 1044.
113 Volavka et al, supra note 108, at 238.
114 Id.
115 Cooke & Goldstein, supra note 107, at 292.
116 A p < .05 level of statistical significance. This is the level of statistical significance
necessary to attribute the results to something other than chance.
117 Daniel A. Martell, Homess Mentally Disordered Offenders and Violent COimes; Prelimi-
najy Research Findings, 15 L & HUM. BEHAv. 333, 342 (1991) (Dr. Martell is a member of
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finding may be a result of differential treatment by the judicial
system, and he also observes that additional factors associated with
homelessness--such as the vulnerability to stress-may increase the
risk of violent behavior among homeless individuals who are men-
tally ill. 118
A thorough study of the interaction between environmental
factors associated with violence-low SES, childhood victimization,
social isolation, and homelessness-must be conducted before any
accurate prediction of violence can be made, whether considering
the risk for violence in general, or the potential for violence
among stalkers in particular.
3. Intrapsychic Correlates of Violence
For the purposes of this Note, the' term "intrapsychic" refers
to the cognitive and emotional processes that occur below the
level of an individual's cognitive awareness. Some of the processes
to be reviewed include the way in which individuals attribute
meaning to others' communication towards them; the manner in
which individuals prefer to relate to others, even if unaware of
this preference; and the ways in which individuals protect their
egos from uncomfortable situations or emotions.
In their study of violent men in intimate relationships,
Sugarman and Hotaling observe that battering husbands appear to
have an "aggressive attributional bias""9 that causes an individual
to interpret neutral or ambivalent communications or behaviors as
being hostile or critical. Hotaling also independently concluded in
a prior study that a husband's potential for aggression towards his
wife was likely to escalate if he perceived her actions to be inten-
tional and aggressive, if she "threaten[ed] his identity, [or]
violat[ed] a dyadic norm."120
Sugarman and Hotaling also report previous research findings
that children who are prone to act aggressively tend to "impute
malevolent intent to accidental or ambiguous aggressive acts...
and as a consequence are more likely to retaliate against the per-
ceived aggressor. "12' This finding has profound relevance to the
the Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, New York University Medical Cen-
ter, and Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center.).
118 Id at 342, 343.
119 Sugarman & Hotaling, supra note 97, at 1046 (quoting G.T. Hotaling, Attributional
Processes in Husband-Wife Violence, in THE SOCIAL CAUSES OF HUsBAND-WIFE VIOLENCE 136-
54 (MA. Straus & G.T. Hotaling eds., 1980)).
120 Id. at 1045.
121 id at 1046 (quoting K.A. Dodge & B.A. Richard, Peer Perception, Aggression. and
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role of attributional style in stalkers and to the prediction of their
possible violent behavior.
The desire for dominance is another risk factor for violent
behavior, especially in cases where the individual in question is ac-
cused of violence in prior relationships or situations. Rouse found
that higher scores on a Dominance/Possessive Index ("DPI") were
related to respondents' reports of using physical force against their
partner,122 and Meloy concluded that "[piurposeful devaluation
of heterosexual objects through emotional or physical injury con-
veys the necessity for psychopathically disturbed erotomanic indi-
viduals to relate on the basis of dominance and intimidation,
rather than affection." 23 Because the desire to dominate another
individual is characteristic of Former Intimate and Sociopathic
stalkers, these individuals must be considered potentially violent.
Individuals who come to the attention of mental health clini-
cians often reflect a tendency to protect themselves from uncom-
fortable memories, insights, or emotions. Some individuals typically
develop patterns of "ego defenses," or other similar mental pro-
cesses when they are forced to deal with internal drives, "real" life
situations, and emotions. Some of these patterns strongly correlate
with violent behavior.
In an empirical study of sixty psychiatric inpatients, Apter'et
aL. determined that the use of "denial," "projection," and "displace-
ment" as defenses were highly correlated to the use of vio-
lence.124 The habitual denial of reality tends to direct one's ag-
gressive drives outward, i.e., others become the culprits while the
actual perpetrator of violence steadfastly assumes, and believes in,
his or her own innocence. Similar conclusions were made by
Vaselle-Augenstein and Ehrlich 2 ' and Sonkin, Martin, and Walk-
er.
126
The individual who uses "projection," the defense that most
positively correlates with violence, attributes unacceptable emotions
Peer Relations, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COGNITION 35-58 (J.B. Pryor & J.D. Day
eds., 1986)).
122 Rouse, supra note 96, at 334; see also id. at 334 (The DPI, as developed by Rouse,
measured behaviors which are "controlling and manipulative (e.g., closely monitoring the
partner's time, isolating the partner by discouraging outside friendships, and ridiculing or
being overly critical of the partner.")).
123 Meloy, supra note 46, at 487.
124 Alan Apter ct al., Defense Mechanisms in Risk of Suicide and Risk of Wolence 146 AM.
J. PSYHIATRY 1027, 1030 (1989).
125 Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 145.
126 SONKIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 42.
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or impulses, such as anger and aggression, to others in the envi-
ronment.27 Apter et al. also determined that "displacement," i.e.,
the transference "of aggression from primary objects onto symbolic
representations of or substitutes for those objects, "121 was highly
correlated with violence. Finally, "splitting," defined previously in
the description of the borderline erotomanic, is correlated with
violence." These defenses are not merely theoretical. Ted
Bundy's killings are an excellent example of the outcome of a So-
ciopathic stalker's displacement. When Bundy was rejected by the
object of his obsession, he displaced his anger onto "substitute"
victims, and he killed them." °
4. Psychiatric Correlates of Violence
A number of studies examine the relationship between violent
behavior and specific psychiatric disorders or disturbances. Several
studies focus on the relationship between affective and anxiety
disorders and violence, while others focus on the relationship
between alcohol or drug use and the propensity towards violence.
Finally, the relationship between psychotic illnesses, particularly
schizophrenia, and violence is examined in the literature.
In a review of data from 1140 male convicted felons, Collins
and Bailey found a statistically significant relationship between dys-
thymia (a chronic moderate level of depression) and adulthood
fighting."' They found a similar relationship between depressive
"symptoms" and fighting, even after controlling for the potentially
confounding influences of alcohol abuse. They conclude that "the
depressive features of mood disorders increase the likelihood that
individuals will resort to violence in interpersonal relations."132
Collins and Bailey admit that their results may not be generaliz-
able to the public at large, since their sample was not random,
but was comprised of convicted felons. Collins and Bailey also
observe that their study does not allow for the analysis of the
temporal relationship between depression symptoms and violence,
and they are thus unable to determine whether depressive symp-
127 Apter et al., supra note 124, at 1030.
128 Id.
129 Meloy, supra note 46, at 482; see also supra text accompanying note 76.
130 See Leibman, supra note 101, at 44.
131 James J. Collins & Susan L Bailey, Relationship of Mood Disorders to VWolence 178 J.




toms precede violence or develop as a result of having committed
a violent act.'-3
Swanson, Holzer, Ganju, and Jono14 sought to determine
whether particular DSM-III-R diagnoses were predictive of violence
using a pooled data base of approximately 10,000 individuals from
the National Institute of Mental Health ("NIMH") Epidemiologic
Catchment Area Surveys. They examined violent and nonviolent
individuals who had features of a singular DSM-III-R diagnosis as
well as those individuals who fit the criteria for more than one
diagnosis.
Swanson et aL. compared the data on 368 individuals who
admitted engaging in some violent behavior in the previous year
with those who denied engaging in violence. They concluded that
an increased risk of violence was present among the individuals
meeting the criteria for a DSM-III-R diagnosis over those individu-
als who did not fit the criteria for any diagnostic group. A. total of
55.5 percent of those reporting violence met the criteria for a
psychiatric disorder, compared to only 19.6 percent of nonviolent
respondents. Little difference was present in the risk of violence
perpetrated by individuals in different diagnostic categories. 3 5 A
notable exception to this finding, however, was among individuals
with substance abuse disorders. Swansbn- et aL. observed that the
most prevalent diagnosis among violent respondents was substance
abuse. A full 41.64 percent of violent respondents fit the diagnos-
tic criteria for substance abuse, as compared to only 4.93 percent
of the nonviolent respondents. 3 6 Swanson et al. conclude that
"[w]e have shown that the interaction between substance abuse
and major psychopathology is a statistically significant predictor of
violence."3  Their finding is consistent with those reported
elsewhere.'38
153 Id.
134 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., 'oklince and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence
From the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PsYcHIATRY 761
(1990).
155 Id. at 765.
136 Id. at 765.
137 Id. at 769.
138 Collins & Bailey, supra note 131, at 47. But see Volavka et al., supra note 108, at
239 (reporting research critical of studies that report a simple associative relationship
between alcohol abuse and violence, and explaining that these studies have not "con-
trolled for associated psychopathology" that may explain both the alcohol use and the
use of violence).
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The Swanson et al. study also strongly supports the hypothesis
that the risk of violence increases if an individual meets the crite-
ria for multiple DSM-III-R diagnoses."3 9 Additionally, they con-
clude that the risk of violence increases even more "substantially"
if the individual in question is male, young, and of lower socioeco-
nomic status. 14°
Research also focuses on the risk for violent behavior among
psychotic individuals within psychiatric institutions and the commu-
nity at large. Volavka et al. reviewed the contradictory findings
regarding the prevalence of, and risk for, violence among psy-
chotic individuals such as schizophrenics. 141 The Swanson et al.
study demonstrates that, statistically, the public is more at risk
from the violence perpetrated by individuals who fit the diagnostic
criteria for alcohol abuse than from those determined to be
schizophrenic. They conclude, therefore, that the public fear to-
wards schizophrenics is "largely unwarranted, though not totally
groundless."1
4 2
This brief review of the research on violence illustrates that
various psychobiologic, environmental, intrapsychic, and psychiatric
factors contribute to the development of a violent individual. Until
a comprehensive model of violent behavior is developed and stud-
ied, however, the ability to predict, with a high degree of confi-
dence, which stalkers will commit violent acts and which will not,
remains a desirable, but elusive goal.
C. The Impact of Stalking on the Victim
Empirical data pertaining to the actual number of victims who
experience physical or sexual violence at the hands of stalkers
does not exist. While not all victims of stalkers become victims of
physical assault, violence need not be physical in order to elicit
"substantial" and "actual" emotional reactions. 4 Some studies of
"violence" even specify that the term "violence" does not only
refer to acts of physical assault but also encompasses the threat to
attack and verbal attacks made on individuals.144 This under-
139 Swanson et al., supra note 134, at 766.
140 Id. at 768.
141 Volavka et al., supra note 108, at 241.
142 Swanson et al., supra note 134, at 769.
143 See infra Part IV-B91)(e).
144 See Thomas K. Greenfield et al., Violent Behavior and Length of Psychiatric Hospitaliza-
tion, 40 HOSp. & COMMUNIrY PSYCIuATRY 809, 810 (1989).
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standing of violence is a premise of the criminal sanctions found
in anti-stalking laws and of the discussion that follows.
No two individuals react to the same traumAtic emotional
event or act of violence in an identical manner. Clinicians, howev-
er, often observe similar behavioral, emotional, and cognitive reac-
tions in victims of emotional or physical trauma. The American
Psychiatric Association defines this characteristic and recognizable
pattern as "Post-traumatic Stress Disorder" ("PTSD")."5  The
DSM-III-R PTSD diagnosis is reserved for individuals who have
experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human
experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost
anyone, e.g., serious threat to one's life or physical integrity;
serious threat or harm to one's children, spouse, or other close
relatives.' 1
In addition, the diagnosis applies to those who manifest re-experienc-
ing, avoidance, and increased arousal symptoms for at least one
month.147
A review of stalking victims' responses to their ordeals indi-
cates the presence of several PTSD symptoms, some of which per-
sist even after the stalking ceases.1 4' Anecdotal evidence suggests
145 AMEI AN Psw=HIATRi ssocuoN, supra note 49, at 250; see also Mary P. Koss,
The Women's Mental Health Research Agenda: Viwlence Against Women, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsr
374, 375 (1990). See generally Herbert I. Levit, Battered Women: Syndrome Versus Self-Defens 9
AM. J. FoRENsIC PsHOLOGY 29, 30 (1991) (describing the impact which battering has on
mental and emotional functioning).
146 AMERICAN PSYCHIATIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 250.
147 Id. at 250 (According to the DSM-III-R, some of the re-e&periencing symptoms in-
clude: having "recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event;" having "re-
current distressing dreams of the event;" suddenly "acting or feeling as if the traumatic
event were recurring;" and "intense psychological distress at exposure to events that sym-
bolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event." Some of the avoidance symptoms
include: "efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma;" efforts "to
avoid activities or situations that arouse recollections of the trauma;" an "inability to re-
call an important aspect of 'the trauma (psychogenic amnesia);" a "markedly diminished
interest in significant activities;" a "feeling of detachment or estrangement from others;"
having a "restricted range of affect, e.g., unable to have loving feelings;" having a "sense
of foreshortened future." The arousal symptoms include "difficulty falling or staying
asleep;" "irritability or outbursts of anger;" having "difficulty concentrating;" being
"hypervigilant;" having an "exaggerated startle response;" and experiencing "physiologic
reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic
event." At least one of the -c'~riendng symptoms, three of the avoidance symptoms, and
two of the arousal symptoms must be present before the diagnosis of PTSD can be made.
In addition, these symptoms must be present for at least one month, regardless of when
the symptoms appear. If the symptoms appear more than six months after the trauma,
delayed onset is specified in the PTSD diagnosis. This Note should not be considered com-
plete, and the reader is encouraged to refer to the DSM-III-R, as cited.).
148 See Dunlop, supra note 58, at 831 ("However, over the months, the employee be-
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that in cases where the stalking victim does not meet the full diag-
nostic criteria for PTSD, the victim may exhibit one or more post-
traumatic symptoms. 149 In general, these symptoms may vary in
severity and duration. Pynoos, Sorenson, and Steinberg state that
the "[o]utcome may range from a relatively successful adaptation
that includes restored psychological, interpersonal, and occupation-
al functioning, to severe trauma-related pathology and pervasive
functional impairment."150 On the "severe" end of the spectrum,
victims of trauma may experience reactions other than PTSD such
as depression, substance abuse, phobic anxiety, generalized anxi-
ety, obsessive-compulsive behaviors, and dissociative disorders.
15 1
In addition, some longitudinal research indicates that "a pro-
portion of victims of violence remain symptomatic for years, and
that if anxiety or PTSD symptoms persist beyond three months,
they are not likely to remit without intervention." 5 2 This finding
came quite frightened by the patient's [following] behavior and finally, on request to the
store's management, she was transferred to Hull so that she could be away from the
patient's attentions."); see also Brown, supra note 67 ("But the minute I start feeling re-
lief, he starts up again .... It's really hard to carry on a normal life .... I watch
over my shoulder all the time," says a woman stalked by a former lover. She has
changed her telephone number four times and has broken off a new relationship for
fear that her former lover will harm her current boyfriend.); Court, supra note 83 ("As
always, the curtains . .. were drawn tightly .... A pair of scissors lay carefully posi-
tioned on the kitchen table .... [The stalking victim] rarely left the apartment."); Jane
Kwaitkowski, Peeping Tom Case Stirs Fear, Anguish, Emotion, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 5, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File ("During. the time of her [stalking] prob-
lems with Giarratano, the woman said a sense of fear was constantly with her. She com-
plained of nightmares."); Laird, supra note 57 ("Linda . . . always carries a gun, even
though it's illegal . . . she still flinches whenever she sees a pickup truck in her rearview
mirror." This woman ate at her desk, became suspicious of strangers, and "wondered
whether it might be her fault."); Puente, supra note 2, at 9A ("She changed her name,
her job, her hair. She installed a security system. She dropped all her old friends. Then,
she disappeared. That was six years ago and she's still in hiding-still afraid of the man
who stalked and threatened to kill her." Another woman "moved in with roommates, had
co-workers follow her home, and screened her calls. He broke in . . . kidnapped her,
shot her, set her body on fire and dumped it in a creek."); Mike Royko, Mediation Order
Is An Obscene Call, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1992, at C3 ("'This wasn't just some kid's prank,'
Nancy said. 'He threatened and terrified me for months.'").
149 It is impossible to identify the number and severity of PTSD symptoms on the
basis of case examples alone. Further studies should examine the lingering effects which
victims experience in the months and years following their stalking.
150 Robert S. Pynoos et al., Interpesonal Violence and Traumatic Stress Reactions, in
HANDBOOK OF STREss; THEORETICAL AND Ct.NicAL ASPECTs 573, 580 (Leo Goldberger &
Shlomo Breznitz eds., 2d ed. 1993).
151 Id at 580 (relying on I. Winfield et al., Sexual Assault and Psychiatric Disorders
Among a Community Sample of Women, 147 AM. J. PscHiATRY 335-41 (1990)).
152 Id. at 581 (quoting D.G. Kilpatrick et al., The Aftermath of Rape: Recent Empirical
Findings, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHATRY 658-59 (1979)).
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implies that victims of traumatic events, including victims of
stalkers' emotionf.l or physical assaults, should be encouraged to
seek professional help if symptoms persist for more than one
month.153
This Note will not describe the various factors that influence-
the impact of a stressful or traumatic situation on any particular
victim of trauma. Similarly, we will not discuss the specific cogni-
tive and physiological effects of victimization. These and related
issues should be examined in future research as they relate to
male and female victims of stalkers-noting any gender differences
that may. exist in the way that trauma and post-traumatic reactions
are experienced.
D. Prospects for Treatment
Until science can predict which stalkers are likely to stalk
repeatedly or behave violently, mental health specialists must ap-
proach each stalking case individually. The approach must be
multi-faceted in order to address the factors that lead to stalking
behavior.
1. Treatment Prospects for Erotomania and de C16rambault's
Syndrome
Once the evaluating psychiatrist determines that the stalker
fits the criteria for a Delusional Disorder, erotomanic subtype, and
rules out other disorders of which erotomanic delusions may be
symptomatic, she faces three treatment options.15 4
First, the psychiatrist must consider whether to hospitalize the
delusional erotomanic. Kaplan and Sadock state: "The possibility of
suicide or" homicide, severe impairment in occupational or social
functioning, and the need for a diagnostic workup are strong
indications for hospitalization."155 If the stalker refuses to be hos-
pitalized, but the psychiatrist can demonstrate the need to hospi-
talize, an involuntary legal commitment may be necessary.
153 See AMERIcAN PS tHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 251 (The diagnosis of
PTSD is only appropriate if the symptoms persist for more than one month. In addition,
a diagnosis of "PTSD with delayed onset" is made if the symptoms do not appear for at
least six months after the traumatic event has occurred.).
154 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 64, at 348.
155 Id.
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The psychiatrist's second treatment option is to use medica-
tion.15 Antipsychotic drugs are currently considered the drugs of
choice for individuals with chronic delusional disorders, "although
adequate proof of their efficacy is lacking."5 7 Some research sug-
gests that Erotomania responds to pimozide, a
diphenylbutylpiperidine antipsychotic' 58 Meloy cautions, however,
that "[t]here is currently no published research, except anecdotal
reports, concerning the pharmacological management of the
erotomanic patient." 59 Another difficulty with using medication
on delusional patients is that they are generally noncompliant with
physicians' instructions to take medications."
The psychiatrist's third treatment option is psychotherapy.16 1
Kaplan and Sadock recommend that the early stages of therapy
should focus on helping the delusional individual manage his
anxiety or irritability, without confronting or criticizing the actual
delusion. As treatment proceeds, and as the erotomanic develops
trust in the therapist, the therapeutic focus can shift to the ad-
verse effects that the actual delusion has on the individual's life.
Meloy also suggests that the clinical evaluator should look for
personality disturbances that are "masked" by the delusions of the
erotomanic1 6 Some of these personality disturbances-paranoid,
histrionic, borderline, and anti-social traits-may influence the
behavioral activities of the erotomanic and should be addressed in
therapy.16 s
Kaplan and Sadock conclude, "A good therapeutic outcome
depends on the psychiatrist's ability to respond to the patient's
mistrust of others and the resulting interpersonal conflicts, frus-
trations, and failures. "'6& They also identify the factors that corre-
156 Id. at 349.
157 Id.
158 Ghaziuddin & Tsai, supra note 52, at 127 (relying on A. Munro et al., TwoCases
of 'Pure' or 'Primay' Eromania Successfully Treated uih Pimozid4 0 CANADLAN J. Ps'z-HIATRY
619-22 (1985)) (Ghaziuddin & Tsai indicate that only "pure" Erotomania responds to
pimozide. "Pure" Erotornania refers to the case where the delusional erotomania does not
coexist with, nor is a symptom of, another psychiatric disorder.).
159 Meloy, supra note 46, at 489. (Meloy also suggests that, in the absence of pub-
lished research findings, psychiatrists should not "be dissuaded from trying various medi-
cations that might be efficacious.").
160 See KAPLAN AND SADoCK, supra note 64, at 349 (explaining that the delusional
individual will "incorporate the administration of drugs into their delusional system").
161 Id.
162 Meloy, sufra note 46, at 489.
163 See AMERICAN Psy-HIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 49.
164 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 64, at 350.
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late with a good prognosis for delusional individuals: "high levels
of occupational, social, and functional adjustment; female sex;16
onset before age thirty; acute onset; short duration of illness; and
the presence of precipitating factors. Patients with persecutory,
somatic, and erotic delusions have a better prognosis than do
patients with grandiose and jealous delusions."166
2. Treatment Prospects for the Borderline Erotomanic
The term "Borderline Erotomania," and the narrowly defined
category of stalkers it describes, is relatively new.6 7 Because bor-
derline erotomanics are diagnostically distinct from. delusional
erotomanics, the literature that pertains to the treatment of
erotomanic delusionals should not automatically be applied to the
treatment of these individuals. The treatment options that Kaplan
and Sadock identify for delusional erotomanics may be helpful,
however, in developing appropriate treatment techniques for bor-
derline erotomanics.
The evaluating psychiatrist should first determine whether the
borderline erotomanic needs to be hospitalized. The criteria that
Kaplan and Sadock set for the delusional erotomanic's hospitaliza-
tion should also apply to the borderline erotomanic.1" These
criteria-the serious risk of suicide or homicide and severe social
or occupational impairment-are general guidelines that psychi-
atrists consider before hospitalizing any client, regardless of diag-
nosis.
The use of antipsychotic medications to "cure" these stalkers
of their erotomanic symptoms may be inappropriate because, un-
like the delusional erotomanic, there is no delusional process
involved with the borderline erotomanic. The evaluating psychia-
trist must determine, however, whether the borderline
erotomanic's symptoms are secondary to other disorders such as
schizophrenia, mood disorders, or organic disorders, because
erotomanic symptoms may accompany these diagnoses. 169 These
other diagnoses can be appropriately treated with medications. For
165 Kaplan and Sadock do not explain why female delusionals have a better progno-
sis.
166 I at 345; s also AMERicAN PsyCHIATIuc ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 200 (def-
initions of persecutory, somatic, grandiose, and jealous delusional subtypes).
167 Meloy, supra note 46, at 478.
168 See KAPLAN & SADOCK supra note 64, at 348.
169 Meloy, supra note 46, at 489.
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example, Meloy suggests that borderline erotomanics who experi-
ence an affective component to their disorder may find symptom-
atic relief from other pharmacotherapy, such as lithium
carbonate.170
The evaluating psychiatrist may determine that psychotherapy
is appropriate for the borderline erotomanic stalker. In this case,
personality disorders that may accompany the borderline
erotomanic's symptoms171 should be addressed in therapy. The
Narcissistic, Histrionic, Antisocial, Borderline, and Paranoid per-
sonality disorders that Meloy identifies are defined in the DSM-III-
R,'72 and mental health professionals currently use various psy-
chotherapeutic approaches when treating individuals who have
personality disorders. 17 Similar therapeutic approaches may be
appropriate for the borderline erotomanic who exhibits these
character disorder traits.
3. Treatment Prospects for Former Intimate Stalkers
The Former Intimate stalker exhibits several of the same per-
sonality characteristics and defense mechanisms that domestically
violent individuals exhibit. Several types of treatment programs are
designed for men and women who batter their partners; because
of the psychological similarities between these types of individuals,
some of these treatment techniques may also be effective with
Former Intimate stalkers.174 As with the delusional erotomanic
170 Id. at 489; see also id. (citing Goldstein, supra note 66, at 267-74).
171 Meloy, supra note 46, at 481.
172 See AMERICAN PSYIIATRiC ASSOCATION, supra note 49, at 351 (diagnostic criteria
for Narcissistic Personality Disorder); see also id. at 349 (diagnostic criteria for Histrionic
Personality Disorder);. id. at 345 (diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder);
id. at 347 (diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder); id. at 339 (diagnostic
criteria for Paranoid Personality Disorder).
173 See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 64, at 531 (treatment recommendations for Nar-
cissistic Personality Disorder); see also id. (treatment recommendations for Histrionic Per-
sonality Disorder); id. at 532 (treatment recommendations for Antisocial Personality Disor-
der); id. at 534 (treatment recommendations for Borderline Personality Disorder); id. at
528 (treatment recommendations for Paranoid Personality Disorder).
174 Beck et al., supra note 84, at 60; see SHUPE ET AL., supra note 87, at 118 (Reality
therapy, cognitive structuring, and various types of anger management techniques are
used, as are individual therapy, group therapy, or a combination of both. Their research
indicates that "no one counseling format is indispensable;" but that a range of approach-
es can have an impact on batterers. They consider three elements essential to these pro-
grams: holding the violent person responsible for the violent behavior;, trying to get ob-
jective, independent information on the violent individual and monitoring him when




and the borderline erotomanic, the evaluating psychiatrist should
first determine whether the Former Intimate stalker needs to be
hospitalized and whether medication is appropriate.
A batterer is often referred into psychological treatment as
part of probation,"5 and in some instances, if the batterer meets
certain prerequisites, he will be diverted into a counseling and
education program as an alternative to criminal prosecution. 176
This alternative is not recommended for the Former Intimate
stalker because of the threatening nature of his stalking behavior
and the effect of his behavior on his victim. Counseling and edu-
cation, however, are both recommended as treatment alternatives
after sentencing.
Former Intimate stalkers are highly ambivalent about interper-
sonal intimacy and emotional dependency. In addition, they expe-
rience rejection as abandonment, and feel the need to control
their former partners. These issues must be addressed in therapy.
The therapeutic techniques generally used with domestic violence
offenders, however, are brief in duration, educational in nature,
and focused on the acquisition of new communication and anger
management skills. 77 Vaselle-Augenstein and Ehrlich recom-
mend, "Because we believe that many batterers exhibit serious
psychopathology, we would argue that treatment not merely be
longer but that a specific attempt be made to deal with deeper
psychodynamic issues."17' This recommendation, and the specific
issues of ambivalence, abandonment, and control, should be con-
sidered when a mental health professional formulates the
treatment plan for a Former Intimate stalker.
The primary treatment goal of Sonkin et aL. for their own
work with domestic violence offenders, a goal that is also appropri-
ate for Former Intimate stalkers-is to stop violent behavior, in-
cluding "physical, sexual, property, and psychological violence."79
They admit that other secondary goals are more likely to assure
long-term change than a singular focus on developing anger man-
agement skills. Some of these secondary goals, also appropriate for
the Former Intimate stalker, include: to increase feelings of self-
175 See Sonkin et al., supra note 92, at 125.
176 See id.. at 55 (citing special Proceedings in Cases Involving Domestic Violence,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.6-.11).
177 Vaselle-Augenstein & Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 150.
178 Id. at 151.
179 Sonkin et al., supra note 92, at 90.
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esteem, to decrease isolation and develop interpersonal support
systems, to increase a sense of personal responsibility for his be-
havior, and to increase acceptance of the consequences of his
behavior."is
4. Treatment Prospects for Sociopathic Stalkers
The prospects for treating sociopathic stalkers is not promis-
ing. Currently, there is no known cure for the condition. 181 The
prospect of incarceration does not deter Sociopathic criminals. Dr.
John MacDonald observes that sadistic murderers, who "figure
prominently in the ranks of serial murders,"8 2 are indifferent to
the suffering of others. He concludes: "Long periods in a peniten-
tiary or a mental hospital do not seem to turn them away from
their homicidal inclinations. While in custody, their behavior is
without reproach and their custodians are too often deceived by
this unreliable predictor of dangerousness.""3 These observations
suggest that additional research is necessary regarding the viability
of different treatment techniques for Sociopathic stalkers. Before
any one technique is implemented, additional research is also
necessary on the rates, and risks, of recidivism within this criminal
population.
180 Id. at 90-93.
181 In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutional limitations of the use of psychiatric testimony to predict violent behavior of
capital defendants. . The Court held that expert testimony predicting defendant's future
dangerousness was admissible at trial. At defendant Barefoot's state trial, psychiatrist John
Holbrook testified that Barefoot was a criminal sociopath and that Holbrook knew of no
treatment that could change this condition. Id. at 918 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Dr.
James Grigson also testified that Barefoot had a sociopathic personality disorder and that
no known cure exists for the condition. Id. at 919. Other psychiatrists and forensic ex-
perts have reached similar conclusions.
182 JOHN M. MACDONALD, THE MURDERER AND HIs VICnM 25 (1986); see id. at 148
(describing the psychological profile of serial murderers) (Dr. MacDonald is Professor of
Psychiatry and Director of Forensic Psychiatry, University of Colorado Health Sciences
Center); see also uupa notes 102-03 and accompanying text (cases of serial killers who
also stalked).
183 PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHABILITATIVE TECHNIQUES, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (Susan E. Martin et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter
NEw DIRECTIONS] (The panel concludes: "Rather than continue to try to develop offend-
er typologies in the abstract, the panel recommends the formulation and adoption of a
'template-matching technique' to guide the assignment of offenders to programs. One
creates a template of the kind of person that is most likely to succeed in a program
according to the theoretical propositions underlying a treatment when supported by em-
pirical findings. Then offenders are selected to fit the template. Thus, the program cli-
ents are theoretically suggested.").
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Treatment techniques for the four types of stalkers identified
in this Note should be evaluated according to the guidelines sug-
gested by the Panel on Research on Rehabilitative Techniques,
with special emphasis on their recommendation that "intervention
programs must be designed for and tested with a theoretically
suggested, clearly specified target population.""8
E. Conclusion
A review of the literature suggests that at least four types of
stalkers exist: delusional erotomanics, borderline erotomanics,
Former Intimate stalkers, and Sociopathic stalkers. While stalkers
in each of these categories may behave in similar ways, the etiolo-
gy of their behavior and the motives for their actions differ.
The delusional erotomanic believes that his affections are
reciprocated by his victim, and he seeks to "continue" a relation-
ship that he believes already exists. By contrast, the borderline
erotomanic seeks to establish a relationship with an individual who
does not "yet" reciprocate his affections. In both of these cases, no
history of an actual intimate relationship between stalker and victim
exists. The Former Intimate stalker does have an actual history of
relationship with his target. In some cases, the Former Intimate
stalker is trying desperately to salvage a failed relationship and in
others is only seeking revenge for the break-up. Finally, the Socio-
pathic stalker is neither seeking to establish a relationship nor
expressing revenge for a failed relationship. He stalks an individu-
al who "fits" a particular victim-profile. Adequate forensic or demo-
graphic data on the risk posed by each of these stalker "types" is
lacking, though by definition the Sociopathic stalker poses a signif-
icant and credible risk to society. More research must be done,
and more accurate crime statistics compiled, before the prevalence
of, and risk posed by, these individuals are known.
The stalker profiles described are useful not only as an aid to
understanding stalking behavior, but are of practical import to
both the defendant and the state in stalking litigation. Based on
psychological studies conducted to date, and the diagnostic tools
available to mental health professionals, a mental health expert
could use the "stalker" profiles described here to help prove1a'
184 Id. at 24.
185 F.R.E. 704(b) does not, however, permit an expert witness to testify specifically
whether the defendant "did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting
an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto." rd See generally Anne Lawson
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whether a person charged with stalking acted, or did not act, with
the requisite state of mind.186 For ,example, if a Former Intimate
stalker commits a proscribed act, he may have acted out of narcis-
sistic or abandonment rage and therefore may or may not have
acted with the requisite intent.18 7 A defense attorney may, if the
case is appropriate, be able to base an insanity defense on a diag-
nosis of Erotomania or Sociopathy.1 Former Chief Judge Sol
Wachtler's attorneys considered basing an insanity defense for him
on a diagnosis of Erotomania 9 Thus, depending on whether
the defendant fits the criteria of one of the stalking profiles de-
scribed above, expert testimony may be useful for proving or dis-
proving that the defendant acted with the requisite intent or that
such a person creates a reasonable threat to the victim.
A person arrested for stalking may fit one of the stalking
profiles described above. Before trial, a comprehensive neurologi-
cal, psychiatric, medical, and psychological evaluation should be
conducted by specialists in these fields."' The goal of such an
Braswell, Note, Resunction of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the
Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L REV. 620 (1987).
186 See People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("Defendant's expert
testified that the defendant did not have a personality disorder. He also testified that the
defendant did have a 'dependent personality pattern' and that, under the circumstances,
the commission of the crime in this case was a normal reaction for a person with that
type of personality." The court held that it was proper rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution's expert to testify that a "dependent personality pattern" was not a recog-
nized personality disorder under DSM-III.)For a general discussion of the use of expert
psychiatrist or psychologist testimony to prove or disprove state of mind through expert
testimony on character, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Psychological Character Evidence and the Athi-
bution of Responsibility, 52 MD. L REV. 1 (1993). Taslitz discusses various uses of this type
of testimony. In State v. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 1983), the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that it was proper for the state to use expert testimony to show that the de-
fendant was in a class of "hatred rapists," and therefore his assault on the victim was
probably by force and not consensual. Id. at 9; Hickman, 337 N.W.2d at 516. Taslitz also
discusses United States v. Roberts. 887 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1989). In that case, the defen-
dant used expert psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant's naive and autocratic
character to prove that the defendant did not intend to distribute cocaine. Taslitz, supra,
at 11-12.
187 See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for examples of the intent with
which Former Intimate stalkers may act. See also People v. Robbins, 755 P.2d 355 (Cal.
1988) (expert witness testimony used to prove that, because the defendant acted out of
sexual frustration and rage, he did not murder the victim intentionally).
188 David Lewis, who represented Carolyn Warmus in a "so called 'fatal attraction'
murder" trial, used her obsession with the victim as the basis for an insanity defense.
John Riley, Wachtler Case Is Insanity a Crazy Idea?, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Feb.
11, 1993, at 8.
189 Id. Former Chief Judge Wachtler subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges
against him. Kleinfeld, supra note 9, at Al.
190 See supra notes 107-42 and accompanying text. It is critical that the following fac-
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evaluation is fourfold: to determine the appropriate stalker "classi-
fication," to establish the stalker's motives, to determine his risk
for violent behavior, and to decide the appropriate clinical treat-
ment, sentence, or both. A neurological examination of the ac-
cused or indicted stalker can identify the presence of organic
brain damage and seizure activity, and a medical evaluation' can
determine endocrinological and neurochemical imbalances that
are correlated with violent behavior. The results of these evalua-
tions may help to determine whether the defendant acted with the
requisite state of mind. Further, a psychiatric evaluation can deter-
mine the, presence of psychosis or other DSM-III-R disor-
ders-particularly important in determining legal competence for
the delusional erotomanics and Sociopathic stalkers. A psychologi-
cal evaluation can determine personality features, the presence of
DSM-III-R disorders, antecedent attachment or bonding disturbanc-
es, and the relational style of these individuals.
tors or correlates of violence be considered when administering a formal evaluation of an
accused or indicted stalker.
-the presence of diffuse brain damage
-endocrinological or neurochemical imbalances
-the presence of psychiatric illnesses
-the presence of delusions
-childhood attachment deficiencies
-- witnessing and/or experiencing family violence as a child
-Narcissistic, Borderline, Histrionic, and Anti-social Personality traits as defined
by DSM-III-R criteria
-- substance abuse




-- ambivalence regarding dependency needs
-a history of aggression towards intimates
-former mental health treatment
-the use of denial, projection, and displacement as ego defenses
-having no one with whom to talk about problems
While some of these correlates may not be as robust as others, they must not be over-
looked during evaluation by the mental health professional or forensic specialist. See also
Meloy, supra note 46, at 489 (Meloy recommends that the evaluator consider the degree
of narcissism, hysteria, paranoia, and psychopathy in the accused stalker "because these
factors may predict the degree of violent acting out that could occur. Generally, the
more obvious the presence of paranoid and psychopathic traits, the greater the risk of
violence, especially if the erotomanic individual meets other criteria, such as use of alco-
hol or psychostimulants, that correlate with violence." I. In addition, Meloy recommends
and justifies the use of specific projective tests during the evaluation phase.).
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Finally, the psychological impact that stalkers have on their
victims must not be minimized or overlooked in the law enforce-
ment process. Both the acute and long-term emotional and practi-
cal effects of the stalking experience are actual and substantial,
and every effort should be made to protect the victim from fur-
ther emotional and physical harm. l"'
III. A HISTORY OF MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
AND STALKING BEHAVIORS
Law enforcement has long faced the behaviors that anti-stalk-
ing laws attempt to prevent, punish, or otherwise control. William
Blackstone, in his Commentaies, discusses the ways in which English
monarchs, parliamentarians, and judges attempted to stop con-
temporary manifestations of the same or similar behaviors covered
by anti-stalking laws. The history of Anglo-American efforts to
control people who threaten to breach the peace I9 or who
threaten the personal security of others through stalking-type be-
haviors-a course of conduct that creates a credible threat of
bodily harm or that causes substantial emotional distress-provides
a helpful perspective for evaluating modern stalking laws.
A. Criminal Law and Stalking Behaviors
[T]he absolute rights of each individual [include] ... the
right of personal security.., so that the wrongs or injuries
affecting [that right] must consequently be of a correspondent
nature.
-Blackstone' 93
English criminal law as it existed at the time of the American
Revolution was distinctly spotty in the protection it gave against
the behaviors covered by a modern anti-stalking law.194 "Lyeing
191 See supra Part II-D.
192 Only acts of violence were breaches of the king's peace. 2 FREDRICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 453-54, 462-66 (2d ed.
1923). Also, the king's peace did not extend to every person in the realm, but was limit-
ed, at the time of the Norman conquest, "to persons, or at places . .. specially protect-
ed by royal power." Id. at 253 (footnote omitted); see also 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTO-
RY OF ENGLISH LAw 47-50 (1923) (discussion of the development of the idea that offens-
es against the king's peace were crimes against the state and not solely against private
individuals). For another discussion of the concept of the king's peace, see JuLIus
GOEBEL, JR., FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAw 1-44,
423-40 (1976).
193 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *119.
194 These behaviors could constitute a "course of conduct" that "seriously alarms or
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in wait," analogous to the surveillance-type behaviors in which
some modem stalkers engage, was not a crime, although it could
be an element in other crimes. Specific statutory punishments
were provided for threatening letters, and in some cases for what
Blackstone describes generically as "menaces." In addition, a quasi-
criminal proceeding was provided through which a victim of re-
peated threats or harassment could require the perpetrator to put
up sureties of the peace. 95 While all these provisions had gaps,
English criminal law at least dealt severely with one behavior that,
if repeatedly done, would be a stalking behavior today-sending
threatening letters.1"
1. Offenses Against the Peace:1 7 Threatening Letters
In fifteenth-century England, unknown persons were "casting
bills" into the houses of citizens in the city of Cambridge and in
the counties of Essex and Kent. The bills demanded. that money
be placed at a specified place at a specified time or else the per-
son receiving the bill would have his house or other property
burned., The houses and chattels of several people were burned in
this way, impoverishing many. A law passed in 1429 made "all such
burnings of houses of any person . . . high treason."198 The lan-
guage of the statute, however, was ambiguous as to whether the
act of sending such a threatening letter was part of the offense of
burning or was a separate offense of high treason. Blackstone,
though, adopted the separate offense interpretation." At this
time, the punishment for high treason was death2" and forfei-
annoys" and that would cause a reasonable person to suffer "substantial emotional dis-
tress." See supra note 23. -
195 See suprn Part II-A(3).
196 It could be part of a course of conduct that violates an anti-stalking statute.
197 This title comes from 4 BtAcKSroNE, supra note 44, at *142.
198 8 Hen. 6, ch. 6 (1429), repeaed by I Edw. 6, c. 12 (1547) (Blackstone cites this
statute as 8 Hen. 5, ch. 6. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *144.).
199 4 BtACysTONE, supra note 44, at *144. The Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. 3, st. 5
ch. 2 (1351), distinguished felonies from treason and went on to specify six treasonous
offenses. High treason was treason against the king, whereas petit treason was treason
against a superior. 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 192, at 449-50. Holdsworth comments that
statutes passed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries after the Statute of Treasons
were passed due to "political necessities" or to "repress a particularly prevalent offense."
Id. at 450. The persons sending the demand letters were either literate themselves or
conspired with someone who wrote the letters for them. Literate persons could escape
the death penalty if convicted of a felony that had the "benefit of clergy." See ROBERT E.
RODES, JR., LAY AuTnotrry AND THE REFORMATION IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH 29-33 (1982).
200 Since before Edward I's reign, high treason was punishable by death. 1 POLLOCK
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ture of the traitor's lands to the crown. 20 1 Effective for a time,
the statute was repealed under a general pruning of the law of
treason in 1547.12
In 1722, a group of armed men, called the "Blacks," so
named because they blackened their faces, terrorized the country-
side. The Blacks committed many illegal acts and did "great dam-
age to several persons." One of their activities was sending de-
mand letters. To combat this activity, Parliament passed a statute
making the sending of this type of letter a felony.203 Parliament
outlawed demand letters' that threatened the receiver with ar-
son, threatened to maliciously shoot a person, or demanded any
valuable thing, whether the letter was unsigned or signed with a
fictitious name.2°' In 1754, Parliament expanded the law to make
the sending of nondemanding threatening letters a felony. N 6
Thus, after 1754, sending a letter threatening to "kill or murder
any of his Majesty's . . . subjects, or to bum their houses [or oth-
er property]," though the sender made no demand for payment
on the receiver, was a felony.20 7 The statute prescribed the death
penalty for those convicted of sending nondemanding threatening
letters.' Thus, shortly before the American Revolution, the act
of sending demand or non-demand letters that threatened bodily
harm or destruction of property was considered a capital offense.
& MAnITAND, supra note 188, at 51.
201 3 HoLDSWoRTH, supra note 192, at 71.
202 See supra note 198.
203 9 Geo. 1. ch. 22 (1722). The class of offenses entitled felonies predates statutory
classification of treasonous offenses and also misdemeanors (which developed from the
action of trespass). 2 HODSWoRTH, supra note 192, at 357-58; 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
192, at 289. Originally, a felony described "those offenses which involved a breach of the
obligation between lord and vassal." Later, the scope of felonies was widened to include
serious offenses which occurred between subjects, but not necessarily between lord and
vassal. The offenses were serious, and thus felonies, because they were "breaches of the
king's peace." 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 192, at 358. Conceptualizing felonies in this
way creates some difficulty in distinguishing felonies from treasonous offenses. Holdsworth
comments that, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the line between treasons and
felonies was "difficult to draw." 3 HOLSWORTH, supra note 192, at 289. For a general
discussion of statutes and case law on threatening letters from 1722 to 1806, see 2 ED-
WARD HYDE EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1104-26 (1806).
204 These are letters demanding money in exchange for the non-occurrence of the
threatened event.
205 Presumably, demand letters properly signed by the sender would also be punished
under the statute.
206 27 Geo. 2, ch. 15 (1754).
207 IM
208 Until the beginning of the nineteenth century in England, almost all felonies
were punishable by death. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 192, at 294 n.4.
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In the United States today, two federal statutes punish the
transmission of threatening communications through the mail or
interstate commerce.' States also punish such communications
under "terroristic threat," harassment, and intimidation stat-
utes.2 10 These laws are similar to the earlier English "threatening
letter" laws.21' Most of them criminalize communications that
threaten the receiver either with bodily harm or with the destruc-
tion of his property. Other laws apply even if the threat is to a
third person. For example, Georgia's terroristic threat statute
criminalizes the act of "threaten[ing] to commit any crime of
violence or to burn or damage property with the purpose of ter-
rorizing another or of causing the evacuation of a building."212
Illinois' intimidation statute makes it a crime to communicate to
another a threat of physical harm or a threat to harm proper-.
ty.21  Finally, Hawaii's harassment statute makes it an offense to
communicate by telephone or facsimile an intent to cause the re-
ceiver bodily injury or damage to the receiver's property.214
While some statutes may not criminalize threats to property, these
three statutes are otherwise representative of this body of law.
Below, we evaluate these statutes and their continued usefulness in
those states that have adopted anti-stalking laws. 15
2. Offenses Against Persons:216 Criminal Menacing, "Lyeing in
Waite," and Attempt Laws
Other stalking behaviors, particularly following and surveil-
lance-type behaviors, 17 traditionally are not regarded as crimes,
209 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(c), 876 (1988). Section 875(c) punishes anyone making an in-
terstate communication threatening injury to another and § 876 punishes anyone who
"knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered [through the mails] any communication
with or without a name . . . containing . . . any threat to injure the person of the ad-
dressee or of another." Id. Violators face a fine of $1000, up to 5 years in prison, or
both. Id
210 See infra Part IV.
211 The language of § 875 and § 876 is similar to 9 Geo. 1, ch. 22.
212 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37 (1992).
213 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-6 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
214. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106 (Michie 1988).
215 See infra Part IV.
216 This title comes from 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *205. These offenses affect
the security of persons. For Blackstone's explanation of why these are public wrongs, see
id. at *176.
217 See the story of Kathleen, stalked for approximately seven years by a man who
claimed to be a former classmate. This stalker committed a series of "stalking" behaviors,
including watching her parents' home. Vernon J. Geberth, Sla/wnr, LAW & ORDER, Oct.
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but rather as a prelude to crime or as important evidence of the
mens rea needed for some target offense. For example, Blackstone
and Hale did not consider "menacings antecedent" (undefined
acts that threaten bodily injury to the point where a person's
business is interrupted)21 as crimes, but said that menacings
might be proof of the mens rea element of murder.219 Unlike
threatening letters or assaults,22 this type of threatening behav-
ior was treated merely as a private wrong subject to tort and equi-
table remedies.I The only other activity analogous to a stalking
behavior addressed by English criminal law was the act of "lyeing
in waite." Lying in wait was not a crime itself, but could be an ele-
ment of another crime, such as mayhem.2 As to other crimes
such as murder, lying in wait could be evidence of the mens rea
(e.g., malice aforethought)"3 needed for a conviction.'
Thus, the criminal law of England through the eighteenth
century did not criminalize many of the behaviors that might
constitute a course of conduct that we would call "stalking." Ac-
1992, at 138, 140. After Kathleen's stalker finally kidnapped her, the court sentenced the
stalker to eight years. Her stalker indicated to the court that he would continue stalking
Kathleen when he was released. ILd. at 141; see also id. (the story of Judy, a 10-year old,
stalked by a 24-year old man who, through the course of his stalking, sent notes to Judy
indicating that he had been watching her as she played in her neighborhood).
218 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *120 (a person who threatened another to the
point where the latter's business is interrupted could have an action for trespass vi et
annis).
219 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 451 (1800) ('The evidences of such
malice must arise from external circumstances discovering inward intention, as lying in
wait, menacings antecedent.. . ."); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *198-99.
220 An assault is "an attempt or offer to beat another, without touching him." 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *120. An assault was a crime and a private wrong. 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *216-17.
221 See 25 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCwLoPEDiA OF LAW 1060-61 (Charles F. Williams
ed., 1887); see also infra note 297 and accompanying text (trespass vi et annis for threats
and menacings).
222 At common law, mayhem occurred when one of the king's subjects violently de-
prived another of a body part such as a hand, finger, or eye which, once lost, would
"abate[] the courage" of the victim. 4 BLACKSTONE .supra note 44, at *205. Further, may-
hem was "a breach of the king's peace, and an offense tending to deprive him of the
aid and assistance of his subjects." Id. By Charles II's reign, it was a felony to lie in wait
and then to attack and maim a person, even if the body part damaged were of less
import. 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 1 (1670 & 1671). A necessary element of this crime was that
the mayhem had to be done 'by lyeing in waite." The catalyst for this statute was an
attack upon Sir John Coventry, a member of the House of Commons, by a group of
men who held him down and slit his nose as well as delivering other wounds. The
Coventry Act, 23 Car. 2, ch. 1, became part of the common law of the United States.
228 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at 199; 1 HALE, supra note 219, at 451.
224 This would be needed for murder, but not manslaughter. I HALE, sup-a note 219.
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cordingly, acts that are the essence of stalking, repeated acts di-
rected at an individual that create a credible threat and cause
substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person, were not
criminal. For example, if someone in eighteenth-century England
followed a ten year old girl to the market every day, it would not
be an offense. But the act of sending a threatening letter was a se-
rious offense-so much so that it was a "felony without benefit of
clergy. " '
Another theory of criminal liability that might have been
useful to prevent or punish stalking behavior was the law of crimi-
nal attempt." 8 Criminal attempt laws authorize the courts to
punish a perpetrator at a point in time before he successfully
commits a contemplated offense. 227 They do not, however, pro-
tect persons who suffer substantial harm from activities that fall
substantially short of the crime itself, even if those activities may
be the prelude to serious physical injury.2 ' Therefore, although
225 4 BLACKsTONE, supra note 44, at *144; see also RODES, supra note 199, at 29-33
(Since Thomas Becket's murder, clerics could not be punished for a felony by the secu-
lar courts. By the seventeenth century, however, this clerical privilege was extended to lay
people who could read-or successfully pretend to read a well-known verse of the Bible.
Thus, a lay person convicted of a felony would not be hung if he could "read.").
226 Criminal attempt is a recent development in the law. As late as 1769, the notion
that to attempt to commit a crime was, independently, a punishable act was not generally
accepted. Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L REV, 821, 833 (1928). Lord
Mansfield is credited with formulating the doctrine in Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784),
in which he highlighted the two facets of criminal attempt: intention and action. He
wrote, "The intent may make an act, innocent in itself, criminal; nor is the completion
of an act, criminal in itself, necessary to constitute criminality." Id. at 40. The requisite
intent of criminal attempt has been described as the 'specific intent to effect some con-
sequence which constitutes a crime" and "that the actor should have had the purpose for
bringing about the commission of the substantive offense."
227 As Such, they authorize police intervention before the commission of the target
offense. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSrANvE CRIMINAL LAW 18
(1986). A person is guilty of criminal attempt when he has "done all he believes to be
necessary to commit the offense in question." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. at 321
(1986); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL AW AND ITS PROCESSES
636 (5th ed. 1989). The difficult attempt cases are those situations when the person does
not complete all of the necessary steps. Attempt must be something more than
preparation and less than completion. Jerome Hall, Ciminal Attempt-A Study of Founda-
tions of Criminal Lia/ity, 49 YALE LJ. 789, 821 (1940). As one court aptly noted, "there
is some point between the formation of a criminal plan in one's mind and one's action
in trying or making an effort to commit the crime that the law, for society's protection,
imposes criminal sanctions even though the crime is never consummated." Brahm v.
State, 571 P.2d 681, 636 (Alaska 1977).
228 What action constitutes the requisite adus res for attempt is variously determined
by the traditional proximity approach, the indispensable element approach, the probable
desistance test, and the re ipsa loquitur (equivocality) test. See LAFAVE &ScoTT, supra note
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the law of criminal attempt may share a common purpose with
anti-stalking laws, it does not usually encompass stalking behavior.
The relationship between attempt and anti-stalking laws is dis-
cussed below.'
The English criminal law remedy designed to prevent stalking
behaviors was "giving sureties of the peace." A surety of the peace
was a means of coercing potential breakers of the peace to leave
their victims alone by requiring the offender to put up money for
his good behavior and to find two other people to do the same.
Because sureties of the peace were the most important, though
limited, Anglo-American legal device used for protecting victims of
stalking behaviors, we will examine more extensively how these
were and are used in both England and the United States.
3. A Remedy for Preventing a Breach of the Peace: Surety of the
Peace'
The giving of sureties of the peace 231 was a practice that
probably existed at common law before 1360.2-2 The defendant
was required to give a certain amount of money as security to
ensure that he would keep the peace. The defendant could also
satisfy the demand by finding other individuals to oblige them-
selves to pay a certain sum if he broke the peace. Sureties of the
peace were authorized in England by statute in 13602 3 and in
the United States by common law and statute. The purpose of this
legal device is to prevent breaches of the peace before they oc-
cur.' Sureties could be had when a justice of the peace or a
227, § 6.2, at 31-38; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, cmt. at 321-29 (1985) (both pro-
vide a general introduction to the different approaches).
229 See infta Part IV-A.
230 See generally 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *248-54 (requiring sureties or other
obligation of one who gives probable ground to suspect will breach the peace in the
future is a legal device which dates to the Saxon King Alfred in the ninth century). For
a general discussion of the history of sureties of the peace and of the construction of
the statute 34 Edw. 3, c.1, see Lansbury v. Riley, [1914] 3 K.B. 229 (1913). We will not
discuss fully a related topic, "sureties for good behavior." A prisoner awaiting trial may be
required to find such sureties to ensure his good behavior until trial. 2 SIR MATTHEW
HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136 n.2 (1847).
231 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 252 (6th ed. 1787) (security against
breaches of the peace before they happen; sureties could also be required post-convic-
tion); 2 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENC cLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 221, at 516-20 (general
discussion of sureties and grounds for requiring sureties); 25 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENcy-
CLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 221, at 1064-65 (threats for which sureties may be had).
232 Lansbury v. Riley, [1914] 3 I.B. 229, 236-37 (1913) (Avory, J.).
233 34 Edw. 3 ch. 1.
234 The peace could be broken by acts of violence actually causing, or having the p-
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court perceived that the defendant, by words o'r behavior, threat-
ened a person with bodily harm. A justice of the peace could
grant a surety of the peace "wherever a person has just cause to
fear that another will burn his house, or do him a corporal hurt,
as by killing or beating him, or that he will procure others to db
him such mischief."' Thus, a wife whose husband threatened to
beat her could get a surety.' Also, women could obtain sureties
against former suitors. For example, in a 17.04 Queen's Bench
case, Dennis v. LaneY' a doctor and former suitor of Dennis'
daughter "intrud[ed] rudely into [the Dennis] house, follow[ed]
the young lady on a journey. . . , assault[ed] the person under
whose protectioi [the daughter was] placed and threatened to
force her from her [protector]."' The court held that the
plaintiffs were in sufficient fear of bodily harm, and it ordered
Lane to give a recognizance for a year of two hundred pounds
and to find two more sureties for one hundred pounds each.
A person could obtain a surety of the peace by giving the
justice of the peace assurance "upon oath" (later "articles of the
peace") 9 that he or she was "actually under such fear; and has
-just cause to be so, by reason of the other's having threatened to
beat him, or lain in wait for that purpose."2' A surety could be
granted only if the articles of peace contained a "reasonable foun-
dation . . . to induce a fear of personal danger."2 41 If the defen-
dant did not expressly threaten to do bodily harm or if the defen-
dant did not assault the plaintiff or someone close to her, the
tential to cause, bodily harm. See supra note 188. We have not explored the extent to
which actions against property (beside arson) could constitute a breach of the peace.
235 1 HAWKINS, supra note 231, at 254.
236 Id. at 253. Husbands could also get sureties from wives, though Hawkins does not
say what for.
237 87 Eng. Rep. 887 (Q.B. 1704).
238 In another case, three women obtained a surety against three men. King v. Net-
tle, reported in 1 HAWiuNs, sufra note 227, at 254 n.2.
239 21 Jam. 1, ch. 8 (1623) ('An Act to Prevent and Punish the Abuses in Procuring
Process and Sureties of the Peace and Writ of Certiorari"); 2 HALE, supra note 226, at
135-36 n.2 (-he court of Chancery and the court of King's Bench cannot grant surety
of the peace upon the mere oath of the party, as formerly, but only on the exhibition
of articles of the peace."). Articles of the peace are a complaint made by on who
"makes an oath that he is fear of death or bodily harm from some one who has threat-
ened or attempted to do him injury." BLACK'S LAw DIaTIoNARY 112 (6th ed. 1990).
240 1 HAWKINs, supra ote 231, at 254.
241 2 S.B. HARRISON, HARRISON'S DIGEST, ALL THE REPORTED CASES 1756-1829, at 425
(1829) (citing Rex v. Doherty, 104 Eng. Rep. 334 (K.B. 1810)).
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articles had to contain a statement by the plaintiff that she feared
for her bodily safety.
242
The legal rules of sureties may be illustrated by Regina v.
Dunn,24 an 1840 case from the court of Queen's Bench, which
posed an issue of first impression: whether a plaintiff, after alleg-
ing sufficient facts to show that she reasonably feared for her
safety, had to expressly state that she feared for her safety in the
articles of peace. The defendant, Richard Dunn, Esq. followed a
young woman, A.G.B. Coutts, for approximately a year. Dunn, a
stranger to Coutts, sent several letters to her,24 followed her in
her travels, watched her at places where she stayed, caused distur-
bances while trying to contact her during church services, followed
her and her friends when she went out, tried to accost 45 her on
the street, and followed her to a house where she took refuge. As
a result, Coutts lived in fear of harm from Dunn and drastically
curtailed her normal habits.2" At the time, Dunn was under an
order to give a surety to keep the peace, but when he did not
procure a surety, he served time in jail. In Dunn, Coutts sought a
second surety for her safety.
The court examined the articles of the peace Coutts present-
ed to see whether they contained both a reasonable basis for her
fear of bodily harm and whether an actual threat was alleged. 241
"Articles of the peace are not sufficient unless they shew a threat.
The threat need not be in words [from the defendant], but may
be inferred from a course of conduct."24 Once the threat was
shown by the articles, the person against whom sureties were
sought could not swear his own affidavits or otherwise controvert
the facts of the articles.249 Coutts's articles met the objective re-
242 This was because sureties could only be obtained for breaches of the peace,
which are by definition, acts of violence.
243 113 Eng. Rep. 939 (Q.B. 1840):
244 One letter stated: "If you refuse [to meet with me], you will, when it is too late,
repent a course, the consequences of which will sooner or later fall on yourself and your
family." Ih at 942, 947.
245 Coutts's manservant put himself between Dunn and Coutts and convinced Dunn
to leave. Id. at 942.
246 rd. at 943.
247 In Rex v. Tregarthen, 110 Eng. Rep. 941 (K.B. 1833), the court held that the
hearing authority (here the mayor) had discretion to determine whether there was a
threat of bodily harm. In this case, the defendant threatened the plaintiff using meta-
phorical language. The mayor had ordered the defendant to give sureties and the King's
Bench affirmed.
248 Dunn, 113 Eng. Rep. at 939.
249 2 S.B. HARRISON, supra note 241 ("Where a person exhibits articles of the peace,
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quirement, but the court found that she did not sufficiently plead
the subjective element. Since Dunn did not expressly state that he
would do her bodily harm,"0 the court held that Coutts's belief
would be sufficient only if stated in the articles. On the other
hand, as long as the victim alleged fear in the articles,2 1 the
court would not substitute its judgment for the victim's.
After the articles were given, courts recorded the sureties or
recognizance." 2 If the defendant could not obtain a ,surety, he
could be jailed indefinitely, though after 1861 the maximum sen-
tence was one year.' s The defendant could later forfeit the re-
cognizance by "actual violence" or "even by words directly tending
to a breach of the peace, as by challenging one to fight, or in his
presence, threatening to beat him."' A person did not forfeit a
surety, however, for using "bare words of heat.., calling a man a
knave, teller of lies, rascal, drunkard ... [because these] do not
directly challenge him [to breach the peace] nor does it appear
that the speaker designed to carry his resentment any further." 5
Blackstone says that a "bare trespass upon the lands or goods of
another" would also not result in a forfeiture.2 6 So, even if
Coutts had been successful in obtaining a surety from Dunn, he
could have, without forfeiting the bond, engaged in a certain
amount of name calling and even trespassing upon her proper-
ty.1 7 Under the standard Hawkins sets forth, though, Dunn
would have forfeited his surety if a justice of the peace believed
his behavior showed a "design" to do something more.
and swears that her life is, in danger, the truth of the facts cannot be controverted.")
(citing Lord Vane's case).
250 Apparently, the most threatening sentence in his many letters to Coutts was the
line in supra note 244.
251 Dunn, 113 Eng. Rep. at 939.
252 2 BLAcKStrONE, supra note 44, at *253.
253 Id. at *256 n.6.
254 1 HAWKiNs, supra note 231, at 258.
255 Id. at 259.
256 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *252-53.
257 She could still bring a civil action against him. Id.
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In the United States, sureties of the peace," s also known as
security against a breach of the peace,U9 recognizances to keep
the peace,' and "peace bonds"26' were adopted by the states
as part of the common law or by statute.262 From 179820 until
1 9 8 4 ,2 4 federal judges and magistrates were authorized to re-
258 Respublica v. Donagan, 2 Yeates 437 (Pa. 1799) (After acquittal on charges of
murder, the court required defendants to give surety to keep the peace of $10,000 each
and to find "two good sureties in 10,000 dollars each." The prisoners argued that the
court was de facto sentencing them to life imprisonment. The court affirmed the trial
court's order saying that the trial court had the discretion to order sureties for "such a
length of time, as they judged would best answer the ends of public justice.*); Common-
wealth v. Bartlett, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 586 (Gen. Ct. Va. 1829).
259 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of the Peace §§ 41-51 (1964 & West Supp. 1988).
260 Commonwealth v. Morey, 8 Mass. 78 (1811) (A justice of the peace had required
Morey to find sureties of the peace after hearing a complaint against him. Morey refused
to find sureties and was jailed. The court held, on this petition for habeas corpus, that
requiring sureties for a year was illegal, but the justice could require a petitioner to give
a recognizance to keep the peace until his court date.); State ex re. Yost v. Scouszzio, 27
S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 1943) (recognizance is the only form of security permitted by stat-
ute).
261 Cox v. State, 47 So. 1025 (Ala. 1908) (discussing threatening behavior as grounds
under a state statute permitting courts to require a peace bond); Shirley v. Terrell, 67
S.E. 436 (Ga. 1910) (discussing grounds for recovery for breach of a peace bond); Stone
v. City of Paducah, 86 S.W. 531 (Ky. 1905) (state statute requiring persons who cannot
or refuse to give sureties to keep the peace to go to jail does not violate the 13th
Amendment because these prisoners are not required to labor); Adams v. Ashby, 5 Ky.
(2 Bibb) 96 (1810) (could be had in criminal matters); In re Bordelon, 29 So.2d 162
(I.a 1946); Ford v. State, 50 So. 497 (Miss. 1909) (deciding jurisdictional issues regarding
a state statute permitting peace bonds for persons threatening harm to the person or
property of another); Croy v. State, Wright 135 (Ohio 1832) (a bond could be required
rather than a recognizance).
262 11 C.J.S. Breach of Peace § 77 (1938 & West Supp. 1992); Shaugnessy v. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Mezei concerned the due process rights of a
former resident alien detained on Ellis Island. The Attorney General detained Mezei for
undisclosed reasons, the disclosure of which would be "prejudicial to the public interest."
Commenting on the constitutionality of the detention procedure, Justice Jackson said the
following about 18 U.S.C. § 3043:
[T]he concept of due process is not so paralyzing that it forbids all detention of
an alien as a preventive measure against threatened dangers and makes confine-
ment lawful only after the injuries have been suffered. In some circumstances,
even the citizen in default of bail has long been subject to federal imprisonment
for security of the peace and good behavior.
Id. at 223.
263 Act of July 16, 1798, Ch. 83, 1 Stat. 609.
264 Act of July 16, 1798, Ch. 83, 1 Stat. 609 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3043 (1948)) M-
peaed by Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, § 204(c), 98 Stat. 1986. Congress issued
13 committee reports regarding the repeal of a number of sections, including § 3043,
but these do not discuss why § 3043 was repealed. Section 3043 was, however, repealed
as part of the "Bail Reform Act of 1984," a subpart of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984. Apparently, Congress viewed peace bonds as a bail device, though courts
used them more broadly throughout their history. Pub. L. 98-473. See S. REP. NO. 225,
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quire security to keep the peace.26 Security to keep the peace
could be had if an individual's actions threatened the complainant
with bodily harm.2' Further, many jurisdictions permitted secu-
rity to keep the peace when a person threatened to destroy the
property of another.2 7 Though the Supreme Court never passed
on the constitutionality of requiring security to keep the peace,
state courts held that certain provisions of security of the peace
laws were constitutional,26 while other provisions were not.2 69
Since the late 1970s, a brief survey of state case law shows, howev-
er, a distinct trend toward the disuse of security to keep the peace
and a concomitant increase in the use of restraining orders or'
other injunctions to stop stalking and other threatening behav-
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), rerinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3182.
265 Creel v. Creel, 184 F.2d 449, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1950). In dicta and citing § 3043,
the Creed court said that the appellant could get a peace bond against the appellee if ap-
pellant made a proper showing that the appellee was harassing him and threatening his
life. In a Second Circuit case involving the conviction of defendants for conspiring to
advocate and teach the overthrow of the United States, the court distinguishes between
the situation where a court may require a § 3043 bond (where one "threat[ens] to com-
mit a crime") and the situation where a court expects that a convicted person awaiting
appeal will commit a crime. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 n.7 (2d Cir.
1950).
266 Engler v. Creekmore, 119 S.W.2d 497 (Ark. 1938) (threat to kill not necessary);
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 240 N.W. 177 (Wis. 1932) (complainant must have just cause to
fear that the threatening party will commit the offense).
267 Psinakis v. Psinakis, 221 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1955) (Pennsylvania Surety of Peace
Act may be used to protect property); Robinson v. Bradley, 300 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass.
1969); Commonwealth v. Voils, 34 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1931) (persons and property). The
English common law did not, in general, recognize threats to property as actionable. The
inclusion of threats to destroy one's house probably derives from the laws against
threatening arson. 2 SIR JOHN COMYNS, LAWS OF ENGLAND 131 (1793). But see Ex pa-te
Harfourd, 16 Fla. 283 (1877) (holding that a person cannot be required to give security.
for tfreatening to destroy property (a schooner)).
268 Commonwealth v. Miller, 305 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1973) (due process not violated be-
cause statute permits bond on less than proof of truth of assertions beyond a reasonable
doubt); State v. Gray, 580 P.2d 765 (Ariz. App. 1978) (quantum of proof required for
peace bond does not violate due process); Cook v. State, 537 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976) (requiring defendant, who had threatened to shoot his sister, to post a peace
bond was not former jeopardy barring a subsequent prosecution for aggravated assault);
Commonwealth v. Cushard, 132 A.2d 366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957) (security to keep the
peace statutes constitutional).
269 Kolvek v. Napple, 212 S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1975) (defendant's incarceration for
one year under peace bond statute because of his financial inability to post the $500
bond violates equal protection); Santos v. Nahiwa, 487 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1971) (peace
bond statute violates due process because it does not require proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt); Ex pafrt James, 303 So.2d 133, quashed, 303 So.2d 145 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1974) (peace bond statute's imprisonment for financial inability to post bond violat-
ed the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause).
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iors.' ° In those states where sureties of the peace are constitu-
tional, these devices may, therefore, be used in conjunction with
stalking laws to prevent or deter stalking behaviors. We examine
below the use and effectiveness of injunctions to prevent stalk-
ing.2
1
A few observations can be made from a review of the sureties
laws in England and the United States. For a surety of the peace
to be granted in England or the United States, the offending
party has to express, in words or deeds, a threat of bodily harm to
another. Also, both countries retained a similar penal philosophy
regarding security to keep the peace. In both countries, the prima-
ry goal of requiring security is to preven 72 the offender from do-
ing the threatened act, rather than to Punish "7 the offender for
engaging in threatening activities. Neither country's law of sureties
of the peace included any provision regarding prevention through
treatment of the emotionally disturbed or mentally disordered
offender.
The Anglo-American law of "sureties of the peace" differs
from anti-stalking laws primarily in two aspects. First, anti-stalking
laws are conceptually different because they treat stalking behavior
as a crime and not as a prelude to crime. Stalking causes mental,
emotional, and economic harm to the victim and the victim's
family, harm serious enough to warrant criminal classification.
Second, anti-stalking laws can be more punitive than modem sure-
ties of the peace laws.Y4 Some laws provide for imprisonment of
up to ten years for multiple convictions.27 While anti-stalking
laws are also designed to prevent stalking, they do this, in part,
through punishing the offender for engaging in the proscribed
acts. The appropriate penal goals of stalking laws are discussed
below.2 '76 Thus, in the area of "peace" law, the historical move-
ment in the Anglo-American tradition reflects a recognition that
270 4 NiNTH DECENNIAL DIGESr, Breach of the Peace §§ 15, 16 (West 1982); 6 TENTH
DECENNIAL DIGEsr, Breach of the Peace § 15 (West 1992).
271 See infra Part III-B.
272 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of the Peace § 41 (1964 & Supp. 1988).
273 Ford v. State, 50 So. 497, 498 (Miss. 1909) (-ro threaten an offense on the per-
son or property of another is not an offense against the law for which a person may be
punished. At most, . . . he may be restrained from so doing by proper proceedings, but
not punished by fine and imprisonment.") (citation omitted).
274 This is assuming a state has held unconstitutional the common law penalty of in-
definite imprisonment for failure to give security to keep the peace.
275 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993).
276 See infra Part IV-A.
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"harm" to an individual's mental and emotional health can be
serious and deserves more protection from the state.
B. Civil Law and Stalking Behaviors
1. Injunctions
Stalking laws emerged, in part, because injunctions frequently
fail to protect victims from threatening behavior and bodily
harm.277 On a national level, it is not known how often individu-
als violate protective orders.278 The Department of Justice does
not collect statistics on how often protective injunctions are bro-
ken and on the consequences to the protected person of the
violation. 9  Some state statistical,2' as well as anecdotal, evi-
dence shows that court injunctions do not always provide the
protection needed by people who have reason to believe they are
the target of future violence from another. Joan Zorza, senior
attorney for the National Battered Women's Law Project in New
277 The person who stalked and murdered Kristin Lardner, daughter of Pulitzer Prize
winning journalist George Lardner, Jr., violated a temporary restraining order by tele-
phoning Kristin, violated a permanent restraining order, and was on probation for
beating up another former girlfriend when he murdered Lardner. George Lardner, Jr.,
The Stalking of Kistin: The Law Made it Easy for My Daughter's Killer, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
1992, at Cl. Sandra Poland, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated
i[d]espite the threats Doe has made against our lives, despite his repeated violations of
restraining orders . . . [the assistant district attorney] has said that there is nothing he
can do until [Doe] has 'done something.'" See Heaings, supra note 3; see also Colman
McCarthy, Better Protection for Women in Danger, WASH. POST, June 12, 1992, at A21 (es-
tranged spouse stalked his wife, was jailed for violating a temporary restraining order, but
released by another judge on due process grounds); North Stars Draw Closer to Dallas Move,
ARIZ. REP., Feb. 19, 1993, at E2, available in WESTLAW, Dialog, Papers File (Broncos
tight end Clarence Kay, who had punched his former girlfriend in the face and stalked
her, was jailed for violating a temporary restraining order); Gunfire in Domestic Disute
Leaves 3 Dea, 2 Hurt ARIZ. REP., Dec. 29, 1992, available in WESTLAW, Dialog, Papers
File (San Francisco man kills two police officers and wounds his estranged wife after
returning to her home in violation of a temporary restraining order).
278 The National Institute of Justice reports no study on the effectiveness of civil pro-
tection orders in preventing bodily harm. PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, CIVIL PROTEC-
TION ORDERS: LEGISlATION, ,CURRENT COURT PRACTICE AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990). We
use the term "protective injunctions" to cover all types of injunctions requiring an indi-
vidual to refrain from contacting another individual because he or she presents a threat
of harm to the other person.
279 FBI, U.S. JUSTICE DEP'T, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1990).
There is a bill pending in Congress that would require the Justice Department to begin
keeping statistics on stalking and other forms of domestic violence. H.R. 840, supra note
28.
280 See Caristone, supra note 7, at 3 (35,346 order-of-protection violations reported in
Illinois in a five-month period in 1992).
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York, agrees that one type of protective injunction, restraining
orders,2s' do not provide enough protection. She explains:
[M]any of these guys [abusive husbands and boyfriends] know
what the definition of domestic violence is and officially avoid
it. Nevertheless, they are forever following their girlfriends or
wives. They block her entrance way to the door, if she wants to
leave her home. They follow her around. They call her repeat-
edly.282
Law enforcement agencies may also not adequately enforce
protective injunctions.2 3 In a National Institute of Justice report
on civil protective orders, the authors discuss recent efforts by
states to improve enforcement. 24 In thirty states, a violation of a
protective injunction is a misdemeanor; in Ohio, the third viola-
tion is a fourth degree felony.285 Many of these statutes permit
police officers to make warrantless arrests for violations in their
presence. Besides increasing the penalty for violations and facilitat-
ing speedy arrest, other measures that Finn and Colson identify
for encouraging compliance include: providing clear and specific
instructions from the bench to both offender and victim concern-
ing compliance, providing procedures for modifying orders, pro-
viding victims with a way to get an order during evenings and
weekends, providing effective monitoring of compliance, and in-
281 With respect to conflicts between natural persons involving bodily harm, a re-
straining order is an injunction issued in an emergency situation by a court against a
person who has harmed, who has attempted to harm, or who has threatened to harm
another. The major difference between a temporary restraining order ('IRO"), FED. R.
CIv. P. 65(b), and a temporary injunction is that the restraining order may be issued ex
pate. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injundions §§ 12, 14 (1969 & Supp. 1992). By definition, the TRO
lasts only until a court can hold a hearing to issue a temporary injunction, 10 days, or
20 days maximum if a subsequent TRO is issued. 42 AM. JUo. 2D Injundions §§ 12, 14
(1969 & Supp. 1992). After trial, a court may issue a permanent injunction against the
defendant. For a more thorough discussion of the requirements for different types of
injunctions, see 43 & 43A CJ.S. Injundions §§ 1-342 (1978 & Supp. 1992); 42 AM. JUIL
2D Injundions §§ 1-385 (1969 & Supp. 1992).
282 Ross, supra note 36.
283 With regard to civil protection orders, the National Institute of Justice study
states, "Enforcement is the Achilles' heel of the civil protection order." FINN & COLSON,
supra note 274, at 49 (discussing ways to improve enforcement).
284 Id. at 49. Under some civil protection order statutes, a violator of a restraining
order may not be arrested or jailed, depending on the punishment prescribed by the





dicting on an upgraded offense, in a addition to contempt, where
appropriate. 286
Prior to 1990, and in those states that do not have anti-stalk-
ing laws, a court might decide that a person who is the target of
stalking behavior does not meet the "irreparable injury" require-
ment for an injunction. In Alberti v. Cruise,287 the Fourth Circuit
reversed a lower court's decision to issue an injunction in a case
where Mireille Alberti, the paramour of Mary Cruise's husband,
engaged in a series of stalking behaviors toward the Cruise family.
Alberti's acts included: contacting Cruise under false pretenses,
using devious means to find the names and addresses of her fami-
ly members, sending letters to family members defaming Cruise,
sending defamatory letters to her husband's military superiors, fol-
lowing Cruise and her family to church, and following her hus-
band to work.26 Though the Fourth Circuit invalidated the in-
junction, the court's rationale left open the possibility that, on
similar facts, an injunction would be proper where irreparable
injury was sufficiently pleaded and included as a finding of fact in
the injunction.8 9
Even if a victim suffered legally sufficient harm to secure a
protective injunction, the procedures for obtaining it may be too
burdensome on the victim, thereby discouraging the victim from
seeking available protection. Procedures for obtaining an injunc-
tion require time, effort, and possibly attorney fees.' Also, an
applicant may not be eligible, under a state's protective order stat-
ute, to get an injunction." In states with adequate stalking laws,
however, the complainant does not need to obtain an injunction
to get immediate protection from the stalker. If the stalker com-
mits the requisite acts, the police have the authority to arrest him.
This relieves the complainant of the burden of pursuing an in-
junction. But before the police can arrest a stalker, the offender
has to have engaged in a threatening "course of conduct" against
the victim. 2 Pending trial, the offender may be released on
286 FINN & COLSON, supra note 278, at 49-63.
287 383 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1967).
288 Id. at 270.
289 Id. at 272. In dicta, the court noted that the injunction was invalid as a prior
restraint on the Alberti's speech.
290 See Lardner, supra note 277.
291 In Ohio, a complainant can get an "and-stalking protection order" as a condition
of pre-trial release. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13.
292 The victim is in a similar situation with regards to obtaining an injunction. For
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bail. If the offender is mentally or emotionally disturbed and is
not evaluated prior to bail being set, release may also be inappro-
priate and may endanger the victim. If the offender is sufficiently
rational in his behavior, the stiffer penalties provided under anti-
stalking laws should more effectively deter the offender from fur-
ther contacting the victim.2 3
2. Tort Remedies -
By the mid-eighteenth century, English common law recog-
nized and provided a cause of action for one type of behavior that
is included in anti-stalking laws. An individual could sue in tres-
pass for "threats and menaces," acts that threatened bodily harm,
but that were not threats rising to the level of assault. 4 The de-
example, a person who wants a temporary restraining order must show "immanency of
harm." Often, the petitioner must already be a victim of harm before a court will grant
a temporary restraining order. See, &g., FLA. STAT. ch. 784.046 (West 1992) (requiring two
acts of violence for a protective injunction); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (West Supp.
1992) (requiring a course of conduct by harasser that results in actual substantial emo-
tional distress). Also, when the person subject to the injunction disobeys it, he may not
serve a jail sentence and may only be further enraged at any enforcement attempt.
Erotomanics and borderline erotomanics may become violent when the police or courts
attempt to keep them away from, the target of their activity or from accomplishing their
ends. "In erotomanics, the risk of violence may increase when third parties, such as the
court or friends, attempt to dissuade erotomanic persons from the pursuit of their ob-
ject." Meloy, supra note 46, at 486; see also Dietz et al., supra note 52, at 190 (In a letter
to a female actress, the subject, who fits the criteria for Borderline Erotomania, told how
he escaped from a psychiatric hospital, stole a gun and ammunition, and engaged police
in a gunfight when he felt the actress "was being starved by police.").
293 In most states, anti-stalking laws provide more protection to the victim by inca-
pacitating first-time offenders for six to five years. Six months: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18-9-111 (West Supp. 1992); 1992 Conn. Legis. Serv. 701; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2
(West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.13-
.14, 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1992); Act of Mar. 24, 1993, H.B. 2023 (amending
and re-enacting W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992)). One year: CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9
(West 1991 & Supp. 1993); 1992 Conn. Legis. Serv. 701; IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp.
1992); 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 190 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 708.11); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §508.130-.150 (Baldwin 1992); 1992 Mich. Legis. Serv. 1165 (West) (to
be codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.4111); 1992 Neb. Laws 1098; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-19A-1 to -6 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315
(Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993). Three years: ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Up to five years:
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Anti-stalking laws also may
provide hefty monetary penalties.
294 Blackstone says that assault occurs when the violence is "considerably higher than




fining characteristic of an actionable threat or menace was
fear-the magnitude of which caused "a man's business [to be]
interrupted." 5 The rationale for providing a remedy for threats
and menaces was that, though not breaches of the peace, these
were actions against the security of a person.9 In Blackstone's
time, threats and menaces were actionable as a trespass vi et
arnis.Y7 As Blackstone observes; the injury was not corporal in
nature, but an injury to the victim's ability to carry on tasks of dai-
ly living. "A menace alone, without a consequent inconvenience,
makes not the injury; but to complete the wrong, there must be
both of them together." 8 Thus, in addition to threatening
harm to the victim's person, the common law required that the
threat be one which actually disrupts the life of the victim.'
English tort law since the late nineteenth century,' and
American tort law for most of the twentieth century,"1 recog-
nized two possible tort remedies for harm caused by stalking be-
haviors: the torts of intentional 2 and negligent infliction of
295 Id
296 See supra Part IILA.3.; see also Petstede v. Marreys, Y.B. 4 Edw. 2, 29 (1310), a&
pinted in 22 SELDEN SOC'Y 29 (1907) (stating, "Although 'with force and arms' be con-
tained in the writ, she does not expect to recover damages for that; but rather for the
trespass done to her. So the writ is good enough." The defendant had stolen the animals
which made up her dower.) (Brabazon, C.J.).
297 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *120. A trespass vid e armis was available even
though actual bodily injury did not occur.
298 Id. at *120.
299 See COMYNS, supm note 267, at 131 ("So a threat is not a trespass, if no inconve-
nience ensues."); id. at 132 ("For a threat, assault, battery or mayhem, the party shall
have a remedy by action of trespass.").
300 Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897) (early cases recognizing the tort of in-
tentional infliction of mental distress).
301 Early twentieth century American cases did not permit a tort recovery for "mere
words, however violent," which threatened or insulted the plaintiff. W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL, PROSSER AND KEET-ON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 56-57 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser
and Keeton think that the tort of intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress
emerged around 1930. Id. at 60. The general rule is that one is liable for "conduct cx-
ceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially
calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind." Id.
302 Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate, 20 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1945); Price v. Yellow Pine Paper
Mill, Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1922).
303 Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (earliest English case recognizing
the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress). The earliest American case recog-
nizing a' cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when a plaintiff is
placed by the defendant in the "ordinary range of physical peril" is Waube v.
Warrington, 258 N.W. 497 (Wis. 1935). Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), recog-
nized a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress where the plain-
tiff was not in danger herself, but witnessed an accident involving her child.
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emotional distress. While a history of the development of these
torts is beyond the scope of this Note, an overview of cases from
the last half of the century shows an increasing sensitivity in Amer-
ican law and society to the consequences of behaviors that result
in a significant loss to the plaintiff of his or her mental and emo-
tional health or tranquility.
In 1947, the American Law Institute revised section 46 of the
Restatement of Torts to permit recovery for mental or emotional
distress alone, without regard to whether the plaintiff suffered
from physical symptoms.' In a passage particularly applicable to
stalking activities, Prosser and Keeton note that, while tort law
does not permit recovery for every insult or inconvenience, when
the defendant's actions are "prolonged or repeated to the point of
hounding," 'the defendant's behavior may be actionable. 5 The
leading American case on intentional infliction of mental distress
through stalking-type actions is Flamm v. Van Nierop. °o In Flamm,
the defendant engaged in a course of conduct beginning in Oc-
tober of 1966 that caused Flamm to suffer substantial emotional
distress. Among other actions, the defendant
[d]ashed at the plaintiff in a threatening manner in various
public places ... [drove] his automobile behind, that of the
plaintiff at a dangerously close distance; walked closely behind,
or beside, or in front of the plaintiff in public streets; and con-
304 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46 (1965) ("One who, without a privilege to
do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable for such emotion-
al distress, and for bodily harm resulting from it."); see also id. cmt. d (rationale for the
change in § 46: behaviors resulting in severe emotional distress have no social utility and
should not be protected).
305 KEETON Er AL., supra note 301, at 6 (the behavior must be considered "outra-
geous" by people in decent society); Webber v. Gray, 307 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1957) (the
female defendant, a former mistress of plaintiff, hounded him and his family, with inci-
dents of aggravation, in an effort to renew the association).
306 291 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct. 1968); see also Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D.
1984) (The court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff in a case where the defendant made
several telephone calls to plaintiffs home, some of which were obscene. Plaintiff sued for
intentional infliction of emotional distress winning $5000 in actual and $20,000 in puni-
tive damages.); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) (defendant repeatedly and
illicitly invited the plaintiff to have sexual intercourse); Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28
(Cal. App. 1960) (plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action claiming that defendants'
"threats, statements and accusations" resulted in plaintiffs' decedent committing suicide);
Hallo v. Lurie, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (App. Div. 1961) (plaintiff need not have physical con-
tact with the defendant in order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress); Mitran v. Willimson, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (App. Div. 1960) (The court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the jury could find that defendant's series of




stantly telephoned the plaintiff at his home and place of busi-
ness... [and] all of this has been maliciously done and for
the purpose of causing physical and mental damage.
°7
Though defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, the court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action for
intentional infliction of mental distress."8
Acts directed at a third person, a family member of the plain-
tiff for example, that cause the plaintiff mental or emotional dis-
tress were traditionally not actionable.' Some courts permitted
recovery on the basis that the mental distress suffered by the
plaintiff was directed at the plaintiff and was so intended by the
defendant. For example, recovery for mental distress was allowed
where a defendant told a woman he would kill her husband and
then later did so." That the mental injury to the plaintiff was
foreseeable was another basis of recovery. Courts that allow recov-
ery for foreseeable mental or emotional distress, however, require
"a very high degree of probability that mental disturbance would
follow [defendant's act], and that the defendant proceeded in
conscious and deliberate disregard of it, so that the defendant's
conduct would properly be called wilful, wanton or reckless."31 '
Victims of stalking may want to pursue a common law tort
action for damages. Some states, such as Wyoming, encourage
victims to pursue a civil action by allowing victims to recover ex-
emplary damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs. 12 The
torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent
infliction of emotional distress should be used in conjunction with
criminal sanctions to further dissuade stalkers from their criminal
activity. The deterrent effect of a tort action, however, may be
minimal if the stalker is an individual who is emotionally disturbed
or mentally disordered. A possible disadvantage 'to the victim of
bringing a tort action is that the pressure and stress of having to
defend a tort action may be the catalyst for more violent behavior
by the stalker.
307 Fatm, 56 Misc. 2d at 1060.
308 Id. at 1061.
309 KEETON ET At, supra note 301, at 65.
310 Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (Il. 1961).
311 KEEON ET AL., supra note 301, at 65.
312 See, eg., Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (to be codified at WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-126, 6-
2-506, 7-3-506); Ca. A.B. 1548, 199394 Reg. Sess. (1993) (bill providing for exemplary
damages in a civil action for harm from stalking).
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IV. ANTI-STALKING LAWS: AN ANALYSIS
A. Laws Used Before 1990 to Prevent Stalking Behaviors
Though legal definitions of stalking differ, California's defini-
tion is typical. An individual is guilty of stalking if he or she
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another
person and makes a credible threat with the intent to place
that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm
or to place that person in reasonable fear of the death of or
great bodily injury of his or her immediate family. 3 1
Before California adopted its anti-stalking law in 1990, courts and
police combatted stalking behavior using other laws. All fifty states
have criminalized some form of harassment, defined by one com-
mentator as "persistent and unwelcome communication of de-
mands or feelings." 4 States also have laws forbidding menac-
ing,s"' loitering, 16  trespassing,3 17  intimidation,1 8  and
terroristic threatening.3 19 Some argue that these laws render anti-
stalking legislation unnecessary. 20  Anti-stalking laws, however,
313 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
314 Andrea J. Robinson, Note, A Remedial Approach to Harasmez;4 70 VA. L. REv. 507,
507 (1984).
315 See, eg., AI.A. CODE § 13A-6-23 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-206 (West
1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 602 (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.050
(Baldwin 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.13-.15 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-1.7-05 (1985); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.21-.22 (Anderson 1993); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.190 (1990).
316 See, eg., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-9 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2905 (1989);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-112 (West 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.090 (Baldwin
1984).
317 For purposes of discussing trespassing as an element of stalking behavior, this
Note is referring to third degree trespassing, which is usually defined as a person "know-
ingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully upon real property." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
821 (Supp. 1992); see also FLA_ STAT. ANN. § 810.09 (Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7011
(Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511-080 (1984).
318 &e, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-6 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-203 (1991).
319 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.810 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-301 (Michie
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 621 (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37 (1992);
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 707-715 to -717 (1988 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3419
(1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.080 (Baldwin 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.713
(1987 & Supp. 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-311.01 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-3
(1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2706 (1983); R.I GEN. LAWS § 11-53-2 (Supp. 1992);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07 (West 1989); Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (to be codified
at WYO. STAT. § 6-2-505).
320 Collina, supra note 40.
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provide a different conceptual and legal framework for these sepa-
rate acts of harassment by treating a "series" of these acts as a
more serious crime, rather than as a stream of unrelated minor
offenses.32 t
Anti-stalking laws 'reflect a legislative decision that stalking is
fundamentally different from harassment crimes, and therefore,
the penalties for stalking must be correspondingly more se-
vere."m While harassment, intimidation, threats, trespass, and loi-
tering laws (collectively "anti-harassment" laws) address activities
that also may constitute the crime of stalking, they do not ade-
quately address the harm that citizens suffer when an individual
repeats one or more of these actions. Unlike anti-stalking statutes,
they do not impose heavier penalties for repeat offenses against
the same victim.
Laws previously used against stalking behavior, such as menac-
ing3 23 and criminal trespass,3 24 address single incidents. Though
individuals are more likely to break anti-harassment than anti-stalk-
ing laws because the anti-harassment laws do not require the per-
petrator to "repeatedly follow"3 25 or "engage in a course of con-
duct,"126 their scope is also narrower. Most menacing statutes
require that the victim be "in fear of immanent serious physical
injury."1 27 Therefore, if a person repeatedly follows an individual
and threatens "I'm going to kill you," but without contemporane-
ously possessing the means to carry out the threat, the person
would not be guilty of menacing. In contrast, only one of the anti-
stalking statutes contains "immanency" language. 28 If a person
repeatedly follows an individual, whether he threatens bodily harm
321 See infra note 369 (anti-stalking laws allow following and several other actions,
fhlling under the purview of "harasses," to be combined to create "stalking").
322 See infra note 423 and accompanying text (anti-stalking laws provide heavier pen-
alties for subsequent stalking actions directed at the same victim).
323 Court, supra note 83, at 110.
324 Joseph Kirby, Salking Law Sends A New Signa4 CHI. TRIB. (North Sports ed.), Apr.
13, 1992, at I ("'Ten years ago, this guy might just have been brought up on charges of
criminal trespass,' said Mary Schostok, an assistant state's attorney in Lake County.").
325 See infra Part IV-B(1)(b).
326 See infta Part WV-B(1)(d).
327 'A person commits the crime of menacing if, by physical action, he intentionally
places or attempts to place another person "in fear of imminent serious physical injury."
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-23 (1982).
328 1993 Ark. Acts 388 § 1(a): "A person commits stalking in the second degree if-
he purposefully engages in a course of conduct that harasses another person and makes
a terroristic threat with the intent to place that person in imrminent fear of death or seri-
ous bodily injury .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
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or whether a danger thereof is immanent, the person could be
charged with, stalking in some states (if he was otherwise a
credible threat). Some anti-stalking laws require the stalker to have
the apparent ability to carry out "a credible threat with the intent
to place that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily
injury" and that the stalker actually issue such a threat.
Loitering 2 statutes are more limited tools against stalking
conduct due to their precise requirements. Therefore, though an
individual would have to repeatedly loiter in some proximity to
the victim before being charged with stalking, anti-stalking laws are
more useful than loitering laws because they encompass a greater
variety of conduct under the heading of "harasses." ° Loitering
statutes also fail to adequately displace anti-stalking laws because
they emphasize the general nuisance that a person presents to his
surroundings, while anti-stalking statutes require repeated stalker-
victim contact.
3 3 1
In some states, harassment statutes are more effective tools
against stalking behaviors than loitering or menacing because they
criminalize more types of conduct. Yet, despite the broader scope
of harassment statutes, anti-stalking laws are broader still. Anti-
harassment statutes criminalize threats and obscene language made
329 Colorado's definition of loitering is typical:
(1) The word "loiter" means to be dilatory, to stand idly around, to linger, de-
lay, or wander about, or to remain, abide, or tarry in a public place.
(2) A person commits a class I petty offense if he:
(a) Loiters for the purpose of begging; or
(b) Loiters for the purpose of unlawful gambling with cards, dice, or other gam-
bling paraphernalia; or
(c) Loiters for the purpose of engaging or soliciting another person to engage
in prostitution for deviate sexual intercourse; or
(d) With intent to interfere with or disrupt the school program or with intent
to interfere with or endanger schoolchildren, loiters in a school building or on
school grounds or within one hundred feet of school grounds when persons
under the age of eighteen are present in the building or on the grounds, not
having any reason or relationship involving custody of, or responsibility for, a
pupil or any other specific, legitimate reason for being there, and having been
asked to leave by a school administrator or his representative or by a peace
officer;, or
(e) Loiters with one or more persons for the purpose of unlawfully using or
possessing a controlled substance ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-112 (1992).
330 See infra Part IV-B(1)(c).
331 Most anti-stalking statutes' definition of "harasses" requires that the stalker's con-
duct be directed at a specific person. See e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(d)(1) (harasses is a
"knowing and wilful course of conduct directed at a specific person").
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or said to the victim either in person, 2 in a writing, or over
the telephone.' Though some states' harassment statutes
criminalize offensive physical contact,'3 3 more often, harassment
statutes focus on the communication of threats made by the ha-
rasser.' In fact, thirty states specifically criminalize threats or
obscene statements made by telephone.3 7 These statutes are de-
332 So, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(1) (1987) (A person is guilty of harass-
ment when "he insults, taunts or challenges another person or engages in any other
course of alarming or distressing conduct in a manner which he knows is likely to Oro-
yoke a violent or disorderly response.").
333 Se e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(2) (West 1989) (A person is guilty of
harassment if, with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass, he
"threatens . . . in writing, in a manner reasonably likely to alarm the person receiving
the threat, to inflict serious bodily injury on the person or to commit a felony against
the person, a member of his family or his property.").
334 See, e.g., HAW. REV STAT. § 711-1106 (1)(c) (1988) (A person is guilty of harass-
ment when, with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, that person
"makes a telephone call or facsimile transmission without purpose of legitimate communi-
cation which would cause the recipient to reasonably believe that the actor intends to
cause bodily injury to the recipient or another, or damage to the property of the recipi-
ent or another.").
335 ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (1982) ("Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise touches a'per-
son or subjects him to physical contact"); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-71-208 (Michie 1987)
("Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person, subjects him to offensive physical
contact or attempts or threatens to do so"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (West
1990) ("Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical
contact" or "offensive physical contact"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106 (Supp. 1992)
("Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches another person in an offensive manner or
subjects the other person to offensive physical contact"); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 525.070
(Baldwin 1984) ("Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical contact or at-
tempts or threatens to do the same"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4 (West Supp. 1992)
("Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens
to do so"); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065 (1990) ("offensive physical contact"); 18 PA. CONST.
STAT. ANN. § 2709 (1983) (-strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same").
336 Robinson, supra note 314, at 553-54.
337 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (1989); CAL PENAL CODE § 653m (West Supp.
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-21 (Michie
1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 86-6710, 86-6711 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 135, para. 1-1
(Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4113 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-285
(West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 506 (West 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
555A (1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 14A (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.79 (West 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29, 97-45 (Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-8-213 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1310 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.255
(Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-12 (Michie
1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196 (Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21 (Ander-
son 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1172 (West Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-
17 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-430 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§
49-31-31 to -33 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1027 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-427, 18.2-429 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1992); WASH.
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ficient against some stalkers because they do not address one
particular recurring stalking behavior: following.' At least one
state legislature considered including "following" in its anti-harass-
ment statute, but declined to do so." 9
States also use terroristic threat statutes to combat stalking
behaviors.' These statutes criminalize the act of threatening an-
other with "death or serious bodily injury."341 This language pro-
tects stalking victims more than menacing laws do because
terroristic -threat statutes do not require a threat of "immanent"
bodily harm. A similarity between terroristic threat laws and anti-
stalking laws is their requirement that the offender present a cred-
ible threat: "The threat must be against the life, or a threat to
cause serious bodily injury to a person."342
Even though terroristic threat statutes target injuries similar to
those targeted by anti-stalking laws (alarm or fear of harm), they
are limited tools against stalkers and insufficient in themselves to
battle the stalking problem. A stalker's "threat" may be in the
context of the series of behaviors. A series of unwanted "love" let-
ters from an ex-lover, acquaintance, or stranger is likely to threat-
en its recipient-especially if the content of these letters indicates
that the sender views the recipient as an object for the sender's
sexual gratification. While many anti-stalking laws require that the
stalker issue a threat, just as many statutes do not. In fact, several
states presently requiring an explicit "threat" have bills pending
that would eliminate this requirement." Not all anti-stalking
laws require that a stalker issue an actual verbal threat.' Al-
though a terrorist threat statute can be violated by a nonverbal,
symbolic threat, 5 it is doubtful that sending "love" letters, the act
of "following," or other surveillance behaviors would qualify as
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.61.230-.250 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-16
(1992); Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (to be codified at W'O. STAT. § 6-6-103).
338 "Following" is a frequently reported element of stalking. See, e.g., Mareva Brown,
State Anti-Stalking Law Shadows Lavers Who Won't Let Go, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 29, 1992,
at Al (former boyfriend who harassed woman by telephone also followed her to a
relative's house over 100 miles away).
339 See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 commentary at 441 (1982).
340 'For a general discussion of terroristic threat statutes, see John P. Ludington, An-
notation, Validity and Constnsteion of Tenoristic Threat Statutes, 45 A.LR. 4th 949 (1986).
341 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-301 (Michie 1987).
342 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(b)(3) (1992).
343 California, Rhode Island and Tennessee have bills pending.
344 See infra Part IV-B(1)(O.
345 State v. Miller, 629 P.2d 748 (Kan. 1981).
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such symbols. Another problem with terroristic threat statutes is
their scarcity only fourteen states have such laws.M
One other type of statute that might be used against a stalker,
especially by a separated spouse, is an involuntary commitment or
involuntary admission statute.' 4' These laws allow family mem-
bers, neighbors, doctors, or certain institution directors to request
the court to commit a person involuntarily because of his or her
dangerous conduct.' These statutes might diffuse hostile situa-
tions because they allow police officers to take dangerous individu-
als into custody so that they can receive short-term' treatment.3 9
Typically, involuntary commitment laws require a judicial hearing
before commitment, at which it must be proven by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and likely to cause
serious harm to himself or others.' ° Involuntary commitment
hearings are probably a way to regain security and peace of mind
for only a small number of stalking victims.
Anti-stalking laws, in addition to achieving their primary goal
of criminalizing a series of threatening behaviors, are also a wel-
come addition to laws providing for early and effective law en-
forcement intervention in cases where the potential batterer or
murderer makes unwanted contact with his victim before commit-
ting a crime involving physical injury. Unfortunately, the law of
346 See supra note 319.
347 See, eg., In re Adams, 607 N.E. 2d 681 (11. App. CL 1993) (involuntary commit-
ment petition filed by woman who had received threatening phone calls from friend for
three years; petition was ultimately rejected because she had failed to list the names and
addresses of friend's family). For a general discussion of civil commitment of the men-
tally ill, see Note, Cvil Commitment and the Mentally 1- Theories and Prcedures, 79 HAIrV. L
REV. 1288 (1968).
348 See, eg., CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2,
para. --700 to -706 (Smith-Hurd 1987); N.Y. MENTAL Hyu. LAW §§ 9.27, 9.37, 9.41, 9.43,
9.45 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.001 (West
1992).
349 The California statute provides:
When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to
himself or herself ... a peace officer ... may, upon probable cause, take, or
cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility
designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental
Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150.
350 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.0. In at least one state, New York,
persons can be deemed mentally ill and involuntarily committed based solely on the
word of two examining physicians and their accompanying statements. N.Y. MENTAL HYn.
LAW §§ 9.27, 9.41.
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criminal attemptass may not reach much stalking activity, even
where it preludes a crime of bodily injury. Frustrated with the
inadequacy of attempt and other laws to reach the harm caused
by stalking, legislators passed anti-stalking laws. The relationship of
attempt laws to anti-stalking laws, and their historical development,
is similar to that of burglary.
The initial development of the offense of burglary, as well as
much of the later expansion of the offense, probably resulted
from an effort to compensate for defects of the traditional law
of attempt. The common law of attempt ordinarily did not
reach a person who embarked on a course of criminal behav-
ior unless he came very close to his goal .... Under that view
of the law of attempt, a person apprehended while breaking
into a dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein would
not have committed an attempt, for he would not have arrived
at the scene of his projected theft, rape, or murder .... The
development and expansion of the offense of burglary provided
a partial solution .... Making entry with criminal intent an
independent substantive offense carrying serious sanctions
moved back the moment when the law could intervene in a
criminal design and authorized penalties more nearly in accord
with the seriousness of the actor's conductL
s2
Traditionally, most stalking conduct is not thought of as a
"substantial step.""3 The action of a stalker, such as repeated
"following," may or may not foreshadow another crime. Therefore,
since it is difficult to tell what the underlying substantive offense
will be, the conduct if not an attempt. Because stalking acts take
place over a period of time, the acts are often not proximate
enough to the substantive offense. Stalking does not happen in a
single day, and by definition cannot be a single occurrence. 
5 4
351 See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
352 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1, cmt. 1, 62-63 (1980).
353 "Substantial step" is the requisite act test utilized by the Model Penal Code and,
in some comparable form, by two thirds of the federal circuits and about half of the
states. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 223, at 651. For a list of federal circuits and
states which have adopted the "substantial step" test, see Young v. State, 493 A.2d 352,
361 (Md. 1985) (appendices A & B). The approach taken by the Model Penal Code
punishes the actor's mens rea as evidenced by these sufficiently proximate acts. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (c) (1985). See also Penny Bender, Biden Chastises Delaware on Actions
In Stalking C4ses, Gannett News Service, Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File (unaware of the extent of a man's threats against his wife, judge simply fined
man; later that same evening, the man set fire to his family's house, killing his wife, two
children, and a neighbor).
354 See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(a) (Supp. 1992) ("Any person who will-
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Stalking scenarios involve a series of individual acts, such as harass-
ing phone calls and slashed tires, that build on one another. 55
Too often, the conduct does not end until serious physical injury,
or even death, results. '  In contrast, most criminal attempt cases
involve a same day occurrence.'
For the step to be "substantial," it must be "strongly corrobo-
rative of the firmness of the actor's purpose,""5 8 which often
means proximate to the intended crime. 9 Ironically, now that
stalking is a crime, prosecutors may be more willing to character-
ize following, threatening, and other stalking behavior as "strongly
corroborative" of intent to commit a substantive offense, though
they do not know, without some indication from the perpetrator,
what the offense was going to be. In the context of drug opera-
tions, courts hold that acts constituting a distribution scheme are a
"substantial step" toward the target offense."6 A similar approach
in the stalking area is warranted.
In addition to the difficulty of characterizing stalking behavior
as a substantial step, many stalking scenarios would fall to satisfy
the mes rea requirement of criminal attempt statutes. Though it is
impossible to generalize as to the initial intent of stalkers, many
fully, maliciously and rpeatedly follows or harasses another person ... is guilty of the
crime of stalking.") (emphasis added).
355 See, e.g., Good Morning Ameica, (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 18, 1993), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File ("Well, there was a whole series in which over time,
he built up more and more hostility .... Again, the threats build up," said Sen. Bob
Krueger, describing the conduct of an ex-employce who has been stalking his family
since 1984.).
356 See, ag., Kevin Fagan, New Focus on Deadly Sakem SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 11,
1993, at Al (man who continually broke into his ex-wife's home and beat her, finally
shot her and his 14-year-old son, then killed two police officers and himself); see also
Lenhart, supra note 9.
357 See, eg., United States v. Woodards, 962 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1992) ("By
driving to the bank with disguises and weapons, slowly circling the bank three times, and
stopping once to open the door of the vehicle, the three crossed the 'shadowy line'
from mere preparation to attempt.") (citing United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 840
(8th Cir. 1982).
358 See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-2-101 (West Supp. 1992). -
359 See, eg., People v. Colp, 537 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) ('rhe act tend-
ing to effect the commission of the crime need not be the final one toward the comple-
tion of the offense, but it must carry the project forward within dangerous proximity to
the commission of the crime.").
360 See, eg., United States v. Wagner, 884 F.2d 1091, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) ("This
Court previously has held that conduct consisting of ordering, receiving, and possessing
the chemicals'and equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine constituted a
'substantial step' toward manufacturing methamphetamine.") (citing United States v.
Mazzella, 768 F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir.), cer. denied 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).
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begin their infatuations lacking the intent to harm or kill their
victims. The stalker may initially intend merely to observe from
afar, to talk with, or to become lovers with their target. At some
point, however, the intent (if the person is capable of forming an
intent) to harm the victim takes root. Criminal attempt laws re-
quire the actor specifically to intend the proscribed result. There-
fore, a criminal attempt statute may not be an appropriate pre-
ventive measure in stalking scenarios, because attempt laws do not
recognize a crime until the stalker has actually physically attacked
the victim,"1 at which point the law serves no preventative pur-
pose.
Anti-stalking laws are, however, not a new type of attempt law.
Such laws were passed to control and prevent behavior state legis-
lators deem to be criminal, independent of whether such anti-
stalking laws are also effective or constitutional early intervention
laws. Criminal attempt laws do not address the effect of the less
than "substantial steps" on the victim. Though courts may recog-
nize that "the apprehension which the particular crime is calculat-
ed to excite""2 aids in distinguishing preparation from attempt,
attempt law does not recognize the criminality of the personal,
social, and economic harm caused by the victim's reasonable and
actual apprehension of bodily injury. In contrast, anti-stalking laws
recognize that actions as seemingly innocent as "following," when
done repeatedly and when targeted at an individual, generate fear
and warrant prosecution."5 Thus, the victim's state of mind is an
important component of many anti-stalking laws. The stalker's
361 But note that in many stalking situations, stalkers have voiced their intention to
kill or injure their victims at an early stage in the "course of conduct." See supra notes 1-
5.
362 Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) (Holmes, J.). Holmes argued
that the more serious the crime attempted, the further back along the "preparation"
continuum the criminal law should reach. Sayre, supra note 222, at 845; see also Robert
H. Skilton, The Requisite Act in a Criminal Atlemp4 3 U. Prrr. L REv. 308, 313 ("If the
substantive crime at which the act is aimed is of a serious nature, it would seem that a
relatively small act would be sufficient to be requisite."). Holmes believed that in the law
of attempts, "Acts should be judged by their tendency under the known circumstances,
not by the actual intent which accompanies them." OIVER W. HoLMES, THE COMMON
LAw 66 (1938). As this comment suggests, Holmes' analysis of criminal attempt did not
concentrate on the actor's mens tea, but his arius reus, and required that the perpetrator's
overt act "is immediately and not merely remotely connected with the commission of it,
and the doing of it cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose than the
commission of the specific crime." KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 227, at 635.
363 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(a) (Supp. 1992) ("Any person who wilfully, mali-
ciously and repeatedly follows or harasses another person or a member of that person's
family is guilty of the crime of stalking. .. ").
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conduct must "cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress."4
Practically, anti-stalking laws will provide earlier law enforce-
ment intervention in cases where the stalker intends another
crime, though law enforcement officials may have no reason to
know that this is the case, absent direct threats. This secondary
effect of anti-stalking laws is justified on the same grounds as crim-
inal attempt laws. In cases where the potential offender is some-
one who plans the crime, historical and empirical evidence shows
that stalking behaviors are the prelude to crimes involving bodily
injury. ' Our historical experience and our increased under-
standing of the danger inherent in repeated, threatening acts is a
sufficient justification for early intervention under anti-stalking
laws.
The criminal statutes discussed above, as well as commitment
statutes and civil injunctions,' are not appropriately tailored or
are ineffective tools against the violence and fear caused by
stalkers. Although they may successfully punish single stalking
incidents, they were not created to combat repeated threatening
or harassing behavior, which is the dominant characteristic of
stalking. This gap limits their usefulness against stalkers.
B. Anti-Stalking Laws
A core group of states use the CaliforniaM7 statute as their
model and develop their laws around a set of definitions, in-
cluding "stalking," "harasses," "course of conduct," and "a credible
threat." Statutes not utilizing this exact language still echo the
concerns and proscribed conduct mentioned in the California
statute. In addition to outlining the elements of the crime, the
anti-stalking laws provide grading elements that punish more se-
verely the crime of "aggravated stalking," or distinguish first de-
gree from second degree stalking. Anti-stalking statutes also ad-
dress the problem of repeat offenses against the same victim.
Critics argue that anti-stalking statutes lack precision and are,
therefore, "void-for-vagueness."' Though no anti-stalking cases
364 Id. § 18-7905(d) (1). Substantial emotional distress must be the result of a course
of conduct directed at a specific person by the stalker.
365 See supra Parts II and III.
366 See supra Part III-B.
367 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.0 (West 1991), amended by 1992 Cal. Stat. 627.
368 See, eg., Sue Carlton, Tampa Man Acquitted of Stalking Chars, ST. PETERSBURG
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have been published, courts have examined similar language in
other contexts. Therefore, when examining the separate compo-
nents of the statutes below, we will address some due process
concerns.
1. Definitions in the Statutes
(a) Stalking.-In California, a person must either follow an-
other person and make a credible threat, or harass another per-
son and make a credible threat, to be guilty of stalking.'
Roughly half of the states with anti-stalking statutes require one of
these combinations,7" while the other half either do not men-
tion a credible threat; 7 ' allow a threat to suffice as a third alter-
TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1993, at 3B (had defendant been convicted of stalking, public defender
would have argued that Florida's anti-stalking law is unconstitutional because it is vague
and does not adequately define the elements of the crime). At common law, the void-
for-vagueness doctrine was the practice of courts to refuse to enforce legislation that was
"too uncertain." LAFAVE & ScOTt, supra note 227, § 2.3, at 90.
369 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9; see also 1993 N.M. Laws 86, § 3(A); 1993 Tex. Gen.
Laws 10.
370 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90(a) (Supp. 1992) (threat may be either expressed or im-
plied)', 1993 Ark. Acts 388(1)(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111(4)(a)(I)-(II) (West
Supp. 1993); 1992 West Legis. Serv. 408 (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 708.11(1)(a));
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (uses "transmits to another
a threat"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.140 (Baldwin 1992) (threat may be either explicit
or implicit); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(A) (West 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, §
43(a) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1993) (threat is not required to be "credible"); 1992 Neb. Laws
1098 § 4 (amending NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-101, 42-903, 42-924 (1988)); 1993 N.M. Laws
86 (this statute uses the term "credible threat," but not as a separate act than either
following or "harasses," but instead as a descriptive term, characterizing the following or
harassment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173(A) (West Supp. 1993); RI. GEN. LAWS §
11-59-2 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(B) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-19A-1 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a) (Supp.
1992); 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 10 (amending TEx. PENAL CODE § 42.07) (the threat can be
"either words or acts); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(2) (Supp. 1992); 1992 Wis. Laws
194 (to be codified at WIS. STAT. § 940.32(2)).
371 1992 Conn. Acts 92-237(2)(a) (Reg. Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5(1)
(Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(a) (Supp. 1993); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298 (to be
codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 95 (a)) (requires following and harassment, but not a
credible threat); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.13-.14, 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-277.3(a) (Supp. 1992) (requires following or being in the presence of another
person without legal purpose, but not credible threat); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2903.211 (Anderson 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (Michie Supp. 1992) (does not
speak of following, harassing, or threatening, but merely "engages in. conduct"); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1) (West Supp. 1993) (requires following in all instances,




native to following or harassing;s 2 or include a threat as a grad-
ing feature.
3 73
In order to meet overbreadth concerns, states exclude certain
activities from their definition of stalking: "lawful business activi-
ty,"374 picketing or demonstrations, 75 engaging in a private de-
tective business,376 activities of a law enforcement officer in the
performance of his duties,' 77 "constitutionally protected" activi-
ties,s' s or activities with a "legitimate purpose..3 79 Other states
employ a presumption that certain activities are not stalking. Dela-
ware establishes a presumption that labor picketing is not stalk-
ing.' Still others permit a person charged with stalking to raise
legitimacy as an affirmatiVe defense." Washington permits an
accused to raise a legitimacy defense if he or she is "a licensed
private detective acting within the capacity of his or her
license."38
2
A "legitimate purpose" exclusion of some type is necessary to
prevent anti-stalking laws from being overbroad, yet legitimate pur-
pose clauses beg the question as to what is legitimate activity. If a
group, such as Operation Rescue, for example, decides to put up
several "Wanted" posters with the face of a doctor who performs
abortions,' is this a legitimate activity or is it stalking? Also,
who decides the legitimacy of the activity? Has the state legislature
372 DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 11, § 1312A(a) (Supp. 1992) (credible threat must be made
repeatedly); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(1) (Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a(1)
(1992) (does not mention harasses, but "lies in wait").
373 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(3) (Supp. 1993) (a credible threat makes stalking a
felony offense); 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261 (to be codified at MIcH. CoMp. LAws §
750.411i(2)(c)) (a course of conduct which includes a threat against a member of the
victim's family will result in a charge of aggravated stalking).
374 See, eg., TENN. CODE ANN. §,39-17-315(c).
375 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3(c) & -7.4(c) (anti-stalking law
does not apply to picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and does
arise out of a bona fide labor dispute); 1993 N.M. 86, § 4(A) (picketing and public
demonstrations "otherwise lawful or that arise out of a bona fide labor dispute").
.376 Se, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(f).
377 See, eg., 1993 N.M. Laws 86, § 4(B).
378 Sm, e.g., RI. GEN. AWS § 11-59-1(b); 1993 N.D. Laws 120.
379 See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9; 1992 La. Acts 80, § 40.2(e)(1); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-107(4); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106-
5(1) (a) (i).
380 Delaware provides a rebuttable presumption that labor picketers are engaging in a
lawful activity and not stalking activity. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(c).
381 1993 Ark'Acts 388, § l(d)' (available for law enforcement officers, attorneys, pro-
cess servers, and others).
382 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(3); see also 1993 Ala. Acts 388, § 2(c).
383 See supm note 42.
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already decided that it is criminal or is the legislature waiting for
the courts to decide? Accordingly, challenges to legitimate purpose
clauses may be expected in the future.
(b) Repeatedly FoUows.--In 1984, though most states
criminalized some form of harassment (predominantly telephonic),
only five included "following" in their list of proscribed con-
duct.' 4 In contrast, thirty-one of the thirty-six anti-stalking stat-
utes list "repeated following" or "repeatedly follows" as a necessary
or possible component of stalking behavior.' Even in the hand-
ful of states that do not explicitly list "repeatedly follows" as a
component of stalking behavior, following would probably satisfy
their general standard of prohibited conduct' s Wisconsin is the
only state which defines "follow" in its anti-stalking statute. 3 7 By
lessening the amount of physical contact required between the
victim and the stalker, this provision provides the victim with
needed protection.'
(c) Harass.-Most anti-stalking statutes utilize the term "ha-
rasses" or "harassment" to cover actions, other than "following,"
that people find to be threatening. Harassment statutes typically
outlaw threats made over the telephone 9 and by other means
of communication, or they outlaw certain forms of physical con-
tact.' g When used in the context of anti-stalking statutes, the
384 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2909 to -2910 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (1978);
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 525.070-.080; N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.25, .30, .31 (McKinney 1980 &
Supp. 1983-84); 18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. §2709 (Purdon 1983). For a condensed compila-
tion of state statutes criminalizing harassment, see Robinson, supra note 310, at 535.44.
385 Georgia's anti-stalking law only requires that a person "follows," not repeatedy fol-
lows. 1993 Ga. Laws 560.
386 1993 Ark Acts 388 (repeated following would probably satisfy the Act's definition
of 'course of conduct," as set out in section 3 of the Act); HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-
1106.5(1) (uses "pursues" instead of follows); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.130 (repeated
following would probably satisfy the section's definition of "course of conduct"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211(A)-(C)(1) (repeated following would probably satisfy the
section's "pattern of conduct" definition); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (following would
probably satisfy section's requirement that stalker "engages in conduct with the intent to
cause emotional distress to another person").
387 "Follow" means to walk or proceed after a person for no legitimate purpose. 1991
Wis. Laws 739. This definition is different than a lay person's. See, eg., THE RANDOM
HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 512 (1982) ("to go or come after; move behind in the same
direction").
388 See Rosalind Resnick, Calfomnia Takes Lead; States Enact 'Stalking' Laws, NAT'L I-j.,
May 11, 1992, at 3.
389 Supra note 337.
390 Supra note 334.
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words "harass" or "harassment" often mean something very dif-
ferent. California defines harassment as "a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously
alarms, annoys, harasses, or terrorizes the person, and which serves
no legitimate purpose." 9 This use of the term "course of con-
duct" broadens the scope of "harasses" to include behaviors that
would not be outside the scope of a typical harassment statute.3 92
(d) Course of Conduct.-A dominant characteristic of anti-stalk-
ing laws is their requirement that the stalker's threatening behav-
ior occur more than once. Also, the subsequent acts need not be the
same as the original. Most statutes utilize the term "course of con-
duct" to inject the notion of repeated actions into the "harasses"
definition. California defines "course of conduct" as "a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, how-
ever short, evidencing a continuity of l'urpose."393 Most of the
other statutes utilize the language "series of acts," but some are
more specific and list the actual number of required actionsY-'
Some statutes also omit the phrase "however short" when describ-
ing the period of time over which the acts must occur to consti-
tute a "course of conduct,"95 while some give a more definite
time frame.'
391 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e).
392 &e, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-I-8 (Supp. 1992):
(a) Harassment.-(i) A person commits the crime of harassment if, with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another person, he:
a. Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to phys-
ical contact; or
b. Directs abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture towards
another person.
Id.
393 CAL. PENAL CODE § 649.9(e); 1993 N.D. Laws 120 ("'Course of conduct'" means a
pattern of conduct consisting of two or more acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.");
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.211(C) (1) (defining pattern of conduct).
394 See, eg., 1993 Ala. Acts 388 ("two or more acts separated by at least thirty-six
hours'); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,.para. 5/12-7.3(a) ("does any one or more of the follow-
ing acts on at least 2 separate occasions"); 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261 ("two or more sepa-
rate noncontinuous acts").
395 1992 Ala. Acts 675; R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-59-1.
396 Arkansas' statute states: "Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed
of two (2) or more acts separated by at least thirty-six (36) hours but occurring -within
one year." 1993 Ark. Acts 388.
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(e) Harm to the Victim.-In addition to defining what a
"course of conduct" is, stalking statutes mandate the effect the
"course of conduct" must have on the victim in order to constitute
stalking. Several states97 mimic the California statute that re-
quires the course of conduct "be such as would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must cause
actual emotional distress."'9s Michigan's statute, for example,
does not specifically require substantial emotional distress, but only
the existence of actual "emotional distress."'~ Though other stat-
utes require that the stalker's conduct be such as "would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress," they do
not explicitly require actual distress.' Hawaii and Utah, howev-
er, do not include any language regarding emotional distress in
their statutes."
(/) Credible Threat.-An idle threat will not satisfy the Califor-
nia definition of a "credible threat."0 2 The threatener must pos-
sess the apparent ability to carry out the threat, and the threat
must cause reasonable fear in the person threatened. The majority
of statutes that contain the "credible threat" language include the
"apparent ability" requirement, but some statutes omit the ability
requirement. 403
California deems a threat to be "credible" if it causes a per-
son to fear for the safety of herself or her family.' This proviso
is not the norm. Most anti-stalking statutes do not allow threats
pertaining to family members to satisfy the criteria for a credible
397 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6.93(c); DEL CODE ANN. tiL 11, § 1312A(b)(1); 1992 Kan.
Sess. Laws 298; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(E)(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(4);
1992 Neb. Laws 1098, § 1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173(E)(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
59-1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 163-1070(A)(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315((a)(3); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1)(b); 1992 Wis. Laws 194; Act. of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92
(Wyoming).
398 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e).
399 Senate Bill 719, 86th Legis (Act 261, Michigan Public Acts of 1992) ("emotional
distress" means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily
require, medical or other professional treatment or counseling).
400 IDAHO CODE §18-7905(d)(1); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43(d); 1992 NJ. Sess.
Law Serv. 265 (West); 1993 N.M. Laws 86; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76.5-106.5((I)(a)(ii).
401 HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5; UTAH CODE ANN § 76-5-106.5.
402 Arkansas substitutes "terroristic threatening" for credible threat. 1993 Ark. Acts
388.
403 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111(4)(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(c); 1992
Mich. Pub. Acts 261; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5((1)(b).
404 CAL PENAL CODE § 649.9(f); see also 1993 Ark. Act 388, § (1)(a)-(2)(a).
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threat. 5 On the other hand, Michigan broadens the scope of a
credible threat to include a threat that would cause an individual
to reasonably fear for the safety of another individual. . Hawaii
and Utah go even further, including a threat of "damage to the
property of the other peison or another" as sufficient grounds for
a stalking charge.
407
2. Constitutionality of the "Course of Conduct" Requirement
The scope of "course of conduct" is qualified in many stat-
utes. Most statutes say that the course of conduct must "serve no
legitimate purpose' in order to qualify as stalking behavior.
The California statute provides that, "Constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of 'course of conduct.'"
This phraseology occurs in sixteen other statutes. 
4 W
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the
question of whether the term "course of conduct" is unconstitu-
405 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111(4)(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(b)(3);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(c); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7 .3(a) (only requires
a threat); IOWA CODE § 708.11(b)(1); K. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.140 (2) ("explicit or
implicit threat"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(E)(3); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(5);
1992 Neb. Laws 1098, § 3; 1992 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 265; 1993 New Mexico 86; R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-59-1(c); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(3); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-
6; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(2) (only includes "threatens"); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-106.5(1)(b); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a(1) (threat must be directed at an individual with
whom the threatener had formerly co-habitated or had sexual relations).
406 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261.
407 Note that in Hawaii, harassment by stalking is only a petty misdemeanor, punish-
able ,by up to 30 days in jail. This might explain the inclusion of property. HAW. REV.
STAT. § 711-1106.5(2). In Utah, however, stalking is a class B misdemeanor which allows
for up to six months in jail. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(3).
408 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6.92(c); 1993 Ark. Acts 388, § 3(a)); CAL. PENAL CODE §
646.9(e); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(b)(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 7 84.048(1)(a); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5(1)(a); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905()(d)(1); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.103(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(E)(1); 1992 Mich. Pub.
Acts 261; Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(4); 1992 Neb. Laws 1098, § 1; 1992 N.J. Sess. Law
Serv. 265, § 1; 1993 N.M. Laws 86, § 2(A)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27 7 .3(a); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1173(E)(1); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-59-1(a); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1070(A)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-19A-4; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(l)(B);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5()(a)(i); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(1) ("without
lawful authority"); 1992 Wis. Laws 194.
409 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-92(c); 1993 Ark. Acts 388, § 3; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1312A(b)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(b); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(1)(d)(2); 1992
Kan. Sess. Laws 298; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §508.130(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:40.2(E)(2); 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261; Mss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(4); 1992 Neb. Laws
1098, § 1(2)); 1992 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 265, § 1(a)(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1173(E)(2); RI. GEN. LAws § 11-59-1(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 163-1070(A)(2); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws ANN. § 22-19A-5.
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tionally vague.410  In Robinson v. Township of Waterford," the
Sixth Circuit rejected the appellant's contention that a township's
harassment ordinance was void because its definition of harass-
ment included: "Engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly
commits acts that alarm or seriously annoy another person, and
which acts or conduct serve no legitimate purpose."4 12 The court
noted that the statute lacked a contextual or specific conduct re-
quirement that could lessen its vagueness and that the use of the
words "alarms" and "annoys" did not help clarify the statute.4
13
The court upheld the statute, however, because it required that
the person act with the specific intent to annoy others.414
In explaining its decision, the Robinson court referred to
Kramer v. Price,415 a 1983 Fifth Circuit decision that held compa-
rable "course of conduct" language in a Texas harassment statute
void-for-vagueness, despite the statute's specific intent require-
ment.416 In explaining its rationale for disregarding the Fifth
Circuit's opinion, the Sixth Circuit noted that Kramer was a 2-1 de-
cision, with a strong dissent from Judge Rubin; 17 that it was "the
410 The void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses two concerns regarding statutes: whether
the law gives adequate notice of its content, and whether the law sufficiently outlines the
power of the police to enforce the law. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON-
STITTrrIONAL LAw § 16.9, at 950 (4th ed. 1991). If a law is deficient in either of these ar-
eas, the courts will not enforce it because to do so would amount to a denial of due
process. See generally, LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 223, § 11, at 83-85. But cf. Note, The
Void.For-Vagueness Doctine in The Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 81 (1960). One
commentator argues that the court really uses the doctrine as "a practical instrument
mediating between, on the one hand, all of the organs of the public coercion of a state,
and on the other, the institution of federal protection of the individual's private interest."
Id. Another commentator has referred to the void-for-vagueness doctrine as an "avoidance
tool," whereby the Supreme Court can avoid ruling on the substantive issue of the case.
ALExANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANaEROus BRANCH-THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
PoLTIcs 158-59 (1962).
411 883 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1989) (reported at 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12347).
412 Waterford Township Ordinance No. 87, § 5.3 (cited in Robinson, 1989 U.S. App.
LEXIS at *5).
413 Id. at *10.
414 Id. at *13. "[W]e agree, that the ordinance is saved from a vagueness challenge
because of the specific intent requirement. The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized
that a scienter requirement may save a statute that might otherwise be unconstitutionally
vague." Id. (citation omitted).
415 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983).
416 Id at 178. The Fifth Circuit wrote, "Specifying an intent element does not save §
42.07 from vagueness because the conduct which must be motivated by intent, as well as
the standard by which that conduct is to be assessed, remain vague." Id.
417 In his dissent, Judge Rubin first argued that the use of the word "annoys" was
not unconstitutionally vague because it was used in a limited way. "[T]he statute limits
unlawful conduct to what not only 'may' but is also intended to annoy or uttered heed-
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only case striking down a disorderly conduct statute despite a clear
intent requirement;" and finally, that although the Fifth Circuit
had upheld the lower' court's dismissal of the action, it did so
"without approving or adopting its rationale."418
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning and holding, that a
specific intent requirement may save an otherwise vague statute,
suggests that "course of conduct" language will withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny because most anti-stalking statutes require the
stalker to possess "the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another
person" or some equivalent language.419 The split between the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits, however, may eventually prompt the Su-
preme Court to grant certiorari in an appropriate case.
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has offered definitions
of the word "pattern" (as in "pattern of conduct"), a concept
similar to course of conduct, and lower courts hold it constitution-
al.420
less of its capacity to annoy a particular person." Id. at 180. Rubin then addressed the
specific intent issue:
The possibility of irbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is minimal because the
statute requires that the state prove not only that the recipient was annoyed or
alarmed but also that the communicatbr intentionally or recklessly caused that
perturbation. The focus of the statute on two identifiable parties, and the re-
quirement that the accused's conduct be tailored to evoke a response in the vic-
tim or be reckless in its disregard of that impact removes the indefiniteness that
was fatal to the ordinance in Coates.
Id.
418 Robinson, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS at *13.
419 Delaware's anti-stalking law requires that the stalker have the intent to place that
person in reasonable fear of death or serious physical injury. DEL. CODE ANN. §
1312A(a).
420 In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (Scalia,
concurring), the Supreme Court re-examined RICO's "pattern" requirement in light of
the "relationship plus continuity" test it had formulated in Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479 (1985). After &dima, the "continuity plus relationship" test "promptly pro-
duced the widest and most persistent Circuit split on an issue of federal law in recent
memory." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251. For a discussion of the lower courts' approach to
the pattern requirement prior to HJ. Inc., see Kim C. Murphy, Note, Reconsideration of
Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L REV. 83 (1986).
In presenting its rationale for the relationship plus continuity test, the Court exam-
ined the legislative history of the RICO statute and the normal usage of the word "pat-
tern." The Court found:
In normal usage the word 'pattern' here would be taken to require more than
just a multiplicity of racketeering predicates. A 'pattern' is an 'arrangement or
order of things or activity' and the mere fact that there are a number of predi-
cates is no guarantee that they fall into any arrangement or order.
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3. Grading of Offenses
(a)' Stalking in Violation of Court Orders or Domestic Violence
Laws.-A handful of states require that a court order exist, and be
violated, before a person can be charged with stalking. 2 1 Most
states consider a court order a grading element of the crime and
not a necessary element. In California, a person is guilty of either
a misdemeanor or a felony if found guilty of stalking while a court
order is in effect that prohibits that person from engaging in
stalking-like conduct.4 22 Most anti-stalking statutes have heavier
penalties for stalkers that violate court orders than for those
H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238-39 (citations omitted). Though the Court stated that the rela-
tionship plus continuity test "cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that it will al-
ways be apparent whether in a particular case a 'pattern of racketeering activity exists,'"
it was able to delineate the separate components. Id. at 240-41, 243.The Court found that
the relationship factor was clearly set out in the RICO statute, but that "'continuity' is
both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated
conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future, with a threat of
repetition." Id. at 241. In an effort to explain the continuity requirement, the Court
noted several different scenarios which either would or would not satisfy the RICO pat-
tern requirement. Id.
This discussion is relevant to the anti-stalking statutes' definition of "course of con-
duct" because those definitions explicitly speak of a "continuity of purpose." Though
Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion found that the Court "had done little more than
repromulgate those hints as to what RICO means," the circuit courts reject challengers
who argue that the "relationship plus continuity" test is unconstitutionally vague. For a
discussion of RICO cases claiming that the H.J. Ina pattern test is vague, see Joseph E.
Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy-Is This The End of Rico?"-Jstice Scalia Invites Con-
stitutional Void-For-Vagueness Challenge to Rico "Pattern," 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106, 1133-
36 (1990). Therefore, a definition that did not set out a definite number of events as
requisite for a "course of conduct" should be constitutional. See United States v. Dischner,
974 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1992) (post-H.J. Inc circuit court cases upholding constitu-
tionality of RICO collected).
421 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 1312A(d); 1992 Neb. Laws § 1098 § 2.
422 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(b) reads:
Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary restraining
order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the behavior
described in subdivision (a) against the same party, is punishable by imprison-
ment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or for both that fine and imprisonment, or
by imprisonment in the state prison.
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stalkers who do not,' but Hawaii, Kansas, and Utah do not ad-
dress this scenario in their statutes.
4
(b) Subsequent Violations.-Subsequent stalking violations by
the original stalker against the original victim, that occur within a
certain period, often seven years, will usually result in a heavier
penalty for the stalker. 42 Some statutes mandate a shorter time
423 AL4. CODE §§ 13A-6-91 (aggravated stalking, a class B felony); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-9-111(5)(b) (sentences for violating the court order and the stalking law run
consecutively, not concurrently); 1992 Conn. Acts 92-237, § 1(a) (stalking in the first
degree, a class D felony, carrying a one-five year sentence); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1312A(d) (imprisonment of not less than six months and fined not more than $1000);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(4) (aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punish-
able by up to five years imprisonment); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12 -7.4(a)(3)-(b)
(violation is aggravated stalking, a class 3 felony); IOWA CODE § 708.11(c) (seriousmis-
demeanor); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298 (violation of temporary restraining order or an
injunction is a class A misdemeanor); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.140(1) (b)-(2) (violation
of judicial order is a Class D felony); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(C) (stalker impris-
oned not less than thirty days and up to one year and fined up to $5000, or both);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43(b) (violation of court order shall be punished by impris-
onment up to one year and not more than five years); 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261 (aggra-
vated stalking if person, having actual notice of restraining order, violates the order, or
the stalker's conduct violates various court orders); MiSs. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(2) (viola-
tion of temporary restraining order or injunction increases possible time of imprisonment
to one year); 1992 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 265, § 1 (crime in the third degree); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-277.3(b) (imprisonment of up to two years, fine up to $2,000, or both); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.214(B) (violation of an "anti-stalking" protection order will be a
misdemeanor of the first degree if the stalker had previously been found guilty of, or
pled guilty to, a violation of the anti-stalking statute; if person not previously guilty of
stalking, then violation of protective order is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173(3) (felony punishable by imprisonment of up to five
years, by a fine up to $2500, or both); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-59-3 (felony punishable by
imprisonment for up two years, by a fine up to $6000, or both); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1070(C) (increases possible jail time to two years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(b)(3)
(class E felony if person "stalks" after having been enjoined by an order, diversion, or
probation agreement from doing so); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(B) (cla.s 1 misdemean-
or if stalker violates a protective order or injunction prohibiting family abuse, or an or-
der prohibiting contact between stalker and victim); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.46.110(5) (class C felony); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a(b) (still a misdemeanor, but possi-
ble penalties increase); 1992 Wis. Laws 194 (class E felony if violation occurs when there
is an order or injunction that limits the stalker's contact with the victim); Act of Feb. 25,
1993, ch. 92 (Wyoming) (felony stalking punishable by imprisonment of not more than
ten years).
424 DEL CODE ANN. § 18-9-111; IDAHO CODE § 18-7905; 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5.
425 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(c); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(e); IDAHO CODE §
18-7905(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(D); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(3); 1992 Neb.
Laws 1098, § 3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(D); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19A-3;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(2); 1992 Wis. Laws 194.
1993]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
period,426 some a longer time; 7 while others do not expressly
mention a time limit.428
4. Provision for Mental Evalutation and Treatment
Three states allow courts to order evalutation or some type of
treatment for stalkers. Ohio's anti-stalking law contains the most
extensive and detailed provisions for mental evaluation.42 First,
the court must consider the mental health of the arrestee in de-
ciding whether to grant bail.4-" If the offender is charged with
breaking an anti-stalking protection order, and if the defendant
caused harm to the victim or the victim's property or if the victim
believed that the defendant was going to do such harm,431 the
court may order a defendant to undergo a mental examination.
Even if the defendant if released on bail, the court can still order
an evalution. The statute also requires an examination by a quali-
fied examiner and specifies reporting requirements.
Some states permit courts to order convicted stalkers to un-
dergo counseling. Hawaii's anti-stalking law enables courts to order
a convicted stalker to undergo counseling.1 2 California requires
mandatory counseling upon probation and Michigan gives the
court discretion to order counseling upon probation.4 3 In Illi-
426 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 408 (six years); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.140(3) (five
years); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-277.3(b) (five years); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(C) (five
years); Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (Wyoming).
427 OKIA STAT. ANN.,tit. 21, § 1173(B)(3)-(D) (10 years).
428 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3(b) ("A second or subsequent conviction
for stalking is a Class 3 felony."); 1992 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 209 ("a person who commits
a second or subsequent offense of stalking which involves an act of violence or a credi-
ble threat of violence against the same victim is guilty of a crime of the third degree");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110(5) (a) (person will be guilty of a class C felony when
that person is guilty of stalking and has "previously been convicted in this state or any
other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9AA46.060, of the same victim
or members of the victim's family or household or any person specifically named in a
no-contact order or no-harassment order").
429 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.215.
430 Id § 29.03.212(A)(2).
431 Id. §2903.213.
432 HAW. STAT. ANN. § 711-1106.5(3) ("[a] person convicted under this section may
be required to undergo a counseling program as ordered by the court").
433 CAL. PENAL CODE §646.9(h) ("[i]f probation is granted, or the execution or im-
position of a sentence is suspended . . . it shall be 'a condition of probation, that the
person participate in counseling"); 1992 Mich. Pub. Act. 216 ("If a term of probation is
ordered, the court may ... order the defendant to ... be evaluated to determine the
need for psychiatric, psychological, or social counseling, and if determined appropriate by




nois, court-ordered mental health treatment is available, but only
for stalkers who are sentenced to prison (not just fined), and only
as a condition of parole or mandatory supervised release.' The
power to order evaluation and other kinds of recommended treat-
ment may be implied by these provisions. If not, these and other
states need the power to order psychological or psychiatric evalua-
tion of persons charged (if the circumstances warrant) as well as
evaluation of those convicted of stalking. Evaluation of a person
charged with stalking would give the court a better basis for decid-
ing whether or not the person should be released on ball pending
trial. Post-conviction, the mental health evaluation provides guide-
lines for treatment, including, but not limited to, psychological
counseling.
Most state statutes do not include provisions for evaluation
and treatment, whether pre- or post- conviction. State legislators
should consider providing for evaluation and treatment at various
stages of the criminal justice process, both for the protection of
the victim and to improve the possibility of compliance.
5. Other Significant Differences Between the Statutes
In addition to the slight variations on the California statute
discussed above, several states have particular sections that set
them apart, both procedurally and substantively, from the general
field.
(a) PmceduraL-Notice of release or escape provisions are
probably a welcome addition, from the victim's point of view, to
statutes which do not already have them. Texas and Washington
require that the state authorities contact the stalking victim upon
the stalker's release or escape from prison.43 5 Further, Texas
does not permit stalkers to be furloughed. Wyoming's statute has
another type of victim protection provision, an "Emergency Assis-
tance" provision. Wyoming authorizes police to give assistance to
alleged stalking victims (i.e., before the alleged stalker has been
434 1992 111. Legis. Serv. 871 (to be codified at'ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para 1003-14-5
(Smith Hurd)).
435 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 10 (the victim of the stalking offense and the local police
must be alerted thirty days before the stalker's release, or immediately, upon the stalker's
escape from prison); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.9A.155 & 9A.46.060 (department of
corrections must send a written notice of the stalker's release, community placement, pa-
role, furlough, work release placement, or escape, to the victim, at least ten days before
the release).
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arrested or charged). Police can advise victims of criminal pro-
ceedings available, preserve evidence, and give any protection
necessary to the victim."'
To encourage victims to bring tort suits against stalkers, Wyo-
ming and Washington give the victim the right to recover attorney
fees and costs when bringing a civil action. Some statutes permit a
stalking victim to seek exemplary damages as well.43 7 The stalk-
ing victim may institute a civil suit whether or not the stalker has
been charged or convicted under the applicable anti-stalking
statute.4 8
(b) Substantive.-A few notable substantive differences be-
tween the statutes includes the following: Connecticut's anti-stalk-
ing statute stipulates that the stalking of a person under sixteen
elevates second degree stalking to first degree stalking. 43 9 West
Virginia's original anti-stalking law only criminalized stalking behav-
ior by one person against "any person with whom that person
formerly engaged in a sexual or intimate relationship,"' but the
legislature amended this statute so that it now resembles the ma-
jority of anti-stalking laws. Texas' statute requires that the victim
report the stalker's previous conduct to a law enforcement agency
before a stalking charge may be filed."l Florida allows the police
to arrest a stalking suspect without a warrant.442
States attempt to protect victims from stalkers after the
stalker's arrest and before the trial date through various means.
Iowa's statute presumes an ineligibility for bail," while Illiniois'
anti-stalking law allows a denial of bail if the defendant "poses a
real and present threat to the physical safety of the alleged victim,
436 Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (Wyoming).
437 See, e.g., 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 262; Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (Wyoming).
438 Sew, eg., 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 262; Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 92 (Wyoming).
439 See, eg., 1992 Conn. Acts 92-237(1)(b); see also 1993 S.D. S.B. 291, § 6. The South
Dakota statute specifically lists the repeated following or harassing of a child twelve years
old and younger as stalking, but the penalty is the same as that for repeatedly following
or harassing "another person." I&
440 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a(a).
441 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 10.
442 FL.A. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(5). "Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a
warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions
of this section." Id.
443 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 408 (court will presume defendant ineligible for ball if
charged with a third stalking violation; if defendant charged with first or second stalking
violation, court will consider the likelihood that defendant will re-establish contact with
the victim, when determining bail).
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and denial of release . . . is necessary to prevent fulfillment of the
threat upon which the charge is based." 4 Arkansas' statute man-
dates that the judicial officer "shall" enter a protective order upon
the pre-trial release of the stalker." 5 Texas' anti-stalking law does
not provide protective orders, but allows the magistrate, court, And
parole board to set conditions on the stalker's release on bond,
probation, or parole."6
These provisions reflect the legislation's growing awareness of
the dangers of stalking. Though stalking behavior is not a recent
development, it has taken legislators time to realize that existing
laws do not adequately address the problem. Before 1990, the
police and the courts had to treat stalking behavior piecemeal,
combatting it with established crimes such as menacing or
terroristic threatening. This haphazard approach meant that many
victims were left without recourse because their situations did not
fit into the guidelines of the penal codes.
To provide more protection, the new anti-stalking laws widen
the scope of the criminal law to prohibit behavior which has previ-
ously gone unregulated, such as following. All anti-stalking statutes
recognize that stalking behavior deserves treatment as an entity
separate from other penal sanctions and some go even further,
addressing the particular needs of both stalkers, for medical help,
and victims, for continuing protection.
V. CONCLUSION
Since California passed the first anti-stalking statute in 1990,
thirty-five states have adopted similar measures and the remaining
states have anti-stalking bills pending. The core feature of these-
laws is that they make it either a misdemeanor or a felony, de-
pending on the circumstances, for an individual to engage in a
"course of conduct constituting a credible, threat." This sets stalk-
ing laws apart from other laws, such as harassment, terroristic
threatening, loitering, and criminal attempt laws.44 These laws,
444 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/110-6.3(a).
445 1993 Ark. Acts 2, § 1(b).
446 As a condition of release on bond, grant of probation, or parole, the stalker may.
be required not to: "(a) communicate directly or indirectly with the victim; or (b) go to
the residence, place of employment, or business of the victim or to or near a school,
day-care facility, or similar facility where a dependent child of the victim is in atten-
dance." 1993 Texas Gen. Laws 10, §§ 2, 3, 5.
447 See supm Part IVA.
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the only available means for imposing criminal sanctions on peo-
ple engaging in stalking behavior before anti-stalking laws, were
not designed to control stalking as a criminal phenomenon, but
only individual stalking behaviors. The hodge-podge effect of this
historical development perhaps prevented legislators from seeing
stalking as a whole. By concentrating on the differences among
harassing behaviors, legislators failed to recognize the commonality
between the behaviors and the greater harm caused by the entire
"course of conduct."
Objections to anti-stalking laws range from concerns about
whether this behavior warrants criminal sanction at all, to ques-
tions about their constitutionality. The anecdotal and psychological
evidence strongly rebuts the proposition that stalking is not serious
enough to be a crime. The fact that stalking is so disruptive to its
victims and that it has long term emotional and occupational
effects also substantiates this point. As for constitutional concerns,
courts have upheld "course of conduct" and similar language, like
"pattern of conduct," in other criminal statutes. Also, having a
sufficiently specific intent requirement may save these statutes
from constitutional infirmity. As anti-stalking laws continue to
proliferate and are implemented, the current split between the
Fifth and the Sixth Circuits on the question of the constitutional-
ity of "course of conduct" language may mean that the Supreme
Court will address the issue in the next few years.
Though a very hopeful development towards protecting stalk-
ing victims, most anti-stalking laws have one major shortcom-
ing-they do not adequately recognize that many stalkers, perhaps
most, are emotionally disturbed or mentally ill. The proper penal
goal of anti-stalking laws, therefore, should be incapacitation of
the stalker. Deterrence is not an appropriate goal because stalkers,
especially emotionally disturbed or mentally ill stalkers, will not
cease their harmful behavior because of criminal penalties. The
anecdotal and limited statistical evidence available shows that per-
sons intent on stalking will break protection orders, and other
laws, to contact their victim. Protection of the victim will be best
served by basing sentencing provisions on the primary goal of
incapacitation. From the victim's point of view, only so long as the
stalker is incarcerated, will the victim feel safe and able to live a
normal life. A possible alternative to incarceration might be twen-
ty-four hour electronic monitoring.
No state includes all of the provisions necessary to compre-
hensively address stalking behaviors and their effects. We have
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highlighted below those provisions that, in their present form, may
be inadequate, unconstitutional, or otherwise overlooked by state
legislatures.
Intent.-In the Sixth Circuit, a specific intent requirement is
necessary to compensate for what the Court believes to be the
vagueness inherent in "course of conduct" language. This require-
ment may mean that anti-stalking statutes will not reach people
who, because they are delusional or otherwise, are not capable of
forming the intent. The delusional offender may be acting out of
"love" for the victim, or out of a belief that she is, or is meant to
be, bonded to the victim. Even language, as in the Ohio statute,
like ."knowingly cause another to believe" may not reach the delu-
sional offender. At the very least, anti-stalking statutes should avoid
traditional mens rea terms such as "wilful" and "malicious." These
terms do not have much content and "intent to" language is less
vague.
Course of Conduct.-At first glance, it seems anti-stalking laws
do not necessarily need to specify acts in an illegal "course of con-
duct" so long as the offender engaged in the course of conduct
with the requisite intent. Most often, anti-stalking laws proscribe
repeated following. Georgia also proscribes surveillance activities
and "contacts" with the victim. A danger in enumeration is that
one can never enumerate all the behaviors that could constitute a
threatening course of conduct.448 State legislatures need not enu-
merate proscribed behaviors, leaving it to the courts to give con-
tent to the term "course of conduct" on a case by case basis.
Courts have done this with the "substantial step" language of the
Model Penal Code. While "following" certainly can be included in
a course of conduct, it is not clear why state legislators felt it
necessary to enumerate this behavior and not others.
The number of stalking incidents required for a course of
conduct in most states is two or three. Courts have held that two
or three incidents can be a pattern or series. Two or three inci-
dents helps law enforcement officers see that the relationship
between the acts, what the acts have in common, is a criminal
enterprise. The more acts one commits related to the criminal
enterprise, the easier it is for law enforcement officials to see what
the enterprise is. Thus, two or three activities seem sufficient to
448 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.070 commentary ("course of conduct is a catch-all
provision . . . included because it is impossible to list all the specific types of prohibited
conduct.").
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establish the core of the crime of stalking-fear generated by re-
peated behaviors that establish a credible threat.
Credible Threat.--One difficulty with many anti-stalking stat-
utes is that they require the stalker issue an explicit threat against
the life of the victim or to cause great bodily injury to the victim.
This requirement narrows the scope of anti-stalking laws and is
inconsistent with human experience and judicial judgment that a
threat can be implied or inherent in a course of conduct. Anti-
stalking laws should, therefore, be modified to allow the stalker's
conduct alone to suffice as a "credible threat."
Mental evaluation and treatment.-The limited number of
states which currently provide for or mandate mental evaluation
and treatment of the accused stalker illustrates an inadequate
understanding of the complex, predisposing factors that may lead
an individual to stalk. It is in the best interests of the state to
mandate a comprehensive evaluation of a stalking defendant. Ide-
ally, this evaluation should include both a medical and a psychiat-
ric or psychological evaluation. A medical evaluation could alert,
the court to underlying medical problems that increase the
stalker's risk of violent behavior. In addition, a psychiatric or psy-
chological evaluation could test the defendant for organic brain
damage, delusional disorders, and personality disturbances that
influence the stalker's behavior-and importantly, the stalker's in-
tent. Based on these evaluations, the court could determine the
best course of pretrial action, and if warranted, appropriate sen-
tencing. If the state fails to adequately assess the mental and emo-
tional status of the stalker, it may jeopardize the right of the stalk-
er to fair sentencing and appropriate treatment and the need of
the victim for safety and privacy. In addition, because stalking
victims often exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder or
other emotional disturbances, they may need counseling or other
supportive services after the stalker is incapacitated. State victim
assistance programs should expand their scope to include stalking-
victims.
Other Provisions.-Given the harm caused by stalking behav-
ior, anti-stalking laws should include provisions that enable them
to more comprehensively deal with stalking behavior. Future laws
should cover threats made against family members. While family
members would be protected by the anti-stalking laws in their own
right, the primary victim should also be able to seek protection
through an anti-stalking protective order.
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In addition to providing some relief to the stalking victim by
incarcerating the stalker, anti-stalking laws should include provi-
sions that are "victim-friendly." Presently, only a few states have
such provisions. Wyoming's emergency assistance provision, Texas'
victim notice provision, and Ohio's anti-stalking protection order
are examples. These provisions would provide more actual protec-
tion and peace of mind for the victim and therefore should be
included in future anti-stalking laws. States could also bolster the
deterrence potential of anti-stalking laws by including attorney fees
and exemplary damages provisions to encourage victims to bring
tort suits against their stalkers.
Anti-stalking laws recognize that harassing acts against individ-
uals are more than simply imprudent, they are criminal. The task
now, is to take one further step-having recognized the crime,
legislators must provide greater protection for the victims.
The common law expands with reason, living and grow-
ing in response to the needs of the community and the





449 Henderson v. Henderson, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106, 111 (1957).
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